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INTRODUCTION
NIETZSCHE AND THE MASKS OF INTERPRETATION
Of all the metaphors deployed by Nietzsche in his texts, perhaps none is as fitting
to his own project as that of the ‘mask.’ In the Third Essay of On the Genealogy of
Morals, Nietzsche presents a theory that in order to survive as a type, philosophers have
found it necessary to adopt the garb of a priest or sage and represent the ideals of those
types to the masses.1 This echoes his statement from Beyond Good and Evil, where he
states, “Every profound spirit needs a mask: what’s more, a mask is constantly growing
around every profound spirit….”2 In the act of representing a priest or a sage to the
general public, the philosopher often comes to mistake himself as a priestly type and take
seriously the mask of the ascetic that he is representing. Nietzsche’s argument is aimed
at deciphering how philosophers have become moralizers and apologists for concepts and
moral ideals that they themselves did not create. An immediate interpretation of
Nietzsche’s text here would suggest that the philosopher adopts this mask to serve his
own ends – ends which are, in actuality different than the priest’s or the sage’s.
Therefore, it would seem that the philosopher must discard this mask if he is to be a true
philosopher and avoid the pitfalls associated with the ascetic priest, the sage, and
1

Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce
Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), Third Essay,
Section 10.
2

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, eds. Rolf-Peter
Horstmann and Judith Norman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Section 40.

1

2
those types’ denials of life. However, one aspect of the appropriateness of the metaphor
of the ‘mask’ lies in the manner in which the interpretation that it seems to suggest
immediately is itself a mask for a deeper criticism that is being made in the text. The
route out of asceticism is not the “resolute” adoption of a truthful “philosophical”
existence in the face of this priestly interpretation of life. Instead, Nietzsche writes that
the ascetic priest is the “classical representative of seriousness” who forces life to turn its
powers against itself in search of a transcendent meaning with which it can justify its
existence:
[The ascetic priest] juxtaposes [life] (along with what pertains to it: “nature,”
“world,” the whole sphere of becoming and transitoriness) with a quite different
mode of existence which it opposes and excludes, unless it turn against itself,
deny itself: in that case, the case of the ascetic life, life counts as a bridge to that
other mode of existence.3
Thus, our initial interpretation of the relationship between the philosopher, the priest, and
the metaphor of the mask must be supplemented with the caveat that the philosopher
cannot avoid becoming a priest simply by removing the mask that he has adopted out of
its necessity for survival. In taking seriously the ends of the philosopher as being true to
himself, his nature, or his ideals, the philosopher interprets himself into becoming a
priest; the mask, in being discarded, paradoxically becomes the philosopher’s ideal. This
ideal that the philosopher now represents and takes seriously is freed to assume a position
of judgment over life in the hands of the philosopher-priest, a situation which Nietzsche
repeatedly warns his readers against. In this way, the “mask” is also an inappropriate
metaphor for Nietzsche’s task because it shows that a traditional understanding of the

3

Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay, Section 11 (emphasis in original).

3
way in which the meaning of Nietzsche’s text is revealed is not as simple as the
deciphering or unmasking of a single metaphor. Nietzsche’s metaphor of the mask must
be considered twice, both in what it suggests about philosophers being masked and in the
impossibility of their moving past being masked.
This “masking” and “unmasking” can also serve as a metaphor for the central
concern of Nietzsche’s philosophical project. For Nietzsche, the relationship between
what we have traditionally taken to be true and good and the methods by which these
concepts have been justified has become problematic. Nietzsche argues that
philosophers, when constructing their concepts, have not been attentive to their own
masks; that is to say, following the preface of Genealogy of Morals, that “we are
unknown to ourselves.”4 The effect that this has on the possibility of determinate
philosophical knowledge is profound as far as Nietzsche is concerned and with good
reason. With Descartes’s radical questioning of the objective nature of philosophical
knowledge, the guarantee of the univocity of meaningful statements about the world has
been located in the philosophical subject’s immediate reflective transparency to itself.
Nietzsche, in doubting this transparent immediacy of the subject to itself opens a doubt
into the possibility of knowledge that Descartes did not reckon with sufficiently: the
doubt that the meaning of our own ideas is stable within the subjective consciousness
itself. In some early unpublished writings, Descartes remarks: “Actors, taught not to let
any embarrassment show on their faces, put on a mask. I will do the same. So far, I have
been a spectator in this theatre which is the world, but I am now about to mount the stage,

4

Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Preface, Section 1.
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and I come forward masked.” Descartes, seeing the world as a theatre, conceives
momentarily of himself as being like an actor who voluntarily masks himself in order to
appear unembarrassedly. But, it seems, this mask does not stay on Descartes for long; or,
if it does, another mask becomes far more important: “The sciences are at present
masked, but if the masks were taken off, they would be revealed in all their beauty. If we
could see how the sciences are linked together, we would find them no harder to retain in
our minds than the series of numbers.”6 This second invocation of the mask does not
concern itself with the masking of the subject but of the possibility of unmasking nature
so that the sciences may reveal their beauty. The necessity of this task in Descartes’s
writings precludes any meaningful kind of mask on the side of the subject because it
demands the objective truth that the mask hides. If consciousness is masked in
Nietzsche’s sense and, therefore, not self-transparent, then the possibility of a stable
meaning can be doubted as well. Nietzsche accepts that if the subject is masked, then the
meanings of that subject are also masked. Paul Ricoeur observes that, in this way,
“Nietzsche says nothing other than simply I doubt better than Descartes.”7 Nietzsche
uses this insight, however, in such as way that enables a general critique of meaning
beyond simply the criticism of consciousness. Nietzsche introduces the concern that the
apparent meanings that concepts seem to bear may only be masks for some different
meaning. For his philosophy, once the illusion of the subjective grounding of a univocal
5

Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol I., trans. John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2.
6

7

Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol I., 3.

Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992),
15 (emphasis in original).
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meaning is shown through consciousness’ failure to ground itself in immediate
reflection, any concept or meaning may be treated as a possible mask for some alternate
function or end that the concept may serve:
There are still harmless self-observers who believe in the existence of “immediate
certainties,” such as “I think,” or the “I will” that was Schopenhauer’s
superstition: just as if knowledge had been given an object here to seize, stark
naked, as a “thing-in-itself,” and no falsification took place from either the side of
the subject or the side of the object.8
Therefore, the key to understanding a concept lies in a reflective interpretation of it
because concepts can only appear and be understood through a process of mediation.
Every attempt to decipher a concept’s meaning must be accompanied by an act of
interpretation that endeavors, through some kind of interpretive framework, to make clear
the obstacles and conflicts that delay the understanding of that meaning. Because
meaning is no longer thought of as immediately given, Nietzsche argues that the process
of deciphering a meaning must be accompanied by an act of interpretation. This
necessitates the approaches to knowledge that Nietzsche names “perspectivism,” and,
later in his career, “genealogy.”
From Nietzsche’s earliest philosophical writings in Birth of Tragedy, it is clear
that Nietzsche conceives of philosophy, in its production of both metaphysical and moral
concepts and ideals, as engaged in acts of interpretation with life as its object.
Nietzsche’s thinking of interpretation, of “genealogy,” grows from the soil of this
investigation into Greek tragedy and the conditions for its appearance and disappearance.
However, from this “extremely strange beginning,” Nietzsche develops a general

8

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 16.
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9

methodology with which to critique and reinterpret concepts. The methodology that
Nietzsche adopts takes, generally, a perspective on concepts that runs counter to the ways
in which these concepts have traditionally been understood. His genealogical method
utilizes two sorts of suspicion toward concepts. The first is exemplified in the very act of
questioning the immediacy or transparency of meaning of any given concept. Nietzsche
will treat the meaning of a concept or practice as an interpreted meaning, which is,
therefore, always complex and always produced from an act of interpretation. This first
suspicion – the suspicion of the possibility of any immediate meaning – makes
Nietzsche’s second sense of suspicion possible. If meaning is produced or the result of a
synthesizing activity then, as Nietzsche will argue, it is possible that any given meaning
is an illusion fostered by forces of interpretation that seek to hide their motives. Thus
genealogy is a double suspicion of the everyday meaning of concepts – at once treating
them as masks for underlying forces and treating those forces as active agents in the
dissembling of their interests.
In this work, I intend to answer two interrelated questions that Nietzsche’s
method of genealogy indirectly raises with regard to itself. As Nietzsche’s philosophy is
interpretive at every step, it no surprise that it would raise problems as to how that
interpretation itself is to be understood reflexively. First, how are we to understand the
project of genealogy as an interpretive gesture? And, secondly, under what authority is
Nietzsche entitled to the interpretations and evaluations that he wields as unremitting

9

Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How to Become What you Are in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight
of the Idols and Other Writings, eds. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), “Why I write such good books, The Birth of Tragedy, Section 2.”
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criticisms of traditional philosophical and moral concepts? This question is raised
concerning the grounding of Nietzsche’s genealogy. Although it has been argued that
Nietzsche, ultimately, has faith in a purified or “naturalized” ideal of truth10 – presumably
beyond the reach of a radical reinterpretation of it – I will argue that it is best to
understand Nietzsche’s genealogy as a hermeneutic philosophical project. As my
vocabulary has already indicated, in doing this I am following the path partly laid down
by Paul Ricoeur in Freud and Philosophy and in his essays collected in The Conflict of
Interpretations. Ricoeur is the clearest proponent of the position that Nietzsche’s
philosophy is a reflexive philosophy engaged in a hermeneutics of meaning. 11 By
“reflexive,” Ricoeur means that Nietzsche’s work can be placed in a philosophical
tradition within which consciousness is investigated in an effort to clarify its contents to
itself. Although Nietzsche appears in this way as the most skeptical of this line of
thinking, this manner of situating Nietzsche’s project enables a productive comparative
study of Nietzsche’s work with those thinkers that remain attached to many of the
concepts that Nietzsche criticizes.
Most notable for this project and for most of Ricoeur’s works as well is the
phenomenological school inaugurated by Husserl’s works. Ricoeur interprets
phenomenology as a reflexive philosophy precisely where it attempts to determine or
10

I will treat these non-hermeneutic readings of Nietzsche’s texts in Chapter Three and attempt to
demonstrate that Nietzsche’s critique of “truth” is not designed to set up a better version of “truth” but to
open the possibility of interpretation.
11

Michel Foucault explores Nietzsche’s genealogy in-depth as well but rarely makes explicit the
connection between genealogy and hermeneutics, although it seems clear that he often had that in mind.
See here Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” in Gayle L Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift, eds.,
Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy (Albany NY: State University of New
York Press, 1990), 59-68.
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constitute objective meaning through the interrogation of subjective consciousness.
Through the practice of phenomenology, Ricoeur becomes concerned that
phenomenological reflection is unable to ground itself in a self-transparent consciousness
and that that subjective consciousness cannot simply be posited but must be constructed.
This is the shared concern between Ricoeur and Nietzsche – that consciousness does not
appear clearly to itself and may be actively or passively obfuscating its origins. It is the
very project of reflection that calls for hermeneutics, in Ricoeur’s estimation, as the
constitution of consciousness does not appear all at once and must, therefore, be
interpreted from its many varied appearances. If the task of determining objective
meaning is to be accomplished, then, for Ricoeur, this can only occur if the
phenomenological method is “grafted” to a hermeneutics.12 Interpretation becomes an
integral moment of the constitution of meaningfulness because it supplies the possibility
of the grounding of objective meaning for the Ricoeurian phenomenology.
Ricoeur’s deployment of hermeneutics must traverse between two poles of
certainty without ever settling on one or the other until the work of interpretation is
completed. The reason for this bivalent approach lies in the problem Ricoeur has in mind
to solve. The “poles” of interpretation that Ricoeur sees as essential to hermeneutics
constitute the archaeological origin of meaning and the teleological destination of
meaning. Each pole is necessary for the project of determining the full meaning of
human consciousness but is not itself sufficient because an over reliance on either pole
can create the illusion of a fully determinate meaning before interpretation has run its
12

Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde, (Evanston IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1974), 6.
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course. Although Ricoeur’s project assumes a hope for full mediation between
competing interpretations, he takes great care to avoid the premature closure of
interpretation into an encyclopedic moment.
The archaeological pole of interpretation, which has already been mentioned as
the element of the hermeneutics of suspicion, is concerned with uncovering the hidden
origins of meaning and of the constitution of human consciousness. Ricoeur’s model for
this hermeneutic pole is Freud’s development of psychoanalysis, although both Nietzsche
and Marx occasionally take prominent places in the analysis as well: “All three rise
before [the contemporary philosopher] as protagonists of suspicion who rip away masks
and pose the novel problem of the lie of consciousness and consciousness as a lie.”13
Ricoeur argues that the hermeneutics of suspicion is a systematic interrogation of the
forces and desires that construct and are also hidden by everyday meaning. In this way,
Ricoeur enables the comparison between Nietzsche’s genealogical method and a
phenomenological hermeneutics. In terms of the moment of suspicion, both Nietzsche
and Freud assert, against the immediate certainty of the Cartesian subject, “that ‘think’ is
the condition and ‘I’ is conditioned, in which case ‘I’ would be a synthesis that only gets
produced through thought itself.”14 For the hermeneutics of suspicion, Ricoeur asserts
that a theory of meaning and interpretation is advanced but that it takes the form of an
“anti-phenomenology” where consciousness is reduced to the unconscious forces that are

13

Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 99.

14

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 54.

10
synthesized in its production.

15

This anti-phenomenological thrust of Nietzsche’s and

Freud’s theories has kept them at a distance from the hermeneutic mainstream, but I will
follow Ricoeur in arguing for the placement of Nietzsche’s genealogy among the other
general hermeneutic theories and methods. Ricoeur, however, argues that for any
hermeneutics to reach a concrete or determinate meaning, archaeology alone is
insufficient. For a concrete meaning to emerge in any situation, Ricoeur holds that a
complementary teleological model needs to be present as the appropriation of meaning.
For the work of interpretation, Ricoeur holds that the object that he names the “symbol”
will call for both suspicion and the progressive recovery of meaning. Although Freud
and Nietzsche are hermeneutic thinkers, Ricoeur will charge that they do not treat
symbols as cites of both critique and appropriation but see them only as “idols” that must
be destroyed. 16 At this point we reach perhaps the most common problem in the
interpretation of Nietzsche’s texts and project. Ricoeur has recast this problem according
to his phenomenological hermeneutic vocabulary, but the problem remains as one of
appropriation.
To return to the initial Nietzschean metaphor, we can rephrase this difficulty in
interpretation as the problem of the ‘mask.’ Nietzsche provides his readers with multiple
tools for identifying, critiquing, and destroying the masked assumptions of metaphysics
and morality. However, what possibilities for meaning are left in the wake of this critical

15

Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, CN:
Yale University Press, 1970), 117, 118.
16

Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 529.

11
genealogy?

17

Is there some positive end that a reader of Nietzsche’s works can point

at once the archaeological project has run its course? Ricoeur denies that an
appropriative end can exist alongside Nietzsche’s radical attempts to de-mystify the
meanings of morality and metaphysics. The charge is that Nietzsche remains mired in
resentment and accusation and cannot raise his philosophy to the level of affirmation.
The discipline of philosophy at this point would consist solely of the perpetual
challenging of the interpretations offered for any meaning that is tied to an event; and
philosophy would never be capable of prospectively granting any new or legitimate
meaning to any phenomenon. The task for this present work is to dispute this
interpretation of Nietzsche’s project and identify how he is engaged in a hermeneutic
philosophy and how his texts conceive of the interpretive pole of appropriation.
In order to approach this end there are several prior, proximate concerns that must
be addressed in turn. The first is the necessity of attaching Nietzsche’s concerns of
interpretation to the phenomenological project. Ricoeur’s work will here be my guide, as
he identifies the necessity of the recourse to hermeneutics resulting from a gap in
phenomenology between the apodicticity of the phenomenological ego and the adequacy
of its content. When the phenomenological method moves to examine the constitution of
consciousness in its passivity, the project of interpretation becomes relevant, as
consciousness can only grasp its contents which are active. In order to understand its
17

Daniel Conway, in Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game, highlights many of the difficulties associated with
appropriating Nietzsche’s texts in political contexts, as well. Conway argues that Nietzsche is unaware of
the depths of his own decadence and that this necessitates a break with Nietzsche even when (and
especially when) one is trying to follow him. See Daniel Conway, Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), particularly chapters one and four. Although I am more
concerned here with Nietzsche’s conceptions of meaning, I will return to this when discussing the failure of
any subjective attempt at pure reflection.
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constitution, consciousness must reflect on the causes external to itself that have
caused it to become what it is. Thus, despite being anti-phenomenological in its
reduction of consciousness to its compositional forces, a method like Nietzsche’s
genealogy is a necessary part of any attempt to determine the meaning of the contents of
consciousness or of a philosophical anthropology. The second preliminary concern of the
current text again follows Ricoeur’s lead in articulating Nietzsche’s hermeneutic
methodology. By arguing that Nietzsche’s philosophy is a hermeneutics, I will make the
case that Nietzsche’s main concern is the building of a general theory of how meaning is
created. I will argue that genealogy is, therefore, less an epistemic doctrine or position
than a series of interpretations designed to uncover the processes through which
meanings are ascribed to events. This concern will be present both in the discussions of
Ricoeur’s depiction of hermeneutics as well as in the general reception and interpretation
offered to Nietzsche’s texts directly.
With these concerns addressed, I will turn to the primary goal of this work, which
is to elucidate the possible appropriative interpretive methods that Nietzsche’s
hermeneutic exegesis employs. Throughout his writings, Nietzsche is concerned with
criticizing the unjustified ends to which previous thinkers have employed concepts,
ethical rules, or history itself. I will examine this in chapters two and three. However,
the genealogical critique of these ends does not necessarily preclude the possibility of
appropriation through the practice of Nietzsche’s method. Nietzsche is a careful critic of
eschatology, the prospect and expectation of a final, static end; but the other sense of an
end, that of teleology, which is understood as a limited way is not necessarily foreign to

13
Nietzsche’s conception of interpretation. I will argue that Nietzsche employs a
teleological prospect in his hermeneutics while maintaining a general criticism of
“superfluous teleological principles.”18 Although he does not frequently utilize either
term, both the archaeological moment and the teleological moment figure into his method
of genealogy as a whole. We will look at Ricoeur’s descriptions of the routes of
suspicion in the texts of Freud and Nietzsche, and this will serve as a contrast to the
appropriative interpretive work that lies behind Nietzsche’s uses of the concepts of
“health,” “nobility,” and “strength.” Ultimately, I will attempt to account for this
appropriative and archaeological conception genealogy through a discussion of
Nietzsche’s moments of self-interpretation. The texts where Nietzsche is explicitly
concerned with interpreting both his past written works, as well as his life itself, are much
more fruitfully read with this full genealogical interpretive method in place. Nietzsche’s
self-interpretation, especially in Ecce Homo, clarifies both his critique of metaphysics
and morality as well as gestures toward the creation of meaning that takes its place as an
appropriative, prospective hermeneutics.
Finally, before turning to the investigation proper, I want to clarify and begin to
justify my choice of primary texts. In the case of Ricoeur’s works, I have focused on his
works where the conflict and starts of a collaboration between phenomenology are most
pronounced, namely Freud and Philosophy and his collection Conflict of Interpretations.
To trace his development of phenomenology, I will look at Fallible Man; but this is
primarily to see how the problem of the “symbol” arises out of phenomenology and to

18

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Section 13 (emphasis in original).

14
prepare the analyses of the hermeneutic works. Ricoeur’s later work is addressed only
obliquely as his interests spread into the philosophy of language, political philosophy,
and to some small degree, away from a phenomenological hermeneutics in the service of
a philosophical anthropology.
Regarding my selection of Nietzsche’s texts, I have attempted to be as narrow as
possible in scope in order to minimize several concerns which are commonplace in
Nietzsche studies. The first concern regards the use of material from Nietzsche’s
unpublished Nachlaß as well as the material collected and published as the volume The
Will to Power. The Colli and Montinari critical edition of Nietzsche’s texts firmly
establishes that Will to Power is not a work of Nietzsche’s in the traditional sense of
being planned, composed, arranged and edited by him and that Nietzsche himself had no
plan for such a work at the end of his life. However, there is still the issue of the
philosophical importance of the writings which Nietzsche left unprepared for publishing
and in his notebooks, especially considering the use that several of the most valuable and
influential studies of Nietzsche’s philosophy have made of it.19 Bernd Magnus has
notably divided Nietzsche scholarship into two groups that, while perhaps being
oversimplified, still serve as a rough approximation for the opinions on the legitimacy of
using the Nachlaß.20 Magnus divides the “lumpers” who use the unpublished writings
freely from the “splitters” who regard as appropriate only the use of those texts prepared

19

Of note here are works by Martin Heidegger, Pierre Klossowski, Gilles Deleuze, Alexander Nehamas,
and Richard Schacht.
20

See Bernd Magnus, “Nietzsche’s Philosophy in 1888: The Will to Power and the Übermensch,” in
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 1, January 1986, pp. 79-98.
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for publication by Nietzsche himself. Although I think the relationship of Nietzsche’s
published works to those of his notebooks is more complicated than this division allows,
for my work I have adopted the “splitter” methodology. I have done this for two reasons.
The primary reason is that in imputing a hermeneutic method to Nietzsche I am
undertaking a task more commonly associated with the “continental” interpreters of
Nietzsche’s works, who tend to be “lumpers.” To establish my claim as persuasively as
possible, I have chosen the more narrow of the textual fields and will use only the
published works. My other reason for adopting this method is so I can focus more
attention on a published work that has often languished for attention – Ecce Homo.
While the Will to Power has had as much, if not more, scholarly attention than Ecce
Homo, I hope to show in my final chapter and conclusion that Ecce Homo is a coherent
philosophical work worthy of attention. If my theory is sound, Ecce Homo can be seen as
the demonstration of the Nietzschean archaeology and teleology as it is practiced on
Nietzsche’s own life and texts. Ecce Homo thus gives us a philosophical anthropology of
the author Nietzsche as well as illustrates the critical and appropriative workings of the
genealogical method. In short, Nietzsche affirms himself as a product of this method in
Ecce Homo while still dealing with the masks created for an by himself.
The second concern with the selection of Nietzsche’s texts is the issue of
Nietzsche’s “periods.” It is a fairly standard procedure to divide Nietzsche’s work into
“early,” “middle” and “mature” periods; and I will not here challenge this division. 21 I
will restrict myself to the series of texts beginning with The Gay Science, which is a
21

See Maudmarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990), Chapter 4 for a detailed working out of these “periods.”
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marker between his middle and mature periods. Primarily, I will focus on those works
written after Thus Spoke Zarathustra, including Book Five of Gay Science, where
Nietzsche’s conceptions of strength, health, and interpretation take on the character that
they retain throughout the remainder of his published works. The exception to this focus
on the mature period will be a brief discussion of the Second Untimely Meditation. The
conception of the values of historical thinking displayed there are remarkably relevant to
the hermeneutic method that is to be gained from Nietzsche’s mature works.

CHAPTER ONE
RICOEUR’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF CONCRETE REFLECTION
Paul Ricoeur’s project of phenomenological hermeneutics arises as an attempt to
achieve a philosophical anthropology through an analysis of mediation in general. This
investigation of mediation becomes necessary when Ricoeur’s project of an eidetic
phenomenological description of human action and willing, announced in The Voluntary
and the Involuntary, reaches an impasse that traditional phenomenology cannot
surmount. This problem is the seeming inscrutability of human fault and the passions,
which do not easily lend themselves to a rational reconstruction and are only expressed in
figurative or indirect language, whereas for phenomenology, “a direct language was
thought to be available.”22 Because humans are subject to many passions that are not
rational, a systematic philosophy such as phenomenology is not well-suited to deal with
them because its insistence on rational reconstruction of objective meaning excludes
them from its inception. There is nothing essential to a phenomenon like fault or evil
because if a totalized concept could be created, that would show how it is necessary,
stripping fault or evil of its non-rational character. For this reason, other discourses that
strive to be purely rational will likely dismiss them as well: “Pure reflection makes no
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appeal to any myth or symbol.”

23

The essential forms of human willing can be spelled

out phenomenologically or, in general, philosophically; but this, for Ricoeur, will not
touch on the nature of how those forms interact with the concrete experience of fault in
human reality. Domenico Jervolino states that “a gap remained between the description
of the essences, in the phenomenological sense, and the concrete condition of
humankind.”24 To achieve a concrete reflection on human willing and also human being
in general, Ricoeur states an “empirics” of the will is necessary to complement an eidetic
description of its forms: “[T]he new description could be only an empirics of the will that
could proceed by means of a convergence of concrete representations; it could not
proceed by means of an eidetics, which is an essential description, because of the opaque
and absurd nature of fault.”25 This empirics will fill that gap, go beyond the eidetic
descriptions of phenomenology, and attempt to show how a feature of human being – in
this case fault – can arise, although there is nothing essential to it. However, Ricoeur
notes, these experiences of the play of the passions are not without their own discourse
and language. Myths and dreams attest for the particular sort of discourse that the
passions may have or narratives that they may create. Therefore, for a concrete empirics
of the will to be possible and for a philosophical anthropology to be completed, Ricoeur
must search for a way to unite these seemingly diverse forms of discourse through a
method of mediation. For this reason, hermeneutic reflection becomes necessary as a
23
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method of interpreting the meaningfulness of these separate narratives and appropriating
their content into a unified whole. Hermeneutics, for Ricoeur, will describe the concrete
ways that discourse gives insight into the being of the human being.
This chapter will detail how hermeneutics becomes necessary for Ricoeur’s
phenomenological research and will also trace the development of Ricoeur’s own
hermeneutics as a mediation between the methodological poles of “suspicion” and
“recovery.” Ricoeur will follow a phenomenological method, rejecting scientific
objectivity and other forms of reductionism, until that phenomenology appears as overly
idealistic in its theory of meaning. The plurivocity of meaning that the phenomenologist
encounters requires not just a change of approach towards meaningfulness but also a
reconception of the ideality that guaranteed meaningfulness – the subject. The
hermeneutic approach thus has as its goal a non-idealistic, concrete description of human
being through the unpacking of the plurivocity of human expressions.
For Ricoeur, the disparity of and conflict between various discourses concerning
the being of humanity are problematic in that all seem to suggest, because of their
multifarious descriptions of human existence when considered together, that a unified
account of what it is to be human is impossible. The explanations of the various sciences,
history, theology, and art all seem to indicate and reinforce their standings as discrete and
non-communicable fields of research. However, Ricoeur points out that for
contemporary philosophy “there is an area today where all philosophical investigations
cut across one another – the area of language.”26 These various explanations of human
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existence must be expressed in language; and, as such, this necessitates that they have a
stake in an explanation of language as a phenomenon that bears the meaning of their
findings. But, as of yet, this discourse over human existence has not brought these
disciplines closer together in understanding but has only reinforced their differences:
“The very progress of the aforementioned disparate disciplines has both revealed and
intensified the dismemberment of that discourse.”27 The act of putting forth reasons in
language means for Ricoeur that these discourses must enter into the mediation between
perspective and sense that Ricoeur speaks of in Fallible Man. Ricoeur’s concept of
language treats language less as a concept than as a “mediation; it is the medium, the
‘milieu’, in which the subject posits himself and the world shows itself.” 28 An analysis of
the sorts of mediation possible through language may aid in a potential showing of the
common root of all these discourses about humanity.
Ricoeur begins from the position that human consciousness does not and cannot
grasp all at once all of the perspectives that a phenomenon or object displays.
Phenomenologically speaking, human perception is open to the world but only through a
particular point of view. Each human consciousness, when confronted with a perception
that is in error or partial, can realize through reflection that it is “a finite center of
perspective.”29 But this point of view also will make claims as to the meaningfulness of
the whole through the subject’s use of language. Discourse about a phenomenon
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“transgresses” this finite perspective in order to express the totality of the object all at
once in meaningful signification. Our perspectives strive for totality through our
intended sense in discourse.30 Therefore, consciousness both perceives singular
perspectives of phenomena and mediates between them through the act of signifying
universally in language. “This transgression,” for Ricoeur, “is the intention to signify.” 31
Since all signification transgresses, Ricoeur will take this common feature of any
discourse as an opportunity to demonstrate the possibility of communication between
discourses. The method of Ricoeur’s philosophical project is always to oppose apparent
“dismemberment” or recourse to “eclecticism” with a philosophical hermeneutics that
seeks to mediate between the differences of each discourse through the discovery of a
transcendental logic that makes each discourse possible. 32 Ricoeur philosophically puts
no stock in the idea that these accounts of language are completely incommunicable to
one another; this would be “dismemberment.” He also will not be happy with recourse to
an “idle eclecticism” that would depict these discourses as aspects of a preconceived idea
of philosophical progress that ignores their concrete differences in both projects and
solutions. “Eclecticism,” he states, “proclaims that all great systems ultimately say the
same thing, at least if one knows how to distinguish the essential from the accessory.”33
The methods of both dismemberment and eclecticism commit the mistake of presuming
30
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to know precisely what is at stake before the phenomena and texts are studied. They take
their particular expressions to account for the totality of the field under discussion rather
than transgressions from a particular point of view. In this way, these methods can teach
and reveal nothing new, because they fail to acknowledge other valid points of view; nor
can they engage in a dialogue about their own possibility, because they appear to
themselves as necessary and not as merely possible. Instead, Ricoeur argues that
although totality cannot be abandoned as a regulative ideal, it cannot be gained all at once
via reduction. However, in spite of the discrete points of view that discourses operate
from, rational reconstruction must be possible, even if never attained, because it is the
“horizon” in which all philosophical efforts take place.34 It is the task of Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics to account more fully for the nature of this “horizon.”
Therefore, with these two sorts of reductionism put aside, the question of
grounding this revelation of the conflict of discourses about human being must be posed
philosophically as a hermeneutic question: How can a critique of the possibility of
conflict of accounts of the world be posed? An answer to this question will satisfy the
requirement for the possibility of communication between these various discourses about
human being. In both his hermeneutics and his phenomenology, Ricoeur seeks, through
an analysis of actions and expressions, the fundamental manner in which the being of
human being is embedded in the world and with others. This horizon of meaning is often
referred to by the term “belonging” by Ricoeur. Belonging is the originary affirmation of
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human willing and is “an immediate or unreflective relation.”

35

If these disparate

discourses can be shown to illuminate various regional aspects of that fundamental
belonging to the world, then a ground for communication between investigations can be
posited and described as they emerge from that belonging. While Ricoeur does not claim
to be the “Leibnizian” figure that could bring about the unification of all discourses, and
he may in fact think that no such figure could exist, he does seek to reconstruct the
differences between the conflicting viewpoints rationally and reconcile them. 36
Following the principles of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method,
Ricoeur cannot accept any “objectivism” that would ground discourse and
communication in the manner of the natural sciences, although this does not mean that
these accounts have nothing to contribute.37 The natural sciences constitute knowledge
on the basis of an individual’s understanding of an objective and measurable exterior
world. But Ricoeur states that Husserl’s phenomenology shows this subject/object
constitution of knowledge in science as possible only on the basis of a prior “horizon” or
“field of meanings anterior to objectivity for a knowing subject.”38 The arguments that
the sciences must provide to demonstrate their applicability to existence or a certain
problematic are possible only on the basis of some other intuition about the world, be it
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the truths of observation or of logic. All disciplines must have, for Ricoeur, a basis in the
“prephilosophical character” of existence – belonging – that provides the horizon within
which reflection can take place.39 However, it is Ricoeur’s wager that each disparate
discourse built on that horizon will reveal a different regional sense of that belonging as it
is expressed in their discourse.
Phenomenology’s sense of its own foundation is different than the grounding for
any other discipline – such as positivism, history, or anthropology – in that
phenomenology’s grounding claims a radical beginning “that cannot be framed in a
demonstrative argument.”40 The radical claim here is that a phenomenological method
must ground itself – be a Selbsts-Begründung – and, therefore, that its foundation must be
directly or immediately found in intuition rather than provided by a deductive argument.
In this, Husserl, and through him, Ricoeur, places himself in the one of the central
debates of Plato’s Theatetus concerning the rational ground of perception and
argumentation. Phenomenologically, recourse to the certainty of intuition must occur in
every attempt to ground any further science; so, these other sciences are, at the least,
epistemologically derivative in their nature by virtue of being posterior to the selfpositing of intuition: “[T]he truth of science is erected as a superstructure upon a first
foundation of presence and existence, that of the world lived through perceptually.” 41
Although Ricoeur, as we will see shortly, will come to doubt the absolute primacy of
39
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immediate intuition, he will not abandon Husserl’s critique of objectivist science or
naturalism in general. Rather, Ricoeur will question the direct access to intuition that
Husserl claims is possible and attempt to replace that technique with the longer path that
passes through an activity of mediation.
For Husserl’s phenomenology, this recourse to direct intuition is achieved through
the application of the “phenomenological epoche” which is utilized to neutralize all
mental acts that would posit “any judgment about spatiotemporal factual being.” 42 By
bracketing all questions of the reference of the contents of consciousness to “factual
being” or existence, the epoche opens up, for phenomenology, direct access to
consciousness and its intentional objects, the essences of which it is phenomenology’s
task to describe.43 These intentional objects are the objects considered only insofar as
consciousness is ‘consciousness-of’ them. If Ricoeur were to remain utterly faithful to
the Husserlian program, this would be the place where the investigation of language
would begin. Ricoeur would look at the specific essential “objectivality” of language as
it appears as given in consciousness.44 It would then be the task to understand our
perspective on it as it expresses a greater whole that we think as a totality. The epoche
would reveal the ideal sense of the thing intended by consciousness when it intends the
object – in this case, language. Thus we would come to understand the meaning of the
object intended in consciousness through a synthesis of the intended sense and the
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perspective. However, for Ricoeur, Husserl’s phenomenology remains too idealistic
because this field of eidetic meaning that is opened, revealed by the phenomenological
epoche, is grounded by the indubitability of the existence of consciousness. This
grounding of sense is accomplished through the phenomenological assumption of the
unity of the subject’s consciousness “by designating the subject as an intentional pole,
directed outward, and by giving, as the correlate of this subject, not a nature but a field of
meanings.”45 While the epoche reveals the significance of the meaning of being and
objects and not just the beings themselves (which have been bracketed), it achieves this
by relying on a theory of a unified consciousness and of the self-transparency of that
consciousness. Because Ricoeur is skeptical about the viability of this starting point of
self-consciousness, as are most phenomenologists that historically follow Heidegger’s
implicit criticisms of Husserl in Being and Time, he thinks Husserl’s theory an idealism
because the univocal sense of beings is regulated by an inscrutable entity which seems
achievable to Ricoeur only through interpretation and not eidetic description – the
transcendental consciousness – and because the objective senses of intention are achieved
prior to any experience.

I. Ricoeur’s Critique of the Cogito
Although not an explicitly hermeneutic text, Ricoeur’s phenomenological
descriptions in Fallible Man take into account many of his criticisms of the Husserlian
subject as well as set up many of the structures that his hermeneutics will later populate

45

Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretation, 8-9.

27
with content. Here, Ricoeur begins the empiric description of human fallibility as it
appears in acts of the will. The phenomenological explanation of human willing shows
humans to be fragile beings, that is, beings that belong in an intermediate role between
two opposed poles in human experience itself. These poles Ricoeur calls the “finite” and
the “infinite.”46 For example, in the realm of theoretical knowledge, we mediate between
a limited perspective in perception and total sense in language.47 However, we must be
careful to see these poles as constituting the lower and the upper extents of human being
and not as a mere spatial metaphor of humanity’s ontological locale: “Man is not
intermediate because he is between angel and animal; he is intermediate within himself,
within his selves. He is intermediate because he is a mixture, and a mixture because he
brings about mediations.”48 This statement, which Ricoeur will spend the entirety of the
book unpacking, holds that human being is not immediately transparent to itself. Due to
the mediating function of consciousness between immediate presence, which is always
perspectival, and the anticipated sense of the whole, which is shown in discourse,
consciousness cannot achieve direct intuition of itself is a meaningful way. Ricoeur
stands strongly against any reductionist account of human being, which must assume a
self-immediacy or transparency at some level with which to ground its theoretical
grasping of the totality of the issue. Husserl’s phenomenology still relies on this selfimmediacy. However, the concretely situated manner in which humanity exists precludes
46
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any immediate shift in perspective to an easily totalized viewpoint. For ethics, ontology,
and affectivity, it would be a mistake to attempt an anthropological explanation utilizing
only either the finite or infinite standpoint because either alone would miss different
concrete realities of existence. Instead, Ricoeur undertakes the arduous investigation of
the character of the mediation that humans are, saying of humanity: “His ontological
characteristic of being-intermediate consists precisely in that his act of existing is the
very act of bringing about mediations between all the modalities and all the levels of
reality within him and outside him.”49 The “disproportion” of human existence – of
being both “more than” and “less than” simultaneously – introduces a metaphoric
distance between our abilities to reflect and comprehend. 50 Direct philosophical grasp of
the entirety of human consciousness is deferred by the concept of consciousness as a
mediator, which makes a starting point like Husserl’s impossible. Thus there is no direct
access to the problem of a philosophical anthropology as a purely eidetic description
because human consciousness never appears as whole to itself.
This main concern with the impossibility of grasping the totality of consciousness
will also appear in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic texts. The “empirics of the will” will now be
“determined as a symbolism” which must be hermeneutic. 51 In these texts, however,
Ricoeur deploys two complementary lines of thought to reveal the idealism of Husserl’s
eidetic description of sense. While the univocity of sense is the primary target here,
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Ricoeur shows its impossibility by critiquing its correlate in the Husserlian system – the
intentional pole of subjective consciousness upon which the unity of sense reposes. The
first argumentative line is characterized by its place within what Ricoeur refers to as the
“reflective tradition” of philosophy and marks a continuation of arguments in Fallible
Man. The second marks the appearance of the “masters of suspicion.”52
Reflective philosophy is, in Ricoeur’s understanding of the school, a philosophy
that aims for self-understanding from the starting point of reflection on the self and its
understanding of the world and the relations of objects in that world. It is, or has been, a
philosophy of the subject; and its explicit historical trajectory runs roughly from
Descartes, through Kant and the German Idealists, to Husserl and egological
phenomenology. 53 It is also, as Ricoeur notes often, the tradition in which he himself was
trained.54 For philosophical systems of this sort, philosophical investigations proceed
from the immediate certainty of self-consciousness toward representations, appearances,
or meanings that are to be explained and understood. Thus, the subject is the selfgrounded foundation for knowledge of the meaningfulness of the external world. As an
example, Descartes’s attempt to ground scientific knowledge about the external world
proceeds from the absolute self-certainty of the concept of the cogito; or, the
52
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indubitability of the inner life of self-consciousness provides the method for the
grounding of the objectivity of scientific investigations into the behavior of material
substance. Similarly, for Husserl, the unity of the sense of objects after the
phenomenological reduction relies on the unity of the Husserlian ego, or the subjective
pole of intentionality. This Husserlian subject produces the univocity of the sense of
objects through the ideal sense that is either fulfilled or left empty through intentional
perception. The ego actively synthesizes, through an intention of some thing, an
“anticipated sense” with the expectation of fulfillment through the perceived object. 55
Intentional consciousness may be always of some thing, but it is the meaning of that
intended object to the ego that is important for Husserl’s project. As Ricoeur writes, “It
is this empire of sense, thus freed from any matter-of-fact question [after the epoche] that
constitutes the privileged field of phenomenological experience, the domain of intuition
par excellence.”56 Thus, Husserl’s too is a reflective philosophy that holds selfconsciousness to be an indubitable, immanent certainty that will provide a ground for all
questions of the constitution of the sense of objects that appear in intuition. Husserl’s
phenomenology holds that we can reflect on the contents of consciousness, after
implementing the epoche, to realize the meaning of those objects that appear in
consciousness. The fact of intentional consciousness sets forth ideals of sense-fulfillment
that perception can fill. We are able to fix these meanings even though “every
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apprehension of transcendence is open to doubt but… self-immanence is indubitable.”

57

The expressions and perceptions of objects are themselves grounded in meaningfulness
by the subject’s intentionality of the sense of the object, which can either be filled or
empty.
It is at this point, for Ricoeur, where reflective philosophy begins to outstrip its
ability to be also an egology – an immediate science of self-consciousness. The
discovery of intentionality, that consciousness is always consciousness-of something,
raises the problem that it is impossible to capture the subject alone; that is, consciousness
is never empty such that it can be known in a meaningful way. There is not a direct
intuition of the self as there is of the other objects in perception. As consciousness is
always consciousness-of, when it takes itself as its object, consciousness cannot in the
same movement capture its own encompassing of the contents of consciousness. The
very act of attempting to totalize consciousness through a reflexive phenomenology
reveals the impossibility of that act; there is always the aspect of reflection that is left
untotalized by direct consciousness. Because of intentionality, the phenomenological
epoche does not itself get us closer to the totality of truths about the subject’s
meaningfulness or adequately fulfill a philosophical anthropology. Instead, the self, or
self-consciousness as an intentional object, is certain as existing but never fully saturated
in terms of meaning because it can never come to full intentional presence. Therefore, if
the sense of intuitions in consciousness is guaranteed as univocal by consciousness’
active syntheses, these active syntheses appear as founded on something without full
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meaningful content of its own. In this context, an effort to understand any truths about
the subject pole itself will either be illusory, in attempting to describe something that
does not exist, or empty, as the self does not directly appear. Consciousness, we are lead
to see, cannot totalize itself and become knowable directly; it cannot immediately
account for itself because the only things given in it are the objects of its intentional
perception. Therefore Ricoeur is justified in concluding, “Although this certainty
[consciousness] is unquestionable as certainty, it can be doubted as truth.”58 The
phenomenological account of consciousness gives us apodicticity in the certainty of the
existence of consciousness, but consciousness’s concept of itself is never adequate to the
meaningful totality of that consciousness.
With this conclusion, Ricoeur moves the reflexive tradition away from one of its
idols – self-consciousness’s immediate transparency – by virtue of a tool discovered
within phenomenology. “The great discovery,” Ricoeur writes, “of phenomenology,
within the limits of the phenomenological reduction itself, remains intentionality, that is
to say, in its least technical sense, the priority of consciousness of something over selfconsciousness.”59 This entails that phenomenological egology need not accompany
phenomenological intentionality in philosophical reflection. Without this egology,
however, phenomenology can no longer assume the univocity of meaning, as its final
bulwark is removed; but it is now also free for a less illusory reflection about the meaning
of things and the self. Don Idhe rightly claims that, “Ricoeur’s claim… means that all
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intentions stop short of total fulfillment.”

60

The signifying intention never finds full

presence because the depth of the intention cannot be fully known through immediate
consciousness. Therefore, the intention always remains somewhat indeterminate. If
univocal, determinate meaning must be sought in full presence to consciousness, this is
always a task for reconstruction rather than a specifically given meaning because
consciousness is never identical to itself. In this form, intentionality, in the Husserlian
sense, remains central to Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics; but it is an
intentionality deployed from a position that is skeptical concerning questions of the
univocity of meaning. As is demonstrated in Fallible Man, Ricoeur’s phenomenological
hermeneutics will instead start from the objective pole to reveal the transcendental
structures that make that appearing or sense possible.
Whereas Ricoeur criticizes Husserl’s early phenomenology for its excessive
idealism of sense, Ricoeur does not abandon the structure of the synthesis of meaning
that Husserl had been developing since the Logical Investigations. Ricoeur notes that
Husserl develops a theory that ties intentionality to signification where the act of
signifying shows a movement from an empty sign in consciousness towards its
fulfillment in the perception of the object it signifies.61 As we have seen, Husserl’s
insistence on the immediacy of the ego forces this theory of signification towards
idealism, but to Ricoeur this problem of the fulfillment of sense shows the necessity of
interpretation to the constitution of the self. Because the signs in consciousness cannot
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be completely fulfilled because of the perspectival nature of perception, their unity must
be the product of a synthesis between the ideality of the sign and the various perceptions
of the presumed unified object. “Therefore,” writes Ricoeur, “what we call ‘intuition’ is
itself the result of ‘synthesis,’ of passive syntheses that already have their syntax, that are
articulated in a prereflective and prejudicative (or prepredicative) sense.” 62 Thus the
phenomenological problem becomes the unpacking of these syntheses that make intuition
itself possible; but Ricoeur must now accomplish this without the foundational subject to
which Husserl refers.
The other track taken against the self-immediacy of the meaningfulness of the
cogito is what Ricoeur broadly labels “the challenge of semiology.”63 Reflexive
philosophy, after its self-criticism, finds itself at the starting point of much of
“semiotics.” If phenomenology can be characterized as giving a semantic theory of how
signs are fulfilled by objects that they designate in intuition, the semiological standpoint
will argue that such fulfillment and immediacy of intuition as is required by
phenomenology cannot be found. Instead of being transparent, consciousness’s workings
are hidden from itself and can only be accessed as mediated through the expressions of
sign systems. Although structuralist linguistics plays a considerable role in this portion
of Ricoeur’s thought, here I will focus only on the role of psychoanalysis as a semiotic
theory in order to bring in gradually the importance of “suspicion” to Ricoeur’s
hermeneutic work.
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Freud’s account of psychoanalysis challenges the self-immediacy of the cogito of
the reflexive tradition but from a position outside that tradition. What is most important
at this point for Ricoeur’s reading of Freud is that Freud views consciousness as the
product of forces or effect of causes that are hidden from itself. Unlike the reflexive
tradition, for Freud consciousness is not the sole, primary location of interest. The fact of
consciousness is undisputed, but the question of “what consciousness is” is accounted for
by Freud in a distinct manner from its handling by Husserlian phenomenology. Ricoeur
argues that Freud shows the cogito to be “wounded” in that its existence is apodictic (just
as Descartes, Kant, and Husserl have shown) but that our idea of self-consciousness is
false and can never be adequate to itself. 64 Consciousness is not merely opaque but false
because it is generated on top of a wholly other unconscious that cannot be made
transparent.65 The Freudian topographic theory reduces what we refer to as
consciousness to a contested field fought over by three forces – the id, superego, and
Reality – of which the individual’s self-consciousness is largely unaware. This renders
“the question of consciousness… as obscure as the question of the unconscious.” 66 For
Freud, consciousness is not a static location but is merely part of the system of the
production of meaning and cannot be the supreme arbitrator that Husserl et al would have
it be, because consciousness is not master of itself. At the very least, the ego (or
consciousness) is used by the competing forces of id and superego to produce their
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desired perception of reality. The “wounded cogito” that Ricoeur sees in Freud’s work
can set itself up as the lone judge of experience, but it cannot itself decipher its own
conditions for being – the unconscious forces that give it efficacy – through naïve
reflection. This can only be determined through the interpretive process that takes place
in analysis concerning the patient’s expressions. Because of this, consciousness is a lie
insofar as it sees itself as the determining judge of the reality of what appears to it, when
in fact it is only the effect of the productive forces have already determined our
relationship to reality. As David Kaplan writes, Freud indirectly shows Husserl’s
egology to be founded on “the ‘transcendental illusion’ of a subject that ostensibly is
immediately transparent to itself.”67
The semiotics that Freud proposes acts as a reading of the signs of conscious
expression so that the unconscious workings of desire can be interpreted. If we want to
come to know the self, or consciousness, we must pass through the signs of the forces of
the unconscious that have dominated the ego and will continue to try and do so. The ego
is here reduced to the forces of desire that that produce it, in contrast to Husserl’s
reduction of experience to the unity of intuition in consciousness. 68 Thus, Freudian
semiology removes consciousness from the position of ground or self-ground and makes
it a field of signs (such as guilt or repetition) that derive their meaning from the processes
of desire that come from the unconscious. In this way, Freudian theory can be seen as an
“anti-phenomenology” because “psychoanalysis undoes the evidence of consciousness,”
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Knowledge of consciousness is, then, not a given to

found univocal meaning upon but is rather a task accomplished by a long interpretation,
and not merely self-interpretation, of its expressed signs.70
Together, these two critiques of the cogito that reveal it to be opaque and a
product of other forces rather than its own auto-affection lead Ricoeur to seek an alternate
method of articulating language and its plurivocity. Rather than look to the ego or selfconsciousness directly, Ricoeur will focus on its expressions in order to find a concrete
sense of self and the belonging from which it arises: “The beginning is not what one finds
first; the point of departure must be reached, it must be won.”71 This shift will lead us to
the founding of Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics and the need for a philosophy
of language.

II. The Ricoeurian Reduction
If Husserl’s account of the univocity of sense has failed to ground itself, this does
not entail Ricoeur’s abandonment of the insight of intentionality. Instead, since the
cogito is now seen as insufficiently unified to suit the task of guaranteeing univocity,
Ricoeur will turn and embrace that which Husserl attempted to exclude with his logic –
the plurivocity of sense. As Husserl himself, according to Ricoeur, seems to realize in
later works such as the Crisis of the European Sciences, “[i]t is in spite of itself that
69
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phenomenology discovers, in place of an idealist subject locked within a system of
meanings, a living being which from all time has, as the horizon of all its intentions, a
world, the world.”72 The active synthesis of sense that occurs in a signifying intention is
not made possible by an a priori univocal logical system - this would be the idealism of
which Ricoeur speaks - but by a lifeworld [Lebenswelt]. Consciousness appears as finite
in its possible determinations of sense because, in order to make determinations at all, it
must be bounded. The lifeworld is the pre-reflective, intersubjective world of relations of
belonging to sedimented meanings as well as future possibilities of meaningfulness that
consciousness finds itself in before it can begin reflection. 73 It is this lifeworld (or our
belonging to it) that is the condition for the possibility of phenomenological
meaningfulness, but this world is not immediately given as bearing just one sense. Or,
rather, it is always carrying too much sense in that its plurivocality always threatens to
undermine the grounds of science and objective knowledge for the consciousness that
attempts its determination.
Because of this excess of meaningfulness in the lifeworld, Ricoeur will hold that
Husserl’s version of the phenomenological epoche fails to reduce completely the being of
the world to the sense of the being of the world. 74 If eidetic description cannot account
for the whole of experience, then the constitution of sense must occur in interpretation,
which narrows the field of possible meanings from a horizon steeped in plurivocal
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expressions. With the guarantee of the ideal, whole cogito removed, we move from
eidetic description to hermeneutics, which discovers “a manner of existing which would
remain from start to finish a being-interpreted.”75 In place of Husserl’s idealistic epoche,
Ricoeur will offer an epoche of a different sort from which to begin a phenomenological
hermeneutics. Rather than a reduction to a subjective pole of intuition, Ricoeur will
argue for an epoche to expressions already in language. The radical self-grounding that
phenomenology seeks has discovered instead the lifeworld, which demonstrates that a
simple starting point for reflection is not possible. “Consequently,” for Ricoeur,
“philosophy has to proceed as a second-order elucidation of a nebula of meaning that at
first has a prephilosophical character.”76 Phenomenological analysis opens up the field of
the lifeworld and the manner in which understanding functions as mode of human being,
however there can only be access to this understanding through reflection that is a
reflection on language: “the point of departure [of ontological questioning must] be
taken on the same level on which understanding operates, that is, on the level of
language.”77 Again we see that language is the field upon which philosophical discourses
must prove themselves, but now Ricoeur has raised the stakes.
While an eidetic phenomenological investigation into language is proven to be
excessively idealistic, the broader picture produced has shown language to be
fundamental to the reflective understanding of the ontological constitution of the self in
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the lifeworld, a self that is always a being-interpreted. The beginning of a philosophical
investigation, here Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology, must start in the already
mediated realm of human expressions and traditions. Consequently, the question of
language has become tied not to its virtual logical structures but to its actual expressions
by human beings. Because the field of the meaning of human being cannot be
immediately reduced to a totalized realm of sense, Ricoeur thinks we instead must start
from within what comprehension we do have of the possible totality. And it is Ricoeur’s
wager that if we bracket the possible transcendent reference of expression to examine the
process of expression alone, we will be lead to a more complete knowledge of the manner
in which language is a mediation between human desires and social reality. We can no
longer hope to discover the concrete meaning of language and the root of communication
in consciousness alone. Ricoeur discovers a “gap” between our total comprehension of
the object and our pure reflection on it.78 Instead of referring to the supposedly pure
contents of consciousness, the Ricoeurian epoche advises us to seek understanding of the
consciousness of meaning in the “deciphering of its expressions.” 79
However, as we have seen, eidetic phenomenology cannot accomplish this as it
can only justify language as being bound by the meanings in consciousness. The
publicity of meaning, its pre-philosophical existence as the horizon of our experience,
requires that the meaningfulness of language not simply be bound by one consciousness.
Ricoeur is here proposing that the surplus of meaning in the lifeworld and in language is
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what provides the boundaries of consciousness and that language can only be studied as
an ontological mode of understanding in its fullness, not in its “subjective” or “objective”
structures alone. Ricoeur’s philosophy of reflection now insists we reflect on meaning to
understand consciousness – thereby inverting the reflexive tradition. He states: “Seeking
meaning no longer means spelling out the consciousness of meaning [as Descartes and
Husserl do] but, rather, deciphering its expressions.”80 This entails that meaningfulness’s
condition of being can no longer be sought internally to consciousness, for Ricoeur.
Meaning and sense are external and in the world and in our traditions before they are
appropriated to a singular consciousness. And as consciousness itself is intentional, we
can only understand it by understanding those signs produced by humans that bear an
external, expressed sense that are then intended by consciousness. We have moved from
understanding consciousness as the condition of possibility of the meaningfulness of
language to the fullness of language as being the condition of the possibility of
understanding self-consciousness itself.
In this way, Ricoeur’s phenomenology again reasserts the critical philosophy of
Kant. He will seek to articulate the structures of self-consciousness through a
transcendental deduction based on the “object” understood as the fullness of language.
Ricoeur states that this argument in the transcendental style is “a reflection that starts not
with myself but with the object before me, and from there traces back to its conditions of
possibility.”81 This transcendental investigation will not start with the immediate given

80

Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 149.

81

Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 5.

42
of consciousness or the sense of its noetic objects; instead it starts with the object of
expressed language and search for the conditions of its possibility as the modes of
understanding that exist in consciousness. The conditions of the varied expressions in
language will correspond to the synthesis constituted through intentional consciousness.
By starting with the fullness of language, Ricoeur will attempts to work backwards to the
synthesizing mediations effected by consciousness and, thereby, enable a description of
that mediating and mediated consciousness.
However, to this phenomenology of expression that Ricoeur is proposing, there
must also be a method. Even though a radical starting point cannot exist for philosophy,
Ricoeur will attempt to reach or demonstrate the core of human being as the object of his
method: “However, if philosophy is not a radical beginning with regard to its sources, it
may be one with regard to its method.”82 The method that Ricoeur will propose is a
“grafting” of a hermeneutics onto this phenomenology.83 A hermeneutics is necessary
because, with the rejection of the Husserlian model of meaning, the meaningfulness of
any phenomenon now exists as an external plurivocal field of meanings that must be
appropriated or intended to be understood. Gianni Vattimo’s statement about Gadamer’s
hermeneutics holds true here for Ricoeur’s as well: “[I]t becomes clear that every type of
knowledge and experience of the truth is in fact hermeneutical. However, this
universalization of the hermeneutic implies that all experience and all knowledge is to be
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Ricoeur follows classical hermeneutics here in holding that

this work of reducing the distance between the sense of a text, whatever that is taken to
be, and the reader is a work of interpretation. Any instance of life that can understand
itself can only accomplish this understanding through a process that passes through
expressive objectification to appropriation. By rejecting the self-immanence of
consciousness, Ricoeur has refocused interpretation on expressions, specifically
“expressions of life which have become fixed through writing.”85 Thus, if we are to
understand language and, through it, ourselves via a reflective philosophy, we must
undertake an interpretation of the plurivocal expressions of language and see what this
reveals of their unity and ground. To avoid any distorting reductionism, the sort that
Husserl and the other purely “logical” views of language provide, attention must be paid
to the “fullness, the diversity, and the irreducibility of the various uses of language.”86
The transcendental grounding must take the form of a hermeneutics. However, Ricoeur’s
method also contains the goal of seeking the common belonging that these various
expressive modes of language utilize and arise from. The task of his philosophical
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anthropology, despite the character of existence as being-interpreted, will be rational
reconstruction of the totality. 87
The commonality that Ricoeur finds lies in the possibility for expressions to have
more than one sense. Depending on how an expression is interpreted, it can bear more
than one meaning. Interpretation can only begin, in fact, where plurivocality has been
actualized: “To interpret is to understand a double meaning.” 88 Rather than immediately
undertaking a concrete hermeneutic reflection on these double meanings in language,
Ricoeur proposes a more indirect path. It may lead to a phenomenological hermeneutics,
but Ricoeur must begin with a critique of the hermeneutic method. This is what is most
distinctive about Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. If interpretation is to be an appropriation of a
double meaning, then it must also be possible for alternate interpretations of any given
expression to be articulated. To launch into hermeneutics (or phenomenology, for that
matter) without undertaking a critique of that particular hermeneutics’s ground of
interpretation opens the door, for Ricoeur, to a one-sided exegesis and illusion.
Therefore, with interpretation freed from univocity and interiority, Ricoeur must provide
a new foundation for hermeneutics and his phenomenology. In his earlier hermeneutic
works, this ground is the symbol. 89
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III. The Ricoeurian Symbol
The entryway to a philosophical anthropology for Ricoeur will always be
mediated by language. In his search for a coherent philosophy of language in which a
philosophical anthropology can be couched, Ricoeur discovers that psychologistic
theories of meaning are untenable and, with them, univocal theories of meaning. So the
turn to expressions and their plurivocality must be made, which has the effect of turning
all reflection into interpretations of expressions in language. Hermeneutic work, then,
becomes central to any philosophy insofar as philosophy attempts to decipher the
meaning of the expressions of consciousness; but here we are back to a seemingly diverse
field of possible interpretations as well as theories of interpretation. Importantly, Ricoeur
does not deny this range of interpretation of what he calls the “hermeneutic field” but
seeks to preserve it and understand its conditions for possibility. For these reasons,
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is not presented directly but is developed only after a functional
critique (in the Kantian sense) of hermeneutic possibility. Ricoeur’s own hermeneutics
will be a dialectic of concrete reflection on opposing hermeneutic methods; but first he
must account for their mutual possibilities. The opacity of self-consciousness when
posited as the site of the grounding of the unity of sense leads Ricoeur to focus instead on
the language in which intentional life is expressed. In order to complete or at least
critique the limits of a philosophical anthropology, Ricoeur holds that the mediating
function of language must be accounted for. This general theory of language that
Ricoeur proposes and attempts is needed to decipher the plurality of ways that humans
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express their interactions in the world and their self-reflection. There is no direct access
to the self; instead the self can only be known through its expressions, which exteriorize
consciousness and make it available as an object. These various types of expressions,
however, characterize existence in radically different ways. To account for this
plurivocality, Ricoeur wishes to reflect on the condition for the possibility of this conflict
of interpretation between fields of study. He finds, in his early work, that it is the symbol
that conditions the possibility of the actuality of polysemic language. Adopting a phrase
from Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, Ricoeur states “symbols give rise to
thought.”90
Ricoeur founds this hermeneutic method by making interpretation the correlate of
a concept he calls the “symbol,” which defines “symbolism and hermeneutics in terms of
each other.”91 The symbol is any object of any hermeneutic field that bears a double
meaning or has been interpreted in more than one way, which means that it can, from one
perspective, be misunderstood. Symbols account for the possibility of a conflict of
interpretations because they occur when “one meaning, not satisfied with designating
some one thing, designates another meaning only in and through the first
intentionality.”92 The symbol stands as a trace of the thought of those who have come
before, but, in appearing as symbolic, it has no one clear meaning but the possibility of
intending several different meanings. Symbols are the originary sites of double meaning
90
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that both appear before reflective thought can begin and also call upon philosophical
reflection in language. This distance from being univocal calls forth, for Ricoeur, the
task of thinking and interpreting what the symbol’s meaning and intentional fulfillment
could be. Although humans must first utter words or inscribe marks which are symbols,
those symbols have a depth that is not exhausted in just one intentional meaning – they
do not refer to only one possible noetic object. Instead, symbolic expressions denote not
only one intentionality but more meanings than can be appropriated by the interpreting
party simultaneously. Thus, while intentionality of meaning is the universal moment of
the mediation from a finite perspective, the intentionality of the symbol “is not universal
and necessary in a univocal sense.”93 The total fulfillment of the intentionality of a
symbol cannot occur because it always refers beyond itself. The depth of meaning in the
symbol, its intentional plurivocity, provides the possibility of hermeneutics by provoking
an attempt to grasp and account for the range of meanings contained within the symbol.
In this way, Ricoeur writes of the symbol as an “enigma” that is capable of fulfilling
several different sorts of intentionality without ever ceasing to leave room for further
interpretation and exegesis. 94 Any hermeneutics must deal with the excess of meaning
that a symbol has, because this excess is what makes hermeneutics possible. Exegesis
cannot begin without a misunderstanding or “enigma” that spurs it forward as well as
constituting its field. The symbol raises the possibility of interpretative work through its
complex intentional structure that keeps escaping all attempts to fix its meaning in its
93
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entirety. Lawlor writes, regarding this, “[b]y making contact with that which is totally
other, the symbol for Ricoeur is actually the transgression of human finitude; it is
completely unlike any mundane reality.”95 This transgression aims at a more immediate
connection with the field of belonging.
With this working concept of symbol, Ricoeur can bound its use – and therefore
define the boundaries of the hermeneutic field – to specific sorts of exegetical work. On
the one hand, there can be, as of yet, no general hermeneutics of totalized mediation.
Although all meaningful experience may be mediated for Ricoeur because of the nature
of intentionality, the complex intentional structure of the symbol does not allow a total
rational reduction or explication. As Ricoeur wants to meditate on the fullness of
language, he will hold that part of the excess of meaning of language is not immediately
recovered in consciousness. Only the immediate self-clarity of consciousness (or an
equivalent idealism) could provide the unification necessary for a general theory of
hermeneutics that accounts for the multiplicity of apparent meaning as a univocal totality.
Without this unified subject, which is given, as we have seen, only as a task, a general
mediation is not possible. Instead, we must approach a general hermeneutics through the
specific regions opened by particular interpretations of symbols. In other words, all
hermeneutic approaches are regional, construct their own hermeneutic fields, and are
based in their own historical moments.
In this way, Ricoeur argues against a “too broad” sort of hermeneutics that
immediately bypasses all regional techniques or methods and moves to establish a
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general mediation or primordial understanding too quickly. This may be seen in
Ricoeur’s criticisms of Cassirer. Cassirer’s project, as it is understood by Ricoeur, is to
establish symbolic mediation as the root of all expressions. 96 The “symbolic” is here
named as “the common denominator of all the ways of objectivizing, of giving meaning
to reality.”97 This definition is too broad for Ricoeur’s liking because it tends toward the
elimination of the distinction between univocal and plurivocal expressions. Cassirer’s
system may not immediately reduce all expressions to univocity, but it does posit that this
is possible as well as desirable. Plurivocality is expressed for Cassirer only on the basis
of a signifying univocal process. Ricoeur will instead argue that univocity and
plurivocality are both required for hermeneutics to begin. A generalized order, such as
Cassirer’s, reduces hermeneutics to a discipline of the not-yet-conquered realms of
experience. This does not entail that Ricoeur thinks of the hermeneutic field as a
generalized disorder, however. Instead, each hermeneutics operates on specific
plurivocal expressions by fixing the univocity of other expressions. This relationship
between the whole (the fixed signs) and the parts (the plurivocal) makes hermeneutics
possible and is also necessary for the accounting of the fullness of language. Cassirer
will be forced to deny, ultimately, that the complex structure of intentionality inherent to
the symbol is real – that his position is but one further historical moment of
interpretation.
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Therefore, the symbol cannot be taken as emblematic of all mediation, only that
of meaning to meaning. But, on the other hand, the relationship of meaning to meaning
cannot be analogical. This hermeneutics, which Ricoeur calls “too narrow,” seeks to
obtain a perspective of the whole of symbolics from an exterior perspective. If the
position of Cassirer is that we can understand mediation clearly from the interior of its
workings, an analogical hermeneutics would seek to contain the symbol’s
meaningfulness within a determinate relation that would force it to reveal its real truth –
its real referent. As Ricoeur says, “The symbol does not conceal any hidden teaching that
only needs to be unmasked for the images in which it is clothed to become useless.” 98
Symbolic meanings are not exhausted by one specific interpretation or determination that
resolves their enigmatic status. Interpretation is not a disposable ladder that discovers the
real analogy between signs but is rather a successive unpacking of latent meanings
hidden in a patent one. And these latent meanings, contra the too narrow view (Biblical
and Neo-Platonic hermeneutics) are not resolvable to a depiction by mere explication
from a supposedly external viewpoint. Thus, even though Ricoeur’s thought of the
symbol flies under the Kantian banner of “the symbol gives rise to thought,” Kant’s own
analogical use of the symbol must be denied. 99
With this act of double limitation, Ricoeur sets the boundaries on the concept of
the symbol. It is neither an expression that can be completely explicated immanently, nor
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reduced to a simple relationship to another meaning from without. The symbol is an
expression of the surplus of literal meaning, the excess of the meaningfulness of
language, as it arises in experience. Ricoeur encloses this entire thrust of hermeneutics in
the phrase “The symbol gives rise to thought.”100 The phrase indicates that thinking and
interpreting results from the multiple possible determinations of meaning found in the
symbol – the excess of meaning sets thought in motion in an effort to create a univocity
out of a presentation of plurivocality. We will study this directional aspect of
interpretation more fully shortly. Symbols function, in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, as the
objects of interpretation and are the correlates of true hermeneutics. Where there are
symbols, there is hermeneutics, and where there is hermeneutics, there are symbols. This
leads Ricoeur to his philosophic hermeneutics proper, which he calls “a philosophy that
starts from the symbols and endeavors to promote the meaning, to form it, by a creative
interpretation.”101 His philosophy is no longer strictly phenomenological because the
failure of the phenomenological reduction points to a horizon that is a world of sense that
cannot be completely idealized. Therefore, all investigations into sense will have to
wrestle with the fundamental plurivocity of its expressions as well as the manners in
which that plurivocity has been determined into univocal expressions by the act of
interpretation.
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IV. The Hermeneutic Poles
This hermeneutics of symbols, however, presents the interpreter with multiple
ways in which to decode the possible meanings and intentions of symbols. Since the
possibility of a general hermeneutics has been ruled out as a hasty totalization of the
hermeneutic field, there is no “general canon for exegesis” and all hermeneutic methods
will be regional. 102 Each will proceed from its own choice of interpretive objects towards
the structures of meaning that make its object of interpretation possible. Thus, as the
objects of interpretation differ, so will the hermeneutic methods and the description of
reality they give. As Ricoeur says, “[t]he hermeneutic field, whose outer contours we
have traced, is internally at variance with itself.”103 This variance arises from the
symbolic object but also from the hermeneutic approach employed. Ricoeur’s
“hypothesis is that each [hermeneutics] is legitimate within its own context.”104 The
analysis of symbols through interpretation necessitates a methodology that both calls for
the “enumeration of symbolic forms” and a “study of the operations of interpretation.” 105
Taking the symbolic forms under discussion as the historical symbols that are related to
us by tradition, we have to consider the specific methodologies of interpretation that
allow us to follow the intentionality of the symbols considered. Hermeneutics “looks at
the symbols in texts as phenomena, and so in doing uncovers the intentional attribute that
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makes them meaningful;” but this intentionality can be interpreted or followed in a
multitude of ways. 106
This is the place of Ricoeur’s famous distinction between two supposedly
opposite tendencies that are employed in the act of interpreting how meaning is
transferred from the latent to the patent expression. Although these competing
methodologies are not the only two possible approaches to the problem of interpreting
symbols, Ricoeur chooses this pairing to highlight the “most extreme opposition” of
interpretive activities that still remain within the hermeneutic field and are concerned
with the same symbols.107 His goal will be to demonstrate that even these antagonistic
hermeneutic methods are not diametrically opposed and can be seen to explicate various
complementary modes of human belonging through their exegetic work: “the double
meaning aims here at deciphering an existential movement, a certain ontological
condition of man, by means of the surplus of meaning attached to the even which, in its
literalness, is situated in the observable historical world.”108 Each hermeneutic method
will unpack the surplus differently, leading to differing characterizations of belonging,
based on the presumed referent of the symbol. Although Ricoeur gives this distinction
many different formulations, we will refer to the distinction here as being between the
“hermeneutics of suspicion” and the “hermeneutics of recollection.” 109 For the
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hermeneutics of suspicion, symbols are to be interpreted as distortions of some other,
often hidden, meaning that dissimulates itself. Their goal, as stated by Ricoeur, is to
dispel illusion. Their practice of interpretation “refers to a new possibility which is no
longer either error in the epistemological sense or lying in the moral sense, but
illusion…”. 110 On the other hand, to the hermeneutics of recollection, symbols are the
sensible manifestation of a forgotten depth of human reality. 111 The presence of symbols
here indicates an authentic relationship with something outside of human experience that
has been forgotten and is in need of retrieval. Here, we will spell out in more detail the
relationship between these rival hermeneutics, broadly conceived, before moving on to a
more detailed analysis of Ricoeur’s reading of Freud’s hermeneutics and its relationship
to Nietzsche’s hermeneutics in the next chapter. The guide here will be Ricoeur’s
statement: “Rival hermeneutics conflict not over the structure of double meaning but over
the mode of its opening, over the finality of showing.”112 Their quarrel is over how the
plurivocal object’s intentional sense is to be treated and the kind of ontology it points
towards.
A glance at Ricoeur’s description of hermeneutics that employ interpretation as a
technique for demystification reveals “[t]hree masters, seemingly mutually exclusive:
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Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.”

113

Although they differ in their choice of the object of

exegesis, the commonality between these three thinkers is twofold: each treats our
everyday consciousness of meaning as naïve and our expressions as mediate products of
something other than immediate consciousness; and each constructs, in the place of this
naïve consciousness, a method of exegesis that works against this illusory meaning. This
first tack of their critique is against the immediacy of self-consciousness regarding
meaningfulness. Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx employ varieties of Ricoeur’s “semiotic”
criticism to denounce consciousness as a false consciousness that is the product of a
series of dissimulations. Because of the illusion of immediate consciousness created by
the idealist conception of the self, the apparent immediate meaningfulness that
phenomena possess in consciousness cannot be taken as merely given because the
meaning of consciousness is underdetermined. Instead, the expressions of consciousness
are to be taken as symptoms or symbols of disguised prejudices, be they economic forces,
instincts, or desires. Their diagnoses of false consciousness point toward conditions for
the production of meaning that are often at odds with the meanings that are produced.
These forces and instincts are self-concealing in the manner in which they produce
illusions of morality and of metaphysics. In this way do Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx not
only denounce immediate consciousness and the immediacy of meaningfulness, they also
strenuously deny the very object of the “sacred” sought by the opposing hermeneutics.
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This object, too, in an illusion that can be reduced as expressions of certain drives or
forces.
However, even as iconoclastic hermeneutic approaches, their philosophical
projects are not to be taken, for Ricoeur, as aiming at the total destruction of meaning or
as nihilistic pursuits. Ricoeur states, “These three masters of suspicion are not to be
misunderstood as three masters of skepticism.”114 Although their projects have one goal
as the demystification of illusory meanings, all three also attempt to decipher the
workings of these illusions through their differing practices of interpretation. The
diagnosis of the genesis of illusion in each case is the result of the creation of a “mediate
science of meaning, irreducible to the immediate consciousness of meaning.”115 This
mediate science is a hermeneutic method derived from the objects of their critiques –
ideology, libido, or moralistic metaphysical concepts. In the next chapter we will look at
Freud’s hermeneutic in more detail, followed by the examination of Nietzsche’s method
of exegesis. However, here it is enough to show that their methods are traced from the
“unconscious” work of the production of meaning. The hermeneutics of suspicion all
“reverse” the processes that result in the creation of illusions.116 The technique of each is
to trace the expressions of everyday life and consciousness, the patent meanings of
symbols, backwards to their latent source of meaning, which can then be reinterpreted in
a more meaningful way. And in these reinterpretations, new practices can emerge or be

114

Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 33.

115

Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 34 (emphasis in original).

116

Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 34.

57
imagined. For example, Nietzsche’s work in Genealogy of Morals is an interpretation of
the commandments of Christian morality as expressions of drives that can also be
interpreted as ressentiment and bad conscience. He treats “good” and “evil” as plurivocal
expressions – as symbols – rather than innately meaningful concepts and then exposes
other ways of actualizing the forces he has diagnosed. Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx all
practice variations on a theme that Ricoeur describes in this way concerning Freud: “it is
a question of substituting for this narration [the dream], unintelligible at the first hearing,
a more meaningful text, which would be to the first as the latent is to the patent.”117
All three hermeneutics of suspicion, then, motivate their programs of
demystification according to what Ricoeur refers to as an archaeological principle. Their
methodologies start from the overdetermination of the meaning of certain concepts and
expose that surplus of meaning in an effort to delegitimize those concepts traditionally
taken as univocally true entities. They show traditional philosophical concepts to have
the status of symbols that rely on interpretation for their meaningfulness. Without the
guarantee of a simple, immediate meaning, these symbols can then be subjected to an
immanent critique that reveals their status as kinds of transcendental illusions. The mode
of this critique is said to be archaeological because the illusions are reinterpreted through
a mediate science of meaning with a reference that points backwards to a moment that is
preconscious. Conscious meaning is shown to depend on forces that precede the
development of consciousness: Freud’s unconscious, Nietzsche’s will to power, Marx’s
economic substructure. They “displace the center of reference” for the meaningful sense
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of consciousness and the symbols under consideration to the non-totalizable origin of
their production.118 Their mode of opening on the problem of plurivocity charts a
regressive course to the archai of produced meaning; sense is realized in a backwards
movement.
Regarding the project that will later be called the “hermeneutics of recollection,”
Ricoeur writes, in The Symbolism of Evil: “It is not regret for the sunken Atlantides that
animates us, but hope for a re-creation of language. Beyond the desert of criticism, we
wish to be called again.”119 This approach to the plurivocity of symbolism recognizes
that the intentional fulfillment of signs that refer to phenomena called “sacred” is
problematic. However, the phenomenology of religion – Ricoeur’s prime example of the
hermeneutics of recollection – recognizes, at least in Ricoeur’s formulation of it, that
once this immediacy of belief is lost that meaningfulness is always mediated. Therefore,
this hermeneutics looks to the compound intentionality of the symbol as the possibility of
an indirect showing of the “sacred” or as a mediated hierophany. The goal of recollection
is the achievement of a post-critical ontology through the roundabout method of
interpretation of signs and symbols and the creation of new key figurations of ultimate
human reality. Ricoeur calls this goal a “second immediacy” or a “second naïveté.”120
The archaeological mode is thus supplemented with an alternate mode of showing
the intentionality of the symbolic. If the surplus of meaning of the symbol is pre-
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philosophical, that is if the “fullness of language” is the horizon of philosophic reflection,
then the symbol, as the object of his transcendental deduction, may also call for
speculative thought. “Symbols give, they are the gift of language;” states Ricoeur in the
familiar refrain of his thought, “but this gift creates for me the duty to think, to inaugurate
philosophic discourse, starting from what is always prior to and the foundation of that
discourse.”121 Therefore even if myths are understood as muthos and not as logos, they
may be interpreted to symbolize, for the hermeneutics of recollection, innovative
“existential concepts” of a concrete reflection that touch upon an ontology. 122 Rather
than abandoning rational reconstruction of these concepts of the modes of being of
human being, recollection invites us to speculate towards the revivified idea of a
philosophical totality. Ricoeur argues that new concepts and new cultural figures need to
be created in this speculative mode. 123 But, again, they will not legitimately give a
totality achievable by the ideal immediacy of self-reflection. In this manner, we get the
first name for this mode of opening – teleology.
The teleological mode of hermeneutics seems necessary to Ricoeur for the
movement of concrete reflection through the hermeneutic method. Reflection remains
abstract if it has only dealt with the regressive movement of interpretation and not the
progressive element whereby the lessons from the critique are ordered and appropriated.
As consciousness is not complete, this teleology is the progressive synthesizing of self
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“in the succession of figures that draw consciousness forward away from itself.”

124

Ricoeur here draws on the Hegelian phenomenology of Spirit where meaning is gradually
revealed as a “becoming conscious” that comes about because of the successive
realization of mediation’s role in the production of meaning. In this way, reflection, as a
hermeneutic procedure, allows “consciousness [to be] intelligible to itself only if it allows
itself to be set off-center.”125 Whereas the de-centering accomplished by archaeology
moves consciousness towards an uncontrollable origin, the teleological movement pulls a
singular consciousness toward universal meaning by making explicit in new concepts the
implicit anticipations of meaningfulness in previous events of consciousness. It is as an
appropriation of the “instinctual ground” of consciousness that the gradual process of
becoming conscious is made possible through the mediation of a “cultural aim.” 126 In
other words, recollection aims at a total fulfillment of the intentionality of symbolic
figures wherein the sense of the subject is drawn from their ultimate referent and is not
just a reduction of the illusions of the false sense of self-mastery that consciousness
originally possessed.
Thus, for Ricoeur, the goal of concrete reflection can occur only when a dialectic
is created between the archaeology of the instincts and the teleology of Spirit. Both serve
to distance consciousness from itself and its false conceptions of its self-adequacy as a
concept through revelation of the mediation necessary for self-consciousness. However,
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the dialectic seeks to re-appropriate this self on the other side of its self-illusions through
a progressive meditation on its powers and goals towards the universality of meaning.
Reflection then takes as its task reflection on the cultural figures found in consciousness,
making the implicit intentions explicit and making consciousness, thereby, more fully
self-aware. The dialectic allows the creative constitution of a conscious self through the
exegesis of its intentional objects.
“Reflection,” Ricoeur states, “is what holds together regression and
progression.”127 As consciousness is de-centered through the exorcism of immediate
certainty of meaning, that sense is recovered through the hermeneutics of the symbols,
which reveals the appropriative activity of self-constitution. However, as this teleology
draws consciousness toward a total exegesis of its figures, Ricoeur has already placed this
complete fulfillment at an insurmountable distance. Symbols themselves, we have said,
contain an intentional surplus of meaning such that the finality of mediation is never
given or accounted for. Therefore, the Hegelian moment is also insufficient for Ricoeur’s
hermeneutics of recollection. It must be supplemented with an eschatological mode, the
second mode of recollection, that treats the fulfillment of symbols as “only a promise,
promised through the symbols of the sacred.”128 The deferral of the end of interpretation
confirms the opaque nature of the symbol and its plurivocity. This recollection strives for
better understanding despite the fact that symbols “are resistant to any reduction to
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rational knowledge.”

129

Just as Husserl’s reduction to the meaning of beings failed, so

too does Ricoeur’s excavation of sense always remain incomplete. Yet the hermeneutics
of recollection treats this not as a failure but as a confirmation of its central insight
concerning the plurivocity of its objects of interpretation. Although rational
reconstruction will never be complete, Ricoeur holds the project to be meaningful in
explicating the horizon of human belonging and both the acts of reflection and
appropriation of that into self-consciousness. Eschatology here functions as the
regulative ideal for reflection that remains philosophical and dialectical while fending off
reduction and eclecticism. This regulative ideal posits that the symbols reflected upon by
both the hermeneutics of suspicion and recollection are the same.
For Ricoeur, only by instituting a dialectic between the archaeological and
teleological interpretations of symbolics can reflection onto the belonging of human
being be made concrete. This concretization is eschatological insofar as is asserts
“ultimately that a phenomenology of the mind [or Spirit] and an archaeology of the
unconscious are not speaking about two halves of man but speaking each of them to the
whole man.”130 Both archaeology and teleology are seen to be working on the same
symbols. Only in this way can a philosophical anthropology be creatively appropriated
through the process of mediation from the non-transparent nature of human being and its
expressions. Ricoeur’s nascent philosophy of language here shows meaning to be bound
not to the subject’s consciousness but to objective realizations of that subject’s
expressions. Through the interpretation of these expressions, we appropriate more and
129
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more of the subject’s intentions, both as arising from a primordial origin and as aiming at
a goal. However, this appropriation of the fundamental belonging of human being can
only approach totalization obliquely and by increments. As Ricoeur affirms that a single
horizon of meaning is promised, it must be thought as an eschatological concept and not
as an ontological one, as the full totality of it cannot be revealed. 131 Concrete reflection
is, then, the process of this appropriation through archeological exegesis and speculative
reflection aimed at both the reduction of illusions and the creative promotions of new
meanings and cultural figures. Concrete reflection, therefore, is a promised goal of
philosophy but is never directly actualized. The disparate discourses concerning human
being all touch upon regions of the horizon of meaning and human belonging, without
ever fully recapturing it.
Having given the broad outlines of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, we will in the next
chapter explore the specific readings of Freud’s and Nietzsche’s theories of interpretation
given by Ricoeur. The goal of that chapter will be twofold: to show how Ricoeur’s
reading of Freud and Nietzsche attributes to them an explicit archaeology but a need for a
complementary teleology; and to begin to draw out Nietzsche’s possible reasons for
opposing this interpretation of his theory of interpretation. Ricoeur, within the
eschatological mode, argues that both have implicit teleological structures; but we will
begin to articulate Nietzsche’s opposition to eschatological reasoning and the impact that
has on his possible teleology.
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CHAPTER TWO
ARCHAEOLOGY AND GENEALOGY IN HERMENEUTIC PRACTICE – FREUD
AND NIETZSCHE
Ricoeur’s route from a reflective phenomenology to a hermeneutic
phenomenology reveals the necessity of pairing interpretation with reflection in any
investigation of or determination of the sense of beings. If philosophical thinking is to
avoid unwittingly falling prey to the transcendental illusion of the immediate certainty of
the contents of consciousness, then our understanding of the process by which the
meaning of those contents is produced must be critically deduced. Ricoeur attempts to
show that a concrete determination of the meaning of beings in experience is produced by
an activity of mediation between an intended sense and a particular perspective; and he
discovers that any knowledge of the synthesis performed in this activity must be a
methodological accomplishment that cannot merely be achieved by a quick reduction to
an immediate consciousness of meaning. In order to decipher the concrete meaning of
beings, specifically the human being, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic method provides a long but
productive detour through the whole of human expression, focusing on those expressions
which Ricoeur calls “symbols” which provide actual conditions for interpretive activity.
Symbols, being overdetermined in their intentional meaning, spur thinking towards the
conditions for the actual conflict of interpretations that a concrete determination of sense
is intended to alleviate: “The hermeneutic problem therefore is not imposed on reflection
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from without, but proposed from within by the very movement of meaning, by the
implicit life of symbols taken at their semantic and mythical level.”132 The
overdetermination of the meaning of symbols itself calls for interpretive activity not
because of a perceived lack of meaning but because the mediated nature of the symbol
cannot be explained in only one determination. With regard to the methods of
deciphering the nature of this overdetermination, Ricoeur identifies two dominant and
opposing tendencies of interpretative methods regarding the possibility or reliability of
determining an authentic and transcendent meaning to these symbols – suspicion and
recovery. And, as we saw in chapter one, he argues that the construction of a dialectic
between these two poles is necessary if reflection is to avoid the fallacies of reductive
immediacy, on the one hand, and the assumption of a totalized and general mediation, on
the other. Therefore, the description of the synthesis of meaning in human consciousness
must allow for both of these poles of interpretation, if it is to be genuine for Ricoeur.
In this chapter, my goal will be twofold. The first task will be to elucidate the
archaeological pole of a hermeneutics of symbols as Ricoeur sets it out in his studies of
Freud’s archaeological psychoanalytic method. For Ricoeur, Freud’s work is most
representative of the hermeneutics of suspicion because the psychoanalytic viewpoint
attempts to carry universal import regarding the interpretation of texts while denying the
possibility of a philosophy that begins from the certainty of the self-understanding of the
consciousness of a thinking subject. However, Freud is not alone among the rolls of the
practitioners of interpretive demystitification; Ricoeur routinely includes Marx and
132
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Nietzsche as well. The second task will be to introduce another of the practitioners of the
hermeneutics of suspicion – Nietzsche. In doing this, I will attempt to piece together
Ricoeur’s interpretation of the import of Nietzsche’s philosophy of interpretation from
the various indications Ricoeur gives and to show how Ricoeur absorbs Nietzsche’s
problematic into Ricoeur’s dialectic of suspicion and recovery. This attempted
reconstruction of a Ricoeurian reading of Nietzsche’s texts will then be my starting point
for my further investigation into Nietzsche’s hermeneutics in chapter three. I wish to
begin to draw from Nietzsche’s texts reasons for a different sort of distinction regarding
the hermeneutic poles than the one drawn by Ricoeur. Ricoeur argues that the
archaeological and teleological trajectories of the hermeneutics of suspicion and
recovery, respectively, need to be reconciled in a dialectical movement directed toward
the reinvigoration of meaning and a restored, or second, naïveté of meaning. His
readings of Freud’s texts as archaeological investigations and Hegel’s texts as
teleological explanations bear this out. It is my contention that, as it is applied to
Nietzsche, Ricoeur’s schematic of archaeology and teleology is insufficient and that
Nietzsche’s interpretive methodology contains more resources and depth than is
attributed to it by the phrase “hermeneutics of suspicion.” While Ricoeur is right in
reading Nietzsche as a practitioner of hermeneutics and as someone for whom “the whole
of philosophy becomes interpretation,” I will begin here to show a difference between the
archaeological strategy of Freud’s psychoanalytic practice, as it is described by Ricoeur,
and what I will call the genealogical strategy that Nietzsche employs in interpretation. 133
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Although both point to a new form of ascesis through their critical methodologies and
iconoclastic interpretations, I will try to show that the process of the re-codification of
meaning that is necessary for Ricoeur’s reading of Freud works somewhat differently in
the case of Nietzsche. Therefore, it may be premature to posit that both Nietzsche and
Freud have the same end of the work of interpretation in mind. Noting the difference in
the goals of their interpretive strategies will help to reveal the difference in their
methodologies, as well. However, Ricoeur’s interpretive strategies in dealing with
Nietzsche’s texts will still be illustrative in demonstrating how other critics have
appropriated, with more or less success, Nietzsche’s texts to their own use.
Their encounter in the final section of this chapter will be staged, as Ricoeur
would have it, around the interpretation of symbols – in this case the cultural symbols of
Oedipus Tyrannus. Reaching that point, however, will require several preliminary steps.
First will be the demonstration of Freud and Nietzsche as iconoclastic interpreters and of
the similarities that cause Ricoeur to consider them together as practitioners of
demystification. Then I will look into the manner in which Freud and Nietzsche
determine the energetics that underlie their hermeneutics. This will be the location of the
core of their differences. Finally, I will consider their interpretations of certain cultural
symbols and show how Nietzsche’s genealogy separates itself from Freud’s
archaeological methodology, in Ricoeur’s sense, precisely because of Nietzsche’s
critique of an eschatological vision such as Ricoeur employs, and not because of its lack
of a teleological sense. Nietzsche’s hermeneutics does not display either an impulse to a
supposed naturalism (as Freud could be accused of following) or to a final, as yet
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undiscovered and reconciling truth that would exist in common to all interpretations.
Genealogy remains a hermeneutic method but does not necessarily fit within the
boundaries of hermeneutics as Ricoeur has drawn them. This discussion will set the
stage for the fuller working-out of Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation as a critical
hermeneutics in subsequent chapters.

I. Freudian Suspicion
The task of hermeneutic reflection, for Ricoeur, is “the appropriation of our effort
to exist and our desire to be by means of works which testify to this effort and this
desire.”134 The concrete meaning of the being of the human being as existing and as
desiring must be interpreted from its various actions and expressions. And to Ricoeur’s
mind it is the texts of Freud that most clearly and thoroughly interpret the connections
and disconnections between the explicit works of humanity and the implicit desires of
humanity. 135 The role of Freudian psychoanalysis – or Freud’s method of interpreting
human action in light of desire – is, for Ricoeur, that of an archaeology into the
conditions of human desire that cause consciousness to gravitate towards certain
expressions of those desires. Freud himself often speaks of psychoanalysis as being akin
to archaeological excavation, although we must be careful to the extent to which this
metaphor is employed. Freud’s account of the ontogenesis of the individual always
134
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focuses on the vicissitudes of the drives; and it is the role of psychoanalysis to bring to
light the causes of those conflicts as they are expressed in works and actions. However,
the act of revealing these conflicts is not the only goal, for the symptoms that
psychoanalysis wishes to treat do not dissolve upon having their causes made patent.136
Additionally, psychoanalysis must deal with the interaction between our desires and our
expressed behavior in an attempt to change our consciousness of ourselves. Jonathan
Lear puts it this way: “This new technique [psychoanalysis] is designed to address the
problem of appropriation: what is involved in people being able to take up their own
psychological states in ways that genuinely make them their own.”137 The interpretative
method of psychoanalysis is designed to facilitate the ability of consciousness to give
meaning to itself, instead of having the meaning of its actions be determined by
unconscious instincts. This is the sentiment behind Freud’s famous phrase “Where id
was, there ego shall be,” which Ricoeur is fond of quoting.138 The relationship between
our desires and their expressions or representations are at the root of the meaning of
consciousness for Freud. However, it is a defining characteristic of psychoanalysis that
the causes of psychical conflicts are not merely buried or lost but are repressed.
Therefore, the process of appropriation that constitutes the psychoanalytic “cure” requires
136
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a method to uncover what is actively repressed in the production of consciousness and its
meaning.
Repression refers to an activity of the psychical whole wherein it hinders or works
to prevent ideas from entering into consciousness internally and also to keep those ideas
from being noticed as perceptions or from being acted upon. Regarding the phenomenon
of repression, the dynamic description of the psyche postulates an active process whereby
mental forces mobilize to oppose the becoming-conscious of some ideas for a variety of
reasons, regardless of the internal or external origin of the ideas. The dominant reason
for this active repression lies in the conflict of the instincts with each other: “In the
course of things it happens again and again that individual instincts turn out to be
incompatible in their aims or demands with the remaining ones, which are able to
combine into the inclusive unity of the ego. The former are then split off from this unity
by the process of repression….”139 As instincts exist which have as their goal some
endpoint that is repugnant or undesirable to some other, stronger instinct or bundle of
instincts, the mechanism of repression excludes these “other” desires and their aims from
its construction of the unity of an ego. The principle behind this repression is the
principle of the constancy of the quantity of mental energy, which we will elucidate
shortly.
The mechanism of repression is a general feature of all mental life for Freud, and
the fact of its presence in relationship to our dreams suffices to show its ubiquity. For
example, sleep, “the condition of rest free from stimulus,” has not only external threats to
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its functioning but internal ones, as well.

140

This internal possibility of disruption is

caused by instinctual forces that are not allowed expression during the waking states of
consciousness. During sleep, there is, for Freud, a “diminishing of repressions” that
allows the unconscious greater reign; however, repression is not abolished even then. 141
The phenomenon of dreaming is thus explained as a mechanism for the expression of
unconscious desires but in a veiled manner so that sleep will not be interrupted. Dreams
are caused by the lessening of repression, which allows the unconscious expression; but
dreaming also witnesses the phenomenon of repression in that unconscious desires are
not expressed directly but instead are transferred into the symbols that appear in dreams.
Thus, for Freud, the manifest contents of dreams are made from the repressed expressions
of unconscious desires.
Freud notes that repression in the therapeutic setting often takes the form of
forgetting. One form of forgetting is a type of repression applied to external stimuli:
“Forgetting impressions, scenes, or experiences nearly always reduces itself to shutting
them off.”142 Again, Freud repeats that the vicissitudes of the instincts are subject to
repression by the instincts which have unified into the ego. Psychoanalytic practice
reveals that the psyche frequently makes use of this repressive mechanism to avoid the
disturbances caused by external stimuli; however, this alone does not account for the
radical nature of psychoanalytic suspicion that is involved in the concept of repression.
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Repression shows its full force when dealing with those disturbing psychical processes
that arise from within the psyche. These processes – “phantasies, processes of reference,
emotional impulses, thought-connections” – arise from the workings of the
unconscious. 143 What is telling for the verification of the existence of repression is that
through the therapeutic technique, these impulses which have been resisted by the
conscious portions of the psyche can be remembered when a repression is undone.
Repression, therefore, also occurs unconsciously, on behalf of the ego: “In these
processes it particularly often happens that something is ‘remembered’ which could never
have been ‘forgotten’ because it was never at any time noticed – was never conscious.”144
Freud’s archaeology is not just a technique for bringing the repressed to light but
also give a “theory of the relationship between the repressed and that which represses.”145
This theory will also give us the method by which the process of the appropriation of our
desires can proceed. In short, psychoanalysis is searching for a method of interpretation
for the expressions of human desires as symptoms of the vicissitudes of instincts within
the human being. These expressions, or “texts” produced by the psyche, contain more
meaning than an individual’s reflective consciousness acting alone can comprehend,
because in most cases consciousness actively represses many of these expressions.
Therefore, the archaeology of the psyche’s expressions cannot occur without the external
diagnostic presence of the analyst. The analyst, the interpreter of the psyche, will attempt
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to make appropriation and recovery of a unified ego possible through the archaeology of
the psyche. In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud employs an archaeological
metaphor to convey the depths of the psyche that he wishes to investigate. He states:
“Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but
a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past….”146 In drawing a metaphor of
this sort, an archaeological analogy between the excavations of a historical site and the
psyche is set.147
The interpretive suspicion operative in Freud’s accounts of our mental lives is due
to the lack of transparency of the meaning of consciousness to itself because of the
manner in which Freud deduces that consciousness originates. Freud’s descriptions of
the second topography of the human psyche situate the conscious aspects of the ego as
arising from the unconscious forces of the psychical whole.148 However, these
unconscious forces cannot be perceived, just as the name would suggest, by the thinking
consciousness. Therefore, the archaeology cannot be direct in its grasping of the
underlying material of the unconscious. For reasons we will see shortly, Freud is forced
to assume that “powerful mental processes or ideas exist… which can produce all the
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effects in mental life that ordinary ideas do (including effects that can in their turn
become conscious as ideas), though they themselves do not become conscious.”149 The
archaeological method will attempt to uncover the unconscious forces through the
technique of the interpretation of manifest expressions and not through an immediate
discovery of something like unconscious ideas. Here, the Rome that Freud describes in
Civilization and Its Discontents is important for his method beyond its obvious
metaphorical value in describing the mental apparatus as having a past that exists prior to
the “founding” of an individual’s consciousness. Freud asks about “a visitor” to presentday Rome who wishes to see the wall of Aurelian or the Servian Wall or other such past
buildings that are preserved now only in ruins. No guesses can be made, he says, with
regard to any archaeological formations that no longer exist or have left us no trace. The
archaeology that can progress, however, must begin from what is revealed by the site’s
surface. Without these expressions of the buried past making themselves known in a
partial, disguised, or mutilated manner, that past remains unknowable to the
archaeologist. The archaeology of the psyche is similar in that the analyst must also work
from the fleeting expressions of conscious thought, even though Freud postulates that it is
possible that nothing psychical – nothing experienced by the mind – is ever lost. Freud’s
clinical experience of the childhood “screen memories” of his patients shows for him that
“[n]ot only some but all of what is essential from childhood has been retained in these
memories.”150 Our “mental” Rome may still witness its versions of gladiatorial combat
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or barbarian invasions, whereas for the physical Rome, those days have long since
passed. But Freud “never gives up hope of exhuming Rome” or making conscious the
past conflicts that determine the meaning of the psychical whole’s present neuroses.151
Despite the suspicion that must be assumed with regard to consciousness and any
attempts it may make to define itself, Freud does not abandon the work of the
appropriation of the desires that motivate the conscious ego and also its symptoms of
illness. In any case, the meaning of the surface events and structures can be explained by
reference to the formations that lie beneath them, spatially in terms of Rome,
chronologically in terms of the psyche. This is the main sense of Freud’s archaeology of
consciousness. Past events and desires, both contained as memories in the unconscious,
will be at the root of present psychological conflicts and must be worked through if
appropriation is to be possible.
Regarding the excavation involved in psychoanalysis, Freud stresses that
“consciousness is the surface of the mental apparatus”152 and that the psychoanalyst, like
the “visitor” mentioned earlier, must be content with “studying whatever is present for
the time being on the surface of the patient’s mind, and [employing] the art of
interpretation mainly for the purpose of recognizing the resistances that appear there, and
making them conscious to the patient.”153 This implies that although Freud’s method is
an archaeological one – or a “depth psychology” – it is properly a “surface archaeology”
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that can only begin its diagnoses from what is expressed by the patient.

154

Our latent

desires can be brought to consciousness through analysis only if they are expressed in
some veiled, although patent, form. Freud makes this aspect of psychoanalysis clear
when speaking of the interpretation of dreams: “What has been called the dream we shall
describe as the text of the dream or the manifest dream, and what we are looking for,
what we suspect, so to say, of lying behind the dream, we shall describe as the latent
dream thoughts.”155 Just as in any other hermeneutic method, psychoanalysis is an
interpretation of a text – in this case the patient’s dream-text or the text of her conscious
thoughts. The unconscious, as field of inquiry, is not represented directly and, therefore,
can only be reached through this surface archaeology, which uncovers the roots of
meaning in the drives of the unconscious through the interpretation of conscious
expression. Discovering the precise way in which a patient’s unconscious desires reach a
textual actualization is the practical task of the interpretive method of psychoanalysis. 156
Because of this criterion of manifestness, psychoanalytic inquiry is limited to studying
the conscious expressions of the psyche and cannot leap directly into the formulation of
any knowledge of the unconscious.
However, this does not preclude all inquiry into the workings of the unconscious
thanks to a general metapsychological rule that Freud adopts regarding a principle of
psychological operations. He asserts that through the findings of the techniques of
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psychoanalysis that it is given that “the course taken by mental events is automatically
regulated by the pleasure principle.”157 This does not mean that it is consciousness itself
that is aware of its seeking pleasure, or that consciousness does seek pleasure, but rather
that the drive towards pleasure is a constant feature in all psychical operations. This
entails the theoretical assertion that our predominant psychical drive is oriented towards
achieving as much pleasure as possible and ridding ourselves of as much negative
pleasure as is possible. Pleasure and pain, as they are considered by Freud, refer to any
change or alteration in the “quantity of excitation” that is present in the psyche.158
Unpleasurable sensations “impel [the psychical apparatus] towards discharge, and that is
why we interpret unpleasure as implying a heightening and pleasure a lowering of
energetic cathexis.”159 Thus we have Freud’s depiction of the pleasure principle as a
tendency whose “final outcome coincides with a lowering of [the] tension” caused by its
conflict with other, unpleasurable forces.160 Our patent expressions will display or
disguise the conflicts the pleasure principle faces and the syntheses it utilizes to achieve
its aims. No specific psychological agency – such as consciousness – is necessarily
imputed by the existence of this pleasure principle; nor, however, do we have direct
knowledge of it. Rather the ego is now to be interpreted as a product of this economy of
pleasure and unpleasure. It is the energetics of desire, seeking pleasure and avoiding
unpleasure, that underlies the synthesis of what will be consciousness.
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Freud quickly recognizes, as Ricoeur was shown to do earlier, that the subject
always finds herself within the fullness of experience wherein the aims of pleasure are
already compromised or conflicted regarding their objects. In other words, the
observation of patients and their psychical conflicts leads Freud to posit the pleasure
principle as the condition for those conflicts’ possibility, as “instincts are known to us
only in their aims.”161 Freud essentially performs the Husserlian Rücksfrage in a nonthematized manner by beginning from the synthesis of psychical conflict found in
neurotic expressions and working backwards to the motivating principles for the
conflict’s genesis. Jonathan Lear also emphasizes this specifically analytic character of
psychoanalytic inquiry when he states, “Adult neurotics never display a pure culture of
the pleasure principle or a pure culture of the reality principle. Neurotic behavior and
imaginative activity are always conflicted.”162 To state this in more Ricoeurian terms,
Freud’s method starts from the fullness of neurotic expression, understood as a synthesis
of conflicting desires, and traces back to the causes of this conflict in order to resolve the
conflict. The etiology of neuroses reveals to Freud an unquestionable desire for pleasure.
But, in fact, the pleasure principle is merely a logical by-product of Freud’s more
fundamental metapsychological principle. This is “the hypothesis that the mental
apparatus endeavors to keep the quantity of excitation present in it as low as possible or
at least to keep it constant.”163 This entails a second hypothesis that Freud expresses as a
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principle of constancy. This “principle of constancy” points to the economic basis of
Freud’s method of interpretation. 164 The dynamism of the unconscious regulates itself by
the principle of constancy which requires that any excitation of the psyche be balanced
economically by ridding the psyche of an equal amount of excitation. The meaning of
consciousness and of its conflicts and neuroses will be tied now to this economic problem
given in the principle of constancy. What Freud’s archaeology is to discover in the
patient is the general way in which this meta-psychological principle is satisfied or
unsatisfied from the economic standpoint. With this postulation of the principle of
constancy, two fundamentally important things to Freud’s method of interpretation come
into view. The first is the general economic principle that will be applied by Freud in all
his attempts to clarify the meaning of human expressions. The other is the suspicion
toward everyday consciousness’s transparency to itself.
Freud’s analyses of the psyche will begin as diagnoses of everyday consciousness
as it is perceived – what he calls “the system Pcpt.-Cs.”165 Consciousness is here treated
only as a perceived consciousness and not as an absolute given but rather as a
phenomenon or set of phenomena that we may become aware of alongside other
phenomena. Freud says: “This system [Pcpt.-Cs.] is turned toward the external world, it
is the medium for the perceptions arising there, and during its functioning the
phenomenon of consciousness arises in it.”166 In other words, the system Pcpt.-Cs. for
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Freud, as for Ricoeur, cannot be known but through our intending of it in perception.
This intended object is labeled in Freud’s second topology as the “ego.” The ego is
described by Freud as the “part of the id [or unconscious instincts] which has been
modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of the Pcpt.Cs.; in a sense it is an extension of the surface-differentiation.”167 This modification is
not entirely spontaneous, however, but is performed in response to an economic demand
on the part of the principle of constancy. As the primary drive to pleasure encounters
objects the difficulties and threats it faces in achieving those objects of its aims causes a
redistribution of its aims to pleasure because of economic reasons. The development of
the economic demand to avoid displeasure results in the “coherent organization of mental
processes” into the ego.168 The ego’s coherence, however, has the purpose of securing
more firmly the demands of the pleasure principle through its replacement by the “reality
principle.”169 The ego serves no immediate purpose of its own but rather serves the
modified purposes of the instincts. This reality principle is a further evolution of the
principle of constancy, with self-preservation occupying a more central role than it does
in the “pure” pleasure principle. However, the explanation of the consciousness of the
ego is still an economic one. Therefore, both the ego and the objects that it considers and
aims for are subject to the economics of desires. The distinction between subject and
object is nullified at the economic level by the economic vantage point of Freud’s method
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of interpretation. Both are explained as being contingent upon the vicissitudes of our
instincts and those instincts’ distribution according to the principle of constancy. The
Freudian topography, therefore, is to be understood as the condition for the possibility of
understanding the subject/object distinction.170 As such, human subjectivity is not an
absolute but is only the development of a synthesis that relies on other forces for its
efficacy.
In Ricoeur’s attempt to render psychoanalysis as a hermeneutics, it is perhaps
unsurprising that at this point in his procedure he refers to psychoanalysis as an “antiphenomenology.”171 Earlier, we saw that Ricoeur arrives at the need for a hermeneutic
method from the development of a phenomenology; and contemporary hermeneutic
theory is often viewed as being derived from the investigations of phenomenologists.
However, what Ricoeur has in mind here is the type of suspicion proper to
psychoanalysis. This suspicion is based on the deduction of the unconscious from the
aforementioned symptoms and the constructed nature of the conscious ego.
Psychoanalysis is anti-phenomenological because of the method that arises as a response
to the resistance that the psyche displays in its symptoms. Phenomenological
investigations create the site for the exposition of meaning by placing the transcendent
references of objects in consciousness into the bracketing function of the epoche, but
Freud hypothesizes that consciousness also must be bracketed if we are to find the origin
of meaning past the resistance and repression displayed by everyday consciousness.
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Ricoeur states: “Whereas the Husserlian epoche is seen as a reduction to consciousness,
the Freudian epoche is seen as a reduction of consciousness; thus we speak of it as an
epoche in reverse.”172 The Freudian epoche considers consciousness as a product of
other forces which themselves must be diagnosed. This necessitates that consciousness
of meaning, so valuable to phenomenology, must also be accounted for as the product of
some system other than consciousness. Because Freud treats consciousness only as it
appears through perception, the meaning of this particular perception is as problematic as
that of any other that we attempt to make sense of through the examination of the
contents of consciousness. Ricoeur states, “Freud’s originality consists in shifting the
point of coincidence of meaning and force back to the unconscious itself.”173 The
meaning of consciousness is identical with and as obscure as the meaning of the
unconscious in Freud’s account. Both arise from the energetics of unconscious desire.
Therefore, like Ricoeur’s hermeneutical project, Freud’s archaeology starts from
the fullness of a specific actualized field of human expressions. However, Freud’s
chosen field of analysis regards the conflicts of our psychical realities as they appear as
symptoms. The Freudian correlate to the role of the symbol of the sacred in the
phenomenology of religion is the symptom of the conflicted consciousness. Starting
from the symptom, however, Freud closes off all possible transcendent references of its
multiple meaning in favor of an “analytical and regressive movement” of
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interpretation.

174

Freud says of his own research in the New Introductory Lectures on

Psychoanalysis that psychoanalysis’s “path [of development] led from symptoms to the
unconscious, to the life of the instincts to sexuality….”175 This is his archaeological path
from given surface phenomena – the ill expressions of consciousness – towards those
forces unknown to consciousness that condition these diagnosed symptoms. In this
archaeology, Freud displaces the source of meaning from consciousness and also places it
at a point beyond the reach of immediate self-reflection. Consciousness, or “being
conscious,” is for Freud only one aspect or expression of the psychical whole of humans:
“[P]sychoanalysis cannot situate the essence of the psychical in consciousness, but is
obliged to regard consciousness as a quality of the psychical….”176 Therefore, the
phenomenon of consciousness arises from a ground, the whole of the psychical; and this
psychical whole cannot be reflected upon totally through self-reflection. Freud postulates
this because of the clinical observations of repression and resistance on the part of the
analysand. The symptoms of the ill patient arise for reasons unknown to the patient’s
consciousness and frequently continue regardless of conscious effort to curb their
actualization. This necessitates that the reality of the unconscious is a “diagnosed reality”
based on a quasi-transcendental deduction from Freud’s identified empirical
symptoms.177 As meaning’s home is in the unconscious instincts, pure self-reflection will
never, for Freud, find a fully transparent determination of meaning.
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Freud’s interpretive archaeology is, therefore, to be understood as a hermeneutic
method that reduces consciousness to a product of the aims of our unconscious instincts.
However, since these instincts are never encountered directly, Freud must deduce their
existence and principles from the expressions of the psyche. The possibility of meaning
of human activity must be discovered from our actual expressions. Freud postulates that
at the roots of our behavior are desires that we gain knowledge of only through
recognition and appropriation of their aims. However, his archaeology reveals the
inability of consciousness or the ego to comprehend fully its foundations in these
unconscious forces. Ricoeur here summarizes Freud’s archaeology as demonstrating the
“unsurpassable character of desire” and the “secondary process’s inability to establish
itself.”178 Viewing consciousness as a “secondary process” establishes the necessity of
casting a wary eye on its expressions, which are motivated by the instincts and not
necessarily by self-conscious intentions. Nevertheless a sort of appropriation of these
underlying desires is possible based on this archaeology. I will describe that more fully
when discussing Freud’s and Nietzsche’s treatment of cultural symbols. At this point, let
us turn to Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche as a practitioner of suspicion.

II. Nietzschean Suspicion
As is the case with Freud’s psychoanalytic method, Nietzsche’s philosophy of
interpretation also argues that the reach of human consciousness is not adequate to the
demands of a system of meaning that must be guaranteed by the transparency of the
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contents of consciousness. Conscious thought, for Nietzsche, is not adequate to its own
demands for knowledge, even concerning itself. 179 Ricoeur’s reading of what he has
termed Nietzsche’s archaeological project is based around this point, which Nietzsche
articulates in this manner: “We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and
with good reason. We have never sought ourselves – how could it happen that we should
ever find ourselves?”180 These first lines of the Genealogy of Morals announce the
project of Nietzsche’s most conventionally organized work, as well as his other more
aphoristic texts – a diagnosis of the conditions that make morality and truth as they are
traditionally conceived of by ourselves and interpreted possible.181 In sorting out the
conditions for what we take to be true or moral, Nietzsche will formulate the diagnosis of
human consciousness as fundamentally weak. It is this diagnosis that Ricoeur takes to be
central to the Nietzschean project of demystification and as his central point of
comparison to the interpretive goals of Freudian psychoanalysis. To this end, Ricoeur
sets out two interwoven strains of this reductive interpretive method that Freud and
Nietzsche purportedly share – a philological movement and a genealogical one:
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It is a philology, an exegesis, an interpretation insofar as the text of our
consciousness can be compared to a palimpsest, under the surface of which
another text has been written. The task of this special exegesis is to decipher this
text. But this hermeneutics is at the same time a genealogy, since the distortion
of the text emerges from a conflict of forces, of drives and counterdrives, whose
origin must be brought to light.182
This is the fundamental manner in which Ricoeur links the interpretive work of Nietzsche
and Freud as critics of the immanence of self-consciousness to itself, contesting the
concept of a transcendental subject.183 In his diagnosis of “we men of knowledge,”
Nietzsche, for Ricoeur’s reading of his texts, sets out a theory of the origin of our
illusions about our morality and philosophy (the genealogical aspect) and also proposes a
method for decoding our expressions of these illusions (the philological aspect). 184 This
double interpretive movement constitutes for Ricoeur Nietzsche’s archaeology into the
foundations of morality and meaningfulness. What is arguably of primary importance for
Ricoeur’s reading is that this archaeology is directed to be a criticism of consciousness
and its supposed transparency to itself. However, since Ricoeur did not publish a detailed
interpretation of this aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking, I will here attempt briefly to
reconstruct these elements of what Ricoeur might see as a Nietzschean archaeology to
complement the Freudian archaeology that is explicitly drawn out in Ricoeur’s texts.
This will provide a foundation to begin to show how Nietzsche’s hermeneutics does
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work, although it might outstrip the characteristics that Ricoeur reads as its essential
features.
Concerning the adequacy of consciousness, Nietzsche indicates that he is, in his
own way, merely following Kant’s critique of the paralogisms: “Kant essentially wanted
to prove that the subject cannot be proven on the basis of the subject – and neither can the
object.”185 What is being identified here, in part, is the failure of self-consciousness to
ground adequately the meaning of itself on the fact of its own existence and,
subsequently, its failure to adequately account for the meaning of objects, as well. Even
if we grant that the expression of the “fact” of the subject is apodictic, its meaning is not
thereby given as simple or univocal. In contrast to the apparent simplicity of the
Cartesian or phenomenological cogito, Nietzsche will advocate that the very “fact” of the
manner in which the cogito is given might be dubitable. Nietzsche asserts that “people
are wondering… whether the reverse [of the cogito] might be true; that ‘think’ is the
condition and ‘I’ is conditioned, in which case ‘I’ would be a synthesis that only gets
produced through thought itself.”186 Ricoeur, even as late in his career as Oneself as
Another, will reiterate this very point in relation to an earlier text of Nietzsche’s: “At least
in these fragments [of 1882], Nietzsche says nothing other than simply, I doubt better
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than Descartes.”

Nietzsche does not doubt that the cogito appears as simple and as a

fact, but he does doubt that its meaning is given immediately and that its givenness is
original. The method Nietzsche utilizes here is similar to Freud’s: take a phenomenon
assumed to be given simply – in this case consciousness – and ask if it is possible if that
concept is instead produced as an effect of other activities. The task then becomes
archaeological for Ricoeur in the determination of the causes and constituent parts of the
synthesis that produce the phenomenon – the transcendental subject – in question.
Essentially, Nietzsche, the “old philologist,” treats the meaning of the “text” of
consciousness as an expression of the activity of the instincts overwriting themselves.188
Our understanding of this process, then, is liable to misinterpret the process as an original
substance. Just as Freud’s depiction of the psyche likened it to a modern Rome, built
upon ruins, Nietzsche’s description of consciousness includes a necessary reference to
that which exists before consciousness – the forces of thought itself. The diagnosis of
these forces will show that not only is consciousness liable to take itself to be a substance
but that it prefers to do this, as well.
However, if we see this as Nietzsche’s version of the Kantian paralogisms, a
crucial difference must be noted. As Ricoeur interprets it, the problem of consciousness
for Kant was one of how consciousness can represent itself in its entirety to itself. With
the Nietzschean turn to interpretation: “It is no longer the Kantian question of how a
187
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subjective representation or idea can have objective validity; this question, central to a
critical philosophy, gives way to a more radical one.”189 The Nietzschean question can
be posed as “how does interpretation (and not representation) produce not only meaning
but also illusion?” If Kant sought the objective ground of subjective perceptions and
accomplished this through reference to certain facts of knowledge and the laws of
thinking that accompanied them, Nietzsche will attempt to radicalize this solution. This
more radical question that Nietzsche poses questions the necessity of these “facts” of
knowledge themselves. Nietzsche states it this way: “[T]he time has finally come to
replace the Kantian question ‘How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?’ with
another question ‘Why is the belief in such judgments necessary?’ – to realize, in other
words, that such judgments must be believed true for the purpose of preserving beings of
our type….”190 In a sense, the fact of knowledge that is to be proven by the Kantian
critical project is marked by Nietzsche as an object produced by the critical project, as is
the consciousness that guarantees its meaning. The belief in the existence of the
synthetic a priori judgment is necessary if one wants to preserve a certain set of truths or
“facts.” The Kantian critique sought to ground certain truths in the production of “new
faculties”; but the Nietzschean project is to ask ‘why these truths and not others?’ and,
perhaps more starkly, ‘why truth at all?’. 191 For example, the purpose of the Genealogy
is to examine the kind and type of forces and thoughts that require the truths that Kant is
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attempting to justify through the mechanism of the synthetic a priori judgment. What
desires require consciousness to be an original substance? What kinds of thoughts or
forces demand the ascetic ideal, or which ones require the coupling of bad conscience
and evil? This is meant to be the form of the critical question as far as Nietzsche is
concerned – “What force determines that such-and-such is a fact?”.192 For Ricoeur, the
critical philological question here asks which forces determine these judgments to be
true; and the genealogical question asks the origin of those forces and their quality. 193
Nietzsche’s project utilizes both questions, as well as an explicit hermeneutics that states
that interpretation and not a fixed form of judgment is responsible for the truths
produced.
The “philological” aspect of Nietzsche’s project here is to elucidate: 1) the
activities of thinking that combine to form consciousness and; 2) the relationships
between these activities which determine the character of consciousness. Rather than
viewing the surface of consciousness’s appearance as a closed text from which authentic
192
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readings can begin, Nietzsche treats the text of consciousness as a palimpsest that is
being continually overwritten by other activities of thinking. 194 This can be seen in his
various exercises in the etymology of the word “good” performed in the first essay of the
Genealogy. The benign concept of “good” is shown to have, at the very least, alternate
possible meanings based on its derivation from other Indo-European languages. These
competing definitions would mark “the good” not as “the useful,” “the pleasant,” or “the
lawful” but as “the warrior” (from the Latin “bonus”), “the one who has reality” (from
the Greek “esthlos”), and “the godlike” (from the German “gut”).195 The seeming
immediacy that the concept of “good” has in consciousness is not due to the concept
alone but to a whole series of historical and instinctive activities. But beside this explicit
sort of philology, Nietzsche’s decisive philological step, for Ricoeur, is to identify
conscious thought as something produced by many competing instincts: “[T]he greatest
part of conscious thought must still be attributed to instinctive activity and this is even the
case for philosophical thought.”196 Consciousness is, then, nothing profound in itself but
is rather “a surface.”197 This move is critical because it would replace traditional
philosophical questions with, in Nietzsche’s language, a “psychology” or “physiognomy”
of the instincts that make consciousness possible. These instincts can also be interpreted
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from the sorts of questions that consciousness or a type of consciousness will attempt to
answer. Nietzsche writes: “To grasp psychology as morphology and the doctrine of the
development of the will to power, which is what I have done – nobody has ever come
close to this, not even in thought: this, of course, to the extent that we are permitted to
regard what has been written so far as a symptom of what has not been said until now.”198
Nietzschean “psychology” is an interpretation of the symptoms expressed in order to
clarify the wills to power that produce those effects. It is this Nietzschean “psychology”
of the instincts that is rendered as “philology” in the Ricoeurian reading. This instinctual
model for Nietzsche is more evocative of his depiction of thinking and willing as
“complicated” and as activities that are not simple but are synthesizing activities whereby
a diverse manifold of instincts are unified and disguised as consciousness. An
examination of section 19 of Beyond Good and Evil will aid in showing Nietzsche’s
reasons for this conclusion as well as the fundamental sort of synthesis that consciousness
is.
In the first book of Beyond Good and Evil, “On the prejudices of philosophers,”
Nietzsche undertakes to reveal one or more dogmatic beliefs that remain for even those
critical philosophers who attack the problem of dogmatism in general. As Ricoeur often
states, it is the unproblematic status of the subject, that “soul-superstition that still causes
trouble as the superstition of the subject or I,” that is a primary target of the Nietzschean
critique.199 A critical philosophy that remains uncritical about the status of the subject as
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a guarantor of meaning will only shift the focal point of the dogmatic elements it
criticizes and not remove them. Nietzsche’s “instinctual” model of consciousness takes
pains to avoid this sort of dogmatism. Nietzsche asserts that just as consciousness is not
knowable without reference to something outside of consciousness, the instincts of life,
which are also frequently referred to as “wills,” are not knowable simply in themselves.
If we are to trace their morphology as they become conscious thoughts, the problem of
deciphering them is compounded as we never encounter a simple or singular will:
“Willing strikes me as, above all, something complicated, something unified only in a
word – and this single word contains the popular prejudice that has overruled whatever
minimal precautions philosophers might take. So let us be more cautious, for once – let
us be ‘unphilosophical.’”200 Philologically, the meaning of consciousness is determined
by the interactions of these instincts or “plurality of feelings”; but, in turn, their meaning
is not discernable in isolation from one another either.201 The illusion of a simple will or
consciousness is reflected in grammar, but it is not the grammar or word that is
responsible for the illusion – it is the relationships that the instincts assume with respect
to one another. The philological for Nietzsche problem is the interpretive untangling of
this complicated series of wills.
To this end, Nietzsche stipulates that the syntheses that produce consciousness are
effects of a hierarchy of command and obedience among the instincts, affects, or wills.
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This hierarchy is deduced in the genealogical moment of the interpretive process. The
affects, which are the component parts of instinctual activity, are not indeterminately
synthesized: “[T]he will is not just a complex of feeling and thinking, it is fundamentally
an affect: and specifically the affect of the command.”202 This affect of command is
essentially the same in its function as the one of the Kantian faculties is in what Kant
holds to be its legitimate domain – although for Nietzsche, the only criterion of
legitimacy is the display of strength. The synthesis of willing is legislated by or under an
affect of superiority – or a “commanding thought.” Consciousness, which is identified as
a particular type of willing by Nietzsche is a synthesis of various instincts of feeling and
thinking which are unified and become meaningful under the sign of the strongest
“commandeering” instinct. Nietzsche’s archaeology of consciousness here deduces a
complex of competing and subordinating wills or instincts whose various desires are
appropriated by a legislating will which coerces obedience. And, in a moment that
reveals a difference in Nietzsche’s deduction from Freud’s, this synthesis or legislation
follows not the principle of constancy, but what I will refer to as a principle of
expenditure. Nietzsche writes: “Every animal – therefore la bête philosophe, too –
instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all
its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power....”203 Instead of seeking a
conservation of its instinctual means while achieving pleasure, Nietzsche deduces that the
legislative instincts desire only to express their strength, whatever the means or ends. As
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Pierre Klossowski notes: “It is excess that makes manifest that which exists….”
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Appropriation, here, has its goal in itself: “Physiologists should think twice before
positioning the drive for self-preservation as the cardinal drive of an organic being.
Above all, a living being wants to discharge its strength....”205 The psychoanalytic
principle of constancy, on the other hand, expresses a conservative nature in the psyche.
For Nietzsche, consciousness, a result for Freud of the reconciliation of conflicting
desires, is not a necessary outcome of the syntheses of the instincts. Nietzsche does not
deduce a self-regulating principle at work in the instincts.
To understand why consciousness itself is not necessary, we must see as coupled
to this legislating synthesis of wills Nietzsche’s suspicion of all forms of “immediate
certainty,” which leads to his perspectivism. 206 If, as Nietzsche has stated, the “I” is an
effect of various drives, then the certainty of any consciousness of that “I” could only be
guaranteed by the interaction of those drives. What appears as consciousness has been
argued to be the result of drives; therefore, the certainty of any thought to that
consciousness must also be a product of those drives. However, the status of thought is
not self-assured, as it (and therefore its certainty) depends upon whichever will is playing
the commanding role. If “willing is complicated” then for Nietzsche the products of that
will are also necessarily complicated: “There are still harmless self-observers who
believe in the existence of ‘immediate certainties,’ such as ‘I think,’ or the ‘I will….’ But
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I will say this a hundred times: ‘immediate certainty,’ like ‘absolute knowledge’ and the
‘thing-in-itself’ contains a contradictio in adjecto.”207 The contradiction in terms here
that Nietzsche is referring to is the contradiction of arriving at non-mediated knowledge
from a consciousness of meaning that is explained as synthetic but without a fixed
hierarchy of legislation. This raises the question of what it is that wills consciousness or
certainty in any form.
The synthesis of the “I” that Nietzsche invokes leads directly to the need from
interpretation as the condition for knowledge. It is not the “I “ alone that is to be doubted
as bearing a determinate meaning but any meaning, due to the process of synthesis: “In
fact, there is already too much packed into the ‘it thinks’: even the ‘it’ contains an
interpretation of the process an does not belong to the process itself.”208 In any
determination of the meaning of consciousness, interpretation will make that
determination possible. And this interpretation must come from a particular perspective:
“There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’….”209 Nietzsche here
finds himself in proximity to the aspect of Ricoeur’s phenomenology that was discussed
earlier under the rubric of perspective and sense. Each instinctual force seeks to interpret
from its perspective; and the sense that a phenomenon bears will depend on which forces
are actively determining its meaning. It appears that although Nietzsche is not a
phenomenologist (as he lacks a concept of the phenomenological epoche and does not
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seek a fully determined logic of sense) he is treading on ground which Ricoeur will
recover in a phenomenological way when he argues that interpretation is necessary for
the constitution of sense between competing wills or forces. For Nietzsche, the
commanding will is the legislator of sense, the interpreter; but sense is no more fixed than
the identity of its interpreter is. There will be no final codification of meaning as an
eschatological result or as a strong kind of teleology. Here we can see Nietzsche’s
description of the “well-turned-out person” as essentially the same as the role of the
commanding will in a synthesis of sense: “Instinctively he collects from everything he
sees, hears, lives though, his sum: he is a principle of selection, he discards much.”210
The strong, selective instinct is responsible for the synthesis of sense as well as for the
determination of worth. And in the field of evaluation, selection is the activity on the part
of the instincts that is called “interpretation” in the field of meaning.
The problem of appropriation here is identical to the problem of which will or
instinct is legislating. The force that determines the synthesis of meaning, for Nietzsche,
is the one that successfully appropriates the action of the other forces under its own
meaning. This appropriative synthesis is revealed, for example, in the illusion of free
will: “What is called ‘freedom of the will’ is essentially the affect of superiority with
respect to something that must obey.”211 The suspicion of consciousness on Nietzsche’s
part here is due to this plurality of wills and the dynamics of their syntheses into what
appears as a free consciousness and free will. What is concealed, however, is precisely
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that “[o]n the one hand, we are, under the circumstance, both the one who commands and
the one who obeys… [o]n the other hand, however, we are in the habit of ignoring and
deceiving ourselves about this duality [of command and obedience] by means of the
synthetic concept of the ‘I.’”212 This concept, being the product of a synthesis, is only the
appropriation of certain drives into a central illusion of unity. This appropriation of
obeying wills by a commanding one is the hidden text behind every consciousness,
revealed by Nietzsche’s philosophical philology. In this way, for Nietzsche, is
consciousness produced as a surface effect – “L’effet c’est moi.”
Because the philological approach shows that the origins of expressions are
“complicated” and plural, it becomes necessary to add a genealogical element to
hermeneutics lest the philological argument fall quickly into another dogmatic position.
A hermeneutics without this complement devolves into just a new method of the
deciphering of static symbols according to a set of techniques. In other words, that
hermeneutics would run the risk of criticizing and then reproducing a dogmatic system
based on the self-immanence of what is interpreted and its meaning. For Nietzsche,
Ricoeur argues, genealogy finds its purpose as a demystifying procedure exposing the
nihilism at the source of religious and ethical value claims. In other words, Nietzsche’s
genealogy is mobilized to show that the interpretation of a symbol is always at a distance
from the circumstances of the expression of that symbol. As was also the case with
Ricoeur’s interpretation of Freud, Nietzsche is shown to interpret ethical prohibitions not
as expressions of supra-temporal values or ideas but as an expression of weakness on the
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part of the forces that compose the prohibition. As Ricoeur writes, “The genealogical
task is to reveal the emptiness of this source.”213 In this way, he argues that Nietzsche’s
genealogy is not itself nihilist but rather that the objects of his diagnosis are nihilist,
insofar as their origin is nothing. The counterpart of metaphysical dogmatism, which was
the target of the philological thrust, is the metaphysical nihilism at the heart of a certain
kind of moral judgment.
Central to this account is the interpretation of the forces that compose
consciousness as originating as weak forces or desires. Weakness is used by Nietzsche to
designate a force or will that does not actively seek determination or synthesis –
preferring not to act.214 The usual position taken by a weak force is one that has been set
down by some other determining agent and then merely followed by the weak.
Nietzsche’s discussions of slavery need always to be understood in this light, as ‘slave’ is
just another designation for Nietzsche of a force that cannot determine itself. For these
weak forces, synthesis is replaced by the phenomenon of belief:
Metaphysics is still needed by some, but so is that impetuous demand for
certainty that today discharges itself in scientific-positivistic form among great
masses – the demand that one wants by all means something to be firm (while
owing to the fervour of this demand one treats the demonstration of this certainty
more lightly and negligently): this is still the demand for foothold, support – in
short, the instinct of weakness that, to be sure, does not create sundry religions,
forms of metaphysics, and convictions but does – preserve them. 215
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As both knowledge and any determination of sense have been discussed as products of
synthesis and expression, these weak forces are called such because of their failure or
inability to determine their own syntheses. Nietzsche also states that this “slavish”
weakness in determination correlates to a demand for a fixed truth. And this demand for
an unchanging determination of meaning is tied to those forces’ inability to actively
determine meaning for themselves. In this way does belief in a fixed truth or meaning
become more important than the act of synthesis to these weak forces. Thus their
meaning is always secondarily derived from some other synthesis, determination, or force
and then posited as arising from some event other than the synthesis by which it became
determinate. The instincts of weak morality that Nietzsche diagnoses, being unable to
actively synthesize values or meanings, have no recourse for their desires except to
preserve a realm of “ideal being.”216 This realm is supposedly the home of all the values
and truths that weak forces want to exist in the world but are unable to enact
efficaciously. In fact, Nietzsche repeatedly states that the motive behind this invention is
one of vengeance or ressentiment. The diagnosis of this “realm” however shows it to be
“‘nothing.’ It emerges only from the weakness of the slave morality, which projects itself
into the heavens.”217 In lieu of creation and affirmation (which are generally afforded a
positive evaluation from Nietzsche), the slave morality makes an illusory creation of a
realm of ideal being from which judgments can proceed. The Nietzschean genealogy
here reveals this realm to be merely a representation of specific desires that are unable to
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manifest themselves through action with other forces. As Ricoeur summarizes it:
“Behind the so-called autonomy of the will is hidden the resentment of a particular will,
the will of the weak. Because of... this genealogy, the god of morality, to speak in the
manner of Nietzsche, reveals himself as the god of accusation and condemnation.”218
Therefore, we see that Ricoeur sees and uses Nietzsche’s critical project here
primarily as an indictment of any morality that is based on abstract conceptions of duty
and punishment. A crucial element to the Ricoeurian reading of the genealogical projects
of both Freud and Nietzsche is the concretizing of seemingly a priori principles by their
reduction into forces that are hidden in their projection. Ricoeur writes of Freud and
Nietzsche that “what seemed to be a strict necessity, the formal principle of obligation,
now appears as the result of a hidden process, a process that refers back to an original act
of accusation rooted in the will.”219 Ricoeur here refers obliquely to both the philological
hermeneutic of the reduction of an act to a process as well as the genealogical
hermeneutic of ascertaining the hidden origin of the act. Central to Ricoeur’s reading is
that the Nietzschean critique shows the real cause of ethical prohibition to be rooted in
the desires of those who “read” existence as possessing a condemnation of itself. This
self-negation of any force of life by itself is criticized as ‘nihilism’ by Nietzsche. The
emptiness here is the result of a positive process attempting to negate itself through
abstract means – slavish desires which attempt to have determinations of sense without
actively determining them. In the positing of an abstract judgment of life, weak forces do
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nothing positive in terms of synthesis (or in Nietzsche’s terms “creation”). Instead they
only accuse life in an empty manner with abstract means, borrowed from other synthetic,
interpretive acts. Even the seemingly naturalistic explanation of life as being primarily
concerned with the preservation of itself is diagnosed by Nietzsche as arising out of
weakness: “To wish to preserve oneself is a sign of distress, of a limitation of the truly
basic life-instinct, which aims at the expansion of power and in so doing often enough
risks and sacrifices self-preservation.”220 With these expressions of weakness, belief and
representation take the place of active determination.
For Nietzsche’s archaeology of consciousness, then, the problem of consciousness
is “To what end does consciousness exist at all when it is basically superfluous?”221 This
statement of the superfluity of consciousness reveals Nietzsche’s deep suspicion that not
only is consciousness deceptive in matters of ethics and of truth but that it is also
unnecessary and a product of weak forces. The principle of constancy that in Freud
makes the conscious ego a necessary outcome in any normal reconciliation of the
vicissitudes of the instincts would also fall under Nietzsche’s suspicion here. This, again,
shows that a different economics of the instincts is active in Nietzsche’s work. The
appearance of consciousness as an effective agent is made possible by the instinctual life
that provides it with its force and direction. But it remains to be seen what sort of instinct
it is that commands in the creation of consciousness. How is it that “the most fragile
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organ it [the body] has developed, comes to dominate the body”?

However, this

picture does not give the full import of Nietzsche’s interpretation of consciousness from
Ricoeur’s standpoint. The synthetic nature of the “I” just described also does not testify
to the radicality of Nietzsche’s interpretation. With this basic outline of Nietzsche’s
suspicion, let us now turn to the comparison of Ricoeur’s readings of Freud with
Nietzsche with the intent of disentangling the two. As was stated before, this will turn on
their interpretations of the symbols of the tragedy of Oedipus Tyrranus.

III. Two Archaeologies of Tragedy
Ricoeur has argued that the nature of the hermeneutics of suspicion is to eschew a
general hermeneutic approach for a regional and critical approach. A genuine
hermeneutic strategy is too easily compromised if it turns too early to a universal account
of all phenomena. For Ricoeur this general hermeneutics is to be hoped for but is not to
be the starting point. Part of the apparent similarity of the approaches of Freud and
Nietzsche lies not only in their archaeological accounts of human instincts but also in
their preference of symbols from Greek tragedy.
For Freud, this preference can be traced to his proposal that “dreams are the
dreamer’s private mythology and myths the waking dreams of peoples, that Sophocles’s
Oedipus and Shakespeare’s Hamlet are to be interpreted in the same way as dreams.”223
The symbols that are chosen to represent the instincts in both dreams and tragedies are
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The complex denoted by the tragic

figure of Oedipus finds its earliest artistic symbolization in the tragedy but derives its
universal import from the conflicting desires and instincts that all humans must work
through. According to psychoanalytic investigation, the tragedy of Oedipus lies in the
desires and emotional ambiguity towards his parents that his character symbolizes. In his
actions, Oedipus, in Freud’s interpretation of the tragedy, represents the demands made
on consciousness by the often-conflicting sources of civilization and the instincts. This
“universal drama” stems from the earliest desires on the part of the (male) child, who
develops an identification with his father and also an object-cathexis with his mother.225
But the complex truly blossoms when this object-choice becomes more intense and the
father with whom the child has identified himself becomes an object of hostility, due to
his being perceived “as an obstacle” to the child’s desires.226 Lear notes, however, that
Freud gives this formulation only as the most simple example for communicating the
theory: “For one gets an impression that the simple Oedipus complex is by no means its
commonest form, but rather represents a simplification or schematization which, to be
sure, is often enough justified for practical purposes.”227 The importance, it seems is not
in the precise details of the complex but rather in the emotional ambivalence towards the
parents and the vicissitudes of the instincts that the myth represents. For this reason, Lear
states “[t]his is the familiar structure of the Oedipus complex and Freud basically admits
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that it never occurs.”

Thus the Oedipus complex arrives as a moment of emotional

ambivalence on the part of the child to the demands made by his own instincts, on the one
hand, and by the situation of reality, on the other. The character of Oedipus is tragic
precisely because he acts out these desires in the killing of his father and the marriage to
his mother. The fact that this situation is unknown to Oedipus at the time of his
accomplishing of these aims does not deter Freud’s reading on this point precisely
because the nature of these desires are repressed by the ego of a “normal” adult. Freud’s
point is that our situation would be identical to Oedipus’s if we allowed the desires of
childhood full play. The reason for this ascribed identification must be the principle of
the constancy of the instincts, which will demand reconciliation from a conflict of this
magnitude.
In his actions and pronouncements, the character of Oedipus represents our
primitive desires as well as those conflicting desires to avoid pain that attempt to arrest
the achievement of the goals of the more primitive instincts. In this way can Freud say
that the overcoming of the Oedipus complex is the foundation of the agency of the
superego.229 The conflict that Oedipus undergoes in searching for the murderer of the
king forces him to identify with the desires of the community against his own libidinal
urges to kill the father and take his place. This symbolizes for Freud the alteration of the
energy of the libido which was previously used for its own aims into energy that attempts
to inhibit the realization of those goals which are repugnant to society. Oedipus must
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then be punished for his transgression of the laws of the civilization. The symbols of the
tragedy hold such importance for Freud because “repression and culture, intrapsychical
and social institution, coincide in this paradigmatic case.”230 All such symbols, then, in
order to be grasped as tragic, must display some universal vicissitude of instincts to
which all of us are prey as well as the downfall of a character who fails to integrate or
synthesize those instincts in an appropriate manner. Tragedy relates the unity of
“ontogenesis, the individual secret, with phylogenesis, the universal destiny.”231 In this
way does the mythic figure of tragic Oedipus carry symbolic weight in the analysis of our
own conflicting desires. At this psychic and cultural level, Ricoeur finds that the symbol
of Oedipus has a profound importance as a demystifying symbol to reflection.232 The
myth of Oedipus can be said to be one of the primary archaeological symbols regarding
the origins of human conflict.
A case could be made that the central symbol of Nietzsche’s philosophical work
is tragedy233 and his preoccupying concern is the sort of culture that is capable of
creating tragedy or understanding “tragic feeling.”234 However, here it will be sufficient
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to show the manner in which these specific tragic symbols that Freud interprets as
symbolizing the Oedipal complex appear differently in Nietzsche’s analysis of them.
This will enable the progressive distanciation of the Nietzschean hermeneutics from the
Freudian.
For Nietzsche, no special place among tragedies is given to Oedipus Tyrannus.
While tragedy as a phenomenon holds an elevated rank over other phenomena, and
cultures that are capable of creating it are also esteemed more highly, Oedipus’s specific
origin and destiny in action are not what is essential. In Freud’s interpretation, the
repetition of the Oedipal event is what is both to be feared as well as appreciated as an
essential event in the development of a healthy consciousness. The difference in
Nietzsche’s interpretation of tragedy in general is twofold: 1) it is not in the specific
characters of the drama that the essence of the tragic unfolds; 2) the repetition that is
sought in understanding the tragedy is an evaluative one, not necessarily one involving a
gain in knowledge. Nietzsche rhetorically asks if the affectivity of the tragedian
demonstrates a valuable possibility for evaluation: “Does [the tragic artist] not display
precisely the condition of fearlessness in the face of the fearsome and questionable?”235
This fearlessness marks the “tragic” as distinct from the “slavish,” as it need not respond
to suffering as ressentiment. It is, instead, the affective disposition towards affirmation in
the face of suffering that is primarily selected as the worth of tragedy: “Affirmation of
life even in its strangest and sternest problems… that is what I called Dionysian, that is
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what I recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet.”
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In the discussion

of any particular tragedy, we should expect this invocation of affirmation or resistance to
ressentiment through fearlessness. And characteristic of Nietzsche’s references to
Oedipus is the mention of Oedipus’s vision and his fearless, nearly reckless questioning:
The problem of the value of truth came before us, - or was it we who came before
the problem? Which of us is Oedipus? Which one is the Sphinx? It seems we
have a rendezvous of questions and question-marks. – And, believe it or not, it
ultimately looks to us as if the problem has never been raised until not, - as if we
were the first to ever see it, fix our gaze on it, risk it. Because this involves risk
and perhaps no risk has ever been greater.237
This “Oedipal” moment is not found as an archaeological relic of desire but as a
progressive, active desire, unrepressed and even encouraged by culture. In this, we can
see Nietzsche’s distance from the Freudian deduction of the instincts. There is no
presence of a state of equilibrium that is to be maintained in the life of the instincts, but
rather a progressive conflict, subordination, or prostration among them. But as is always
the case in Nietzsche, the notion of individuation that we normally take for granted is
suspended. However, not only does the passage distance us from consciousness, it also
multiplies the possible origins of the questioning. Are we, as those who seek the truth,
Oedipus or the Sphinx? Are we the tragic hero or the monster of uncertain origin? This
question, though, is only pertinent regarding the value of what Nietzsche calls the “will to
truth.” The correct answer to the Sphinx’s question causes her/it to take her own life –
but the answer to Oedipus’s investigation results in his blindness as well. Both results are
meant to show the nihilism operating in the seemingly unconditioned desire for truth and
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not necessarily any kind of profound identification with the actions of either character.
With the mechanism of identification absent, we are clearly dealing with a different
symbolism of Oedipus than there is in Freud’s texts. As Assoun states, “there is thus no
theory of identification [in Nietzsche’s works] as an elaboration of the paternal
model.”238 Without this mechanism of identification, Nietzsche’s archaeology is quite
different than Freud’s, as well. The past, either psychical or historic, is not in danger of
being repeated in Nietzsche’s archaeological strategy. With this repetition absent, the
appeal to the principle of expenditure is less one of regaining force that has been lost than
it is in the expression and affirmation of new syntheses. Said in a negative manner,
Nietzsche’s archaeology reveals a different emphasis than Ricoeur places on his texts in
saying “What Nietzsche wants is to augment man’s power and restore his force....”239
Ricoeur reads Nietzsche here in a manner that is closer to Freud’s more conservative
archaeology than to Nietzsche’s valorization of expenditure. Another of Nietzsche’s
references to Oedipus will help clarify this.
In a less ambiguous reference to Oedipus, Nietzsche links him with the hero
Odysseus. The basic thrust of the appeal to these heroes, however, is the same as in the
previous passage:
To translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and
fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and
drawn over that eternal basic text of homo natura so far; to make sure that, from
now on, the human being, just as he already stands before the rest of nature
today, hardened by the discipline of science, - with courageous Oedipus eyes and
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sealed up Odysseus ears, deaf to the lures of the old metaphysical bird catchers
who have been whistling to him for far too long....240
Oedipus’s eyes, blinded after his search for truth, are valorized as are Odysseus’s ears,
sealed to the calls from speculative metaphysics for an abstract conception of truth.241
Again, the genealogical question is raised as to what it is that wills truth. Oedipus, it
seems, in this passage has learned to resist this call – the call not just for a particular
interpretation of truth but for any truth whatsoever. The particular characters (here
Oedipus and Odysseus) symbolize not just their particular actions but in general the
affectivity of a tragic conception of life. In summarizing this passage, Jacques Derrida
states: “Oedipus, no longer naive, does not assume their [the metaphysical bird catchers’]
blinding charge any more than he disclaims it.”242 Oedipus, here the symbol for the
tragic, neither assumes nor denies the truth of the metaphysicians’ claims. Rather, he and
this ‘Odysseus’ aim at something else. The aim here is what, for Nietzsche, is labeled as
“noble.” The noble in thought, distinguished from the slavish, is precisely the active
determination of the synthesis of sense that was discussed earlier. And, it is nobility that
is also at the heart of the principle of expenditure. Nietzsche glosses this nobility as
“[being] incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds
seriously for very long – that is the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess
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of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget....”

111
It is nobility, as an affect

or as a taste, for which Nietzsche the author claims to be aiming. 244 His statement of this
is remarkable for its proximity to the stance taken by Nietzsche’s Oedipus: “My taste,
which may be called the opposite of a tolerant taste, is even here far from uttering a
wholesale Yes: in general it dislikes saying Yes, it would rather say No, most of all it
prefers to say nothing at all....”245
If any aspect of Oedipus as a character is important for Nietzsche as a symbol, it
is not his action of killing his father and marrying his mother. For Freud’s archaeological
interest, this aspect is key. Instead the importance of the myth for Nietzsche could be
seen to lie in Oedipus’s rule of the kingdom and his demand for truth, which ends up
proving Oedipus to be both the legitimate and illegitimate ruler at the same time – while
not being the master of his own destiny, either. In blinding himself, it seems that
Oedipus transforms into a symbol for the critique of the value of truth for Nietzsche.
Oedipus reaches the point described in the Genealogy of Morals where he must “patere
legem, quam ipse tulisti” – submit to the law you yourself proposed.246 From a
philological perspective, we can see Oedipus as a Nietzschean symbol for the many
forces that coalesce to produce a singular fate. But, from the genealogical perspective,
Nietzsche’s diagnosis is startlingly different than that which was Freud’s. The origin of
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these forces, particularly the ones criticized by Nietzsche, lie in the weakness of the will.
Nietzsche introduces not just a criticism of the morality of duty but also a criticism of
morals, broadly construed. The will to truth and the weakness of the slavish moralities
are deduced to spring from the same sources.
The affirmative symbolism of the tragic is what Nietzsche opposes to this
weakness. Whereas in Freud’s texts, the Oedipal symbol gives us only the goal of
acclimating ourselves to the fate it communicates, the goal Nietzsche has in mind is much
different. And is on this point precisely where Nietzsche can be seen more clearly to
break from the hermeneutic framework that Ricoeur has proposed as belonging to the
hermeneutics of suspicion. Throughout, the predominant criticism that Ricoeur has made
of the hermeneutics of suspicion is that it needs completion in a progressive hermeneutics
of creation. His refrain has been that Nietzsche and Freud remain too archaeological, and
while this is a needed corrective to a naive investigation of things as being simple in their
meanings, it is insufficient for the task of an affirmative account of human nature. Part of
Nietzsche’s use of the symbols of tragedy, however, calls for the definite affirmation of a
goal – what Nietzsche will call the goal of nobility. In this, it appears that as an
archaeological task, Nietzsche’s methodology has lead to some profound differences
from Freud’s analytic archaeology. This is reason enough, despite the initial appearances
of similarity, to pose the problem that Nietzsche’s genealogy, while being a type of
hermeneutics, poses significantly different diagnoses of interpretive conditions than
Ricoeur’s poles of archaeology and teleology allow.247 How can we reconcile the
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principle of expenditure and the critique of the will to truth and its moralism with
Ricoeur’s hope for a dialectical resolution to the problem of the multiplicity of meaning?
At least, the route we must take through Nietzsche’s texts is markedly distinct from the
route we would take through Freud’s. In the next chapter, I will attempt to lay out in
more positive terms Nietzsche’s hermeneutic strategy, building from Ricoeur’s insights
into his hermeneutic method but incorporating Nietzsche’s own criticisms of the polarity
that Ricoeur has been working between.

fixed concept only ever results in another metaphor, another interpretation. See Eric Blondel, Nietzsche:
The Body and Culture: Philosophy as Philological Genealogy, trans., Sean Hand, (Stanford CA: Stanford
University Press, 1991), 245 passim.

CHAPTER THREE
THE TELEOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN NIETZSCHE’S GENEALOGICAL
METHOD
For Nietzsche, the value of interpretation lies not only in its capacity to provoke
suspicion, as Ricoeur has suggested, but also in its ability to enable what Nietzsche refers
to in Twilight of the Idols as “war.”248 Nietzsche mobilizes this symbol at the beginning
of The Gay Science, as well, in a poem entitled “Heracliteanism”: “Happiness on earth,
friends,/ only stems from war!”249 This symbol of ‘war,’ and its associated other names,
plays the part for Nietzsche of a complementary hermeneutical pole to that of
“suspicion,” akin to Ricoeur’s description of the “hermeneutics of recovery.” Whereas
Ricoeur criticizes Freud for focusing excessively on the archaeology of desire – despite
the possible recourse that Freud’s theories have in the mechanism of sublimation – little
is said in Ricoeur’s accounts of Nietzsche’s archaeological method of a possible
Nietzschean counterpart to sublimation, other than to criticize its absence.250 In this
chapter, my goal will be to elucidate this generally neglected or overlooked teleological
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dimension of Nietzsche’s hermeneutic method, which is produced from the activity of
conflicting interpretations: “War has always been the grand sagacity of every spirit
which has grown too inward and too profound; its curative power lies even in the wounds
one receives.”251 The apparent wisdom that Nietzsche locates in war lies in its expression
of the exteriority of interpretive forces and their conflicts. Metaphorically, war arises on
a contested field of interpretation over the meaning of concepts; and its activity is the
progressive reinterpretation and appropriation of those concepts on that field. In this
chapter, I intend to show that the critical force that Nietzsche’s method possesses derives
its power for appropriative activity from the very concepts that it criticizes. In the place
of a dialectical progression toward a concretized final determination of sense, the
Nietzschean conflict of interpretations valorizes the activity of the conflict, under the
symbol of ‘war,’ between the exegetical tactics but without renouncing a certain, limited
impulse to teleology. In this way, ‘war’ utilizes the forces at hand in a directed attempt to
reinvigorate those which have turned inward, like those of the bad conscience, to a kind
of health. 252 Far from denying the hermeneutics of appropriation, Nietzsche’s texts
conceptualize a type of appropriation that resists eschatological impulses and – contra
Ricoeur and others – engages in a creative process of sense-building and not merely in a
critique of meaning. However, the critique of the hope for eschatology that Nietzsche
offers alters the kind of appropriation possible to a determination of sense that lies
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beyond the bounds of Ricoeur’s sense of recovery. As Nietzsche writes, “Another form
of recovery, in certain cases more suited to me [than war], is to sound out idols…. There
are more idols in the world than there are realities….”253 The criticism of idols, the idol
of God in particular, will lead us to the problem developed in Nietzsche’s texts of how
appropriation is possible once eschatological hope has been “sounded out” as hollow and
disregarded. One aspect of Nietzsche’s idea of “recovery” will be this continuing work
of suspicion, of iconoclasm.
The task for this chapter will be to construct this interpretive position in
Nietzsche’s works and begin to show how it operates as a part of his genealogical
method. As I am arguing that there is a teleological trajectory in the accounts of
Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation, it will be necessary to show how this method
emerges from Nietzsche’s discussions of interpretation, genealogy, and perspective. It is
possible that finding this Nietzschean “soil” of interpretation can also reduce a number of
the apparent paradoxes that emerge in Nietzsche’s texts – and are aided and abetted in the
secondary literature surrounding those works.254 It will be argued that Nietzsche’s
chosen field of battle will be the field of sense and that it is as a critique and
appropriation of sense that his genealogy or hermeneutics is best understood. His
criticisms of “teleology” and “ends” must be considered with this in mind, as well. I
contend that the sense of teleology understood as an eschatological termination of
movement or change is the primary target of Nietzsche’s criticisms of teleology – and
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also one of the targets in the invocations of the “death” of the concept(s) of god. A
second sense of teleology as a “directedness” to sense is retained by Nietzsche’s
hermeneutics and can even be considered as “healthy.” If this is successful as a reading
of Nietzsche’s texts, then the Nietzschean hermeneutic will avoid the precise
categorizations of the Ricoeurian poles of hermeneutics while remaining a hermeneutic
method. And Nietzsche’s method would retain a powerful criticism of a hermeneutics of
recovery, such as Ricoeur employs, by removing the goal of an interpretive finality from
within the hermeneutic method itself.

I. Interpretation and War
For Nietzsche, the process of critique is inseparable from the activity of
interpretation. In his genealogies, the interpretive act is the attempt to determine the
meaning of certain concepts according to the conditions that have enabled these concepts
to become actualized. All interpretive acts, however, proceed from a particular
hermeneutic standpoint or perspective. According to what Nietzsche calls his
“perspectivism,” however, “all our actions are incomparably and utterly personal, unique,
and boundlessly individual.... that due to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of
which we can become conscious is merely a surface- and sign-world, a world turned into
generalities and thereby debased to its lowest common denominator....”255 Becomingconscious of a field of meaningfulness is a result of the application of a certain
perspective to the symbols and signs encountered. Thus, each interpretation of the
255
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conscious world is but an interpretation of a sign or symbol and the application of a
concept to it. In fact, the constitution of a world at all is the result of the work of
interpretation, as Eric Blondel states: “The body is a series of instincts (Instinke) or drives
(Triebe) that constitute reality as they interpret it.”256 Although it is not necessarily
important here to develop Blondel’s concept of the body, I agree with the manner in
which he situates interpretation as simultaneously working on and working in the world
as it is constructed. Nietzsche is not discussing the construction/interpretation of the field
of objectivity by a transcendental subject. Instead, following the earlier discussion of the
construction of the subject through interpretation, it is important to extend that analysis to
objects as well: “As one might guess, it is not the opposition between subject and object
which concerns me here [discussing perspective]; I leave that distinction to those
epistemologists who have got tangled up in the snares of grammar (of folk
metaphysics).”257 Perspectivism and interpretation are the activites by which both subject
and object are constituted. Here, I also agree with Christoph Cox’s assessment that
“Nietzsche’s theory of interpretation holds that objects are nothing given but that they,
too, are only ever constructions of one or another interpretation.258 And, in a manner
similar to that described by Ricoeur, each interpretation of the world must necessarily
occur from a particular, finite perspective of a drive. What is distinctive about
Nietzsche’s method, however, is that genealogy interprets the causes of these concepts to
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be both historically based and contingent – and neither transcendent nor necessary.

259

119
As

Nietzsche states in his exegesis of the meanings of the pair of concepts “good” and
“evil”:
Fortunately, I learned early to separate theological prejudice from moral prejudice
and ceased to look for the origin of evil behind the world... A certain amount of
historical and philological schooling... soon transformed my problem into another
one: under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and evil?
and what value do they themselves possess? 260
Thus, a questioning of the meaning of the judgments “good” and “evil” must look into
the historical and psychological conditions that make those judgments possible.
Nietzsche’s critique of this sort of moral judgment both shows us the actual conditions
for their employment and also that the terms “good” and “evil” mean something different
than what the morality which claims them in its domain would have us believe.
Moral judgments, if subject to the historical process with its accidents and
developments for their meaningfulness, can neither be justified by transcendent ideals nor
judged according to events not actualized. Michel Foucault states regarding this that
Nietzsche’s genealogical project “rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal
significations and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for ‘origins.’”261
The interpretations offered by genealogy criticize the deployment of concepts from a
non-transcendent standpoint and look for their actual meaning and value as they have
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developed in history. Nietzsche’s criticism of final ends comes from the same reasoning
as his criticism of any origin that would be characterized as causa sui – or as the cause of
itself. His late works, with their intertwining yet distinct itineraries, all form part of what
Nietzsche proclaims is his “No-doing”: “After the Yes-saying part of my task had been
solved [in the works through Thus Spoke Zarathustra], the turn had come for the Nosaying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the great war – conjuring up a
day of decision.”262 This dense passage of self-interpretation marks a kind of departure
in the works from Beyond Good and Evil to Anti-Christ towards a critical enterprise – a
work of suspicion. However, the genealogies articulated in those texts form a sustained
project of interpreting how the metaphysical and moral assumptions and concepts of
philosophy are made possible through the work of the forces that compose them.
Although these texts develop as distinct works, distinct genealogical trajectories, the
similarities in the forces that are expressed accounts for the commonality in the targets
that Nietzsche finds in the philosophical tradition. Thus, Beyond Good and Evil, with its
broad critique of Modernity, reveals the same forces at work that the Genealogy of
Morals does, although the latter book attempts to focus on a narrower moral field. 263
Nietzsche’s No-doing is coextensive with his declaration of war on these metaphysical
concepts as both activities offer a critical re-evaluation and, ultimately, re-interpretation
262
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of metaphysics and morality. If, as Ricoeur has said, Nietzsche wants to be able to say ‘I
doubt better than Descartes’ then a Nietzschean wish to ‘critique more fully than Kant’
must be seen at work here, as well. 264 This desire to fulfill the Kantian attempt at critique
leads Nietzsche to his greatest expenditures, but it remains to be seen if those can be
viewed as successful ventures from Nietzsche’s own standpoints. As David Farrell Krell
writes, “Genealogical critique attacks the grounds of the metaphysics of Descartes and
Kant, but finds itself compelled to question whether such an attack remains within the
Leibnizian metaphysics of ground….”265 Is there some thing that remains fundamental in
Nietzsche’s critique and, therefore, exempted from critique? The answer to this problem,
I think, lies in the extent to which Nietzsche advocates deploying ‘war.’
The reasons for taking Nietzsche’s statements of ‘war’ as a key symbol of his
critique lie in Nietzsche’s method of critique. War, as a depiction of a conflict of forces,
is not a representative of a critique that arrives from a radically exterior or transcendent
source; war derives its power from a source immanent to that which is criticized itself –
its “curative power lies in the wounds one receives.”266 In other words, critique cannot
operate other than with tools that are already actualized in some manner and on concepts
or ideals as they have been actualized. This is the sense of Nietzsche’s conclusion
regarding the critique of ascetic ideals:
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All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of selfovercoming: thus the law of life will have it, the law of the necessity of “selfovercoming” in the nature of life – the lawgiver himself eventually receives the
call: “patere legem, quam ipse tulisti [Submit to the law you yourself
proposed].”267
In this context, Nietzsche’s criticism of the ascetic ideal and its conditions for possibility
is made possible by an unrealized aspect of that very ideal. When a command to know
the meaning of all things cannot know the meaning of itself, or has necessarily deceived
itself about its meaning, it can no longer stand as it once had because of the very reasons
immanent to that initial command. Nietzsche’s texts recognize the aims of the Kantian
project but desire to reach Kant’s end of a critique that is immanent to itself without the
illusions caused by the morality that Kant assumed uncritically – “that [morality] of a
cunning Christian....”268 The moral illusions that what Nietzsche terms the “will to truth”
has demanded will ultimately be subjected to that same will to truth through its desire for
universality. For this reason, Nietzsche likens Kant to “a fox who strays back into his
cage. Yet it had been his strength and cleverness that had broken open the cage!”269
Kant’s critical method inquires into the ground of the same concepts that Nietzsche
critiques, but Kant’s work assumes their rightful existence for moral reasons alone. With
the critique of morality that we have seen Nietzsche employ, he aims to rid philosophers
of the very cage – morality – that continues to dog attempts at completing the Kantian
project.
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As Nietzsche himself notes, he is “warlike by nature.”

270

But this is meant to

signify that his practice of critique is different than any criticism that comes about by
ressentiment. Nietzsche’s genealogies have their origin not in a desire for revenge, if we
take him at his word, but in an “aggressive pathos [that] belongs just as necessarily to
strength as vengefulness and rancor belong to weakness.” 271 The employment of war in
this case is opposed to way in which weakness gives birth to ideals. Forces that
Nietzsche characterizes as weak discover a need for a change in evaluation because of an
experience with suffering caused by a “hostile external world.”272 These values that are
created in response to this suffering, which Nietzsche refers to as products of a “slave
morality,” have as their motivation the resentment of those who are unable to act, “that
are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary
revenge.”273 Part of the form of this revenge is the setting-up of ideals from which the
weak can (negatively) judge the “external world” and find it lacking in all that it
seemingly does to inflict pain upon them. In this way, slave morality, in all of its
expressions, approaches problems contemptuously as things to be explained and justified.
Nietzsche’s adoption of the symbol of “war” is done for the sake of opposing this
resentment but not from the standpoint of a resentment that resents itself. This is why
Nietzsche proclaims, “Equality before the enemy: the first presupposition of an honest
270
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dual. Where one feels contempt, one cannot wage war; where one commands, where one
sees something beneath oneself, one has no business waging war.”274 In his attempt to
raise counter-ideals to those created by slave morality, Nietzsche is operating on “objects
of resistance.”275 These “objects” he is concerned with are not objects of hatred on his
part but are viewed as “equals” which do have a power that can be opposed.276 Even
though Nietzsche sees these ideals as products of resentment, as problems Nietzsche must
treat them as synthesized products of other forces, even if those forces are diagnosed as
weak. And it is Nietzsche’s attempt to distance himself from any reciprocal charges of
resentment when he states, “attack is in my case a proof of good will, sometimes even of
gratitude.”277 He must treat the products and ideals of slavish morality as legitimate
targets for reinterpretation and appropriation and not merely as “evil” objects that ought
not even be touched. When qualified in this way, if we take Nietzsche’s texts at their
word, the intent of the critique is to offer something other than a slavish resentment
towards resentment or “an accusation of accusation.”278
Another of the benefits for Nietzsche’s philosophy of the symbolism of “war” is
that its references and participants are never external to the field where it is deployed.
War symbolizes an immanent conflict between actual adversaries and not an imposition
from a radically exterior or transcendent viewpoint onto a field that it has already
274
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overcome. As Deleuze writes, “Transcendental philosophy [Kant’s critique] discovers
conditions which still remain external to the conditioned.”279 In Nietzsche’s terms, this
reflects the “inversion of the value-positing eye – this need to direct one’s view outward
instead of back to oneself....”280 Nietzsche, on the other hand, uses genealogy to uncover
the hidden internal sources – the contests and conquests between wills – of the genesis of
values and truths. If judgment occupies a vertical scheme of “one who judges” and “that
which is judged,” with its attending problems, then war works on a horizontal plane as a
conflict between actual forces or wills. Nietzsche, in opposing the judgments of slave
morality is already “an incarnate declaration of war and victory over all ancient
conceptions of ‘true’ and ‘untrue’.”281 And as it is possible without invoking external
transcendental conditions, the primary importance of the symbol of war is that it eludes
any description according to law. While there is a conflict or war of interpretations, there
can never legitimately be a law of interpretation for Nietzsche. Such a law would
mistakenly judge an interpretation or sense from a “heaven” of concepts and never fulfill
a project of critique. Indeed, the imposition of a law of interpretation would return
interpretation to the condition of a table of judgments and never free interpretation on its
own account. Genealogy shows us that interpretation can be internally bound by a will –
for example the will to truth – but not externally bound by a law. In order for humans to
operate according to laws, “man himself (sic) must first of all have become calculable,
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regular, necessary, even in his own image of himself....”
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In other words, lawfulness

itself is a phenomenon that must be conditioned; and those conditions can be sought
through genealogy. Pierre Klossowski asserts that for Nietzsche “[l]aws exist only
because of our need to calculate.”283 Also, the need for and feeling of being constrained
by a law is a mark of the weak: “The slave worked under the pressure of the feeling that
he was doing something contemptible: ‘doing’ was itself contemptible. ‘Nobility and
honour (sic) are attached solely to otium [doing] and bellum [war]’ – that was the ancient
prejudice!”284 We also see it in one of Nietzsche’s characteristically ambivalent passages
regarding the character of Jesus: “Jesus said to his Jews: “The law was for servants, love God as I do, as his son! Why should we care about morals, we sons of God?....”285
Respect for an external law, for Nietzsche, is always tied to a moral quality displayed by
weakness and negation. That forms of judgment continue to arise from an unquestioned
moral stance (in accordance with the law) in Kant’s texts is essentially Nietzsche’s
criticism of Kant and, potentially, of any form of transcendental idealism.
However, as interpretation’s “law” is replaced as “war” for Nietzsche, this does
not entail that Nietzsche abandons any sense of method or prediction in the sense in
which we have see Ricoeur use those terms. The preface to the second edition of The
Gay Science tells us that that book is full of “goals that are permitted and believed in
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One piece of the difficulty in making sense of Nietzsche’s texts is the manner

in which they deploy both a critique of systems and maintain a diagnostic stance that
Nietzsche seems to believe has traction or explanatory power. As Nietzsche maintains,
even the critical effort of Beyond Good and Evil contains “pointers to a contrary type that
is as little modern as possible – a noble, Yes-saying type.”287 In order to capture this, it is
necessary to see a limited teleology at work in Nietzsche’s method – a teleology without
an eschatological movement. Such a teleology would presumably be immanent to the
wills in the conflict and not an externally conditioning force operating on the conflict
from a position beyond it. It would mark an intended or actual end of the wills but not a
transcendent end from which one could objectively judge the conflict that has preceded it.
In this way can we understand both the Nietzsche of “the will to system is a lack of
integrity” and “Formula of my happiness: a Yes, a No, a straight line, a goal....”288
Insofar as the literature on Nietzsche has focused only on one or the other of these
aspects, it has neglected the resources of the whole of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics. In
Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche, for example, he focuses primarily on Nietzsche’s critique
of consciousness and of a system of knowledge built on that consciousness. Under this
interpretation, Nietzsche’s texts become wholly archaeological in their use with their
possible “teleological” pole left underdeveloped. For Ricoeur, as for Alexander
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, the value of Nietzsche’s texts is as a critical perspective on the difficulties

and task of realizing or recovering an authentic self or authentic knowledge. We can take
as emblematic of this approach Ricoeur’s discussion of Nietzsche’s announcement,
specifically in The Gay Science, of the “death of God.”290 First, it must be noted that
Ricoeur’s intention here is to discover what, if any, meaning Nietzsche’s pronouncement
has for religion – if there can be any faith after the acknowledgement of the criticisms by
Nietzsche and Freud. He intends to take up the “great hermeneutical conflict... between
the priest and the philologist” but in such a way as to recover a kind of meaning to
religious faith after the iconoclasm of Nietzsche’s and Freud’s criticisms of its
expressions. 291 Ricoeur writes: “If we are now to investigate the theological meaning of
this atheism, we must first say what sort of atheism is here in question. Everyone is
familiar with the famous expression of the madman in The Gay Science: ‘God is
dead.’”292 Presumably, Ricoeur has in mind that the sort of atheism that Nietzsche and
Freud advance may leave conceptual space for a Ricoeurian retrieval of a different brand
of theism, a theism not dominated by “accusation” and “consolation.”293
Ricoeur frames his exegesis of the proclamation ‘God is dead’ as a tripartite
response: “[T]he true question is to know, first of all, which god is dead; then, who has
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killed him (if it is true that this death is a murder); and finally, what sort of authority
belongs to the announcement of this death.”294 Ricoeur judges the ‘God’ that has died to
be the god of metaphysics or of ontotheology. ‘God is dead’ sums up for Ricoeur the
result of Nietzsche’s criticism of the concepts of traditional metaphysics – “first cause,
necessary being and the prime mover, conceived as the source of values and as the
absolute good.”295 In this, Ricoeur follows Heidegger, who interprets Nietzsche in part as
the figure who tries to end metaphysics.296
The ethical import of this ‘death’ is that all forms of a priori ethical “obligation”
can be viewed as constructed value claims and be made subject to a genealogical
analysis. For example, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, Essay Two analyzes the
concept of “original sin” in just this way and finds it to be an expression of weakness and
a negative judgment of life from that weak perspective. Ricoeur writes that “Concrete
accusation thus appears as the truth of formal obligation.”297 The death of God
symbolizes for Ricoeur that metaphysical truths are grounded on a baseless ethical
judgment of obligation. The obligation is seen as a priori only so long as we value life
negatively and construct ethics as accusation. The concept of God, the great accusation
of life, has buttressed metaphysical claims regarding truth. With the former gone,
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Ricoeur thinks we are freed from the latter as well and become able to seek truth
differently, affirmatively.
Ricoeur’s second response can be seen as developing one aspect of the
Nietzschean question of “which one?”. Who or what is it that has murdered God?
Ricoeur’s reply is that the “god of morality” has been murdered by metaphysics itself, as
it is understood as nihilism. Again we have an iteration that Nietzsche’s texts are not
necessarily themselves nihilist but only report the nihilism already evident in metaphysics
itself. “It is not the atheist [Nietzsche or Freud] but rather the specific nothingness that
lies in at the heart of the ideal, the superego’s lack of absolute authority.”298 Ricoeur’s
interpretation hinges on the inability of this concept of God to ground itself adequately as
a solution to the demands of certainty placed on it by metaphysics, which effectively
“kills” the concept because it can no longer be viewed as rigorously true. The ideal
cannot maintain the coherence required of truth and falls victim to the “cultural process,
the process of nihilism” that is deployed in all such searches for absolute truth.299 As it
arises from accusation and weakness, the concept of the god that fills the needs of the
weak succumbs to the weakness or nihilism at its origin by failing to deliver on its
promise of universal truth and consolation.
Ricoeur’s final interpretive question here asks the authority of Nietzsche’s
interpretation. And Ricoeur is not alone in asking this type of question of hermeneutics
and of genealogy in particular: “What sort of authority is invested in the words that
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proclaim the death of the god of morality? – everything suddenly becomes problematical
once again... Everything becomes doubtful when we ask: Who is saying this? The
madman? Zarathustra? The madman as Zarathustra? Perhaps.”300 Similarly, Lawrence
Hatab reads the pronouncement of the death of God as the madman’s attempt to summon
the threat of nihilism for “nonbelievers who are chastised for not facing the consequences
of God’s demise.”301 In these cases, what is being driven at here is the problem of how
we are to take the prospective, appropriative aspect of Nietzsche’s critique if there is no
finality that we can hope to recuperate. The Nietzschean genealogist asks “which one?”
in revealing the ruses of culture and morality; and here Ricoeur asks precisely this
question of Nietzsche’s texts themselves. The texts’ critical force is unquestioned, but
Ricoeur finds problematic the sweeping positive claim that Nietzsche’s pronouncements
can be proven: “At least we can say in negative terms that this type of thinking does not
prove anything conclusively one way or the other. ‘The man with the hammer’ has only
the authority of the message that he proclaims, namely, the will to power.”302
The question of the authority of Nietzsche’s interpretations and statements lies at
the heart of two great questions that often confront Nietzsche’s philosophy: 1) How can
Nietzsche claim that all is interpretation and claim that interpretation to be true?; 2) Do
the resources found in Nietzsche’s texts provide any positive status that would justify the
critiques of other philosophical concepts? These questions are related, as I see it; and to
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satisfy the first and more frequent question, the second must also be answered. For his
part, Ricoeur also would link these questions under the rubric of the hermeneutic poles of
suspicion and recovery. Of a possible hermeneutics of appropriation in Nietzsche’s texts,
Ricoeur writes, “This positive Nietzschean philosophy, which alone is capable of
conferring authority on his negative hermeneutics, remains buried under the ruins that
Nietzsche has accumulated around him.”303 As we saw in the last chapter, Ricoeur
believes that Nietzsche has not developed a hermeneutics of recovery which Ricoeur
thinks is necessary for a positive philosophy. In the text under consideration, Ricoeur
elaborates this, saying, “Nietzsche’s major work remains an accusation of accusation and
hence falls short of a pure affirmation of life.”304 Ricoeur reads Nietzsche as developing
a powerful archaeological critique of morality and metaphysics but as lacking an
affirmative account of the goal to be reached after the critical moment. In brief, then, this
passage demonstrates how Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche’s genealogy sees the text as
specifically neglecting a teleological trajectory to thought on the other side of critique.
With this development it remains for Ricoeur’s reading that Nietzsche’s hermeneutics is
valuable as critical archaeology but ultimately inadequate outside of the narrow
parameters Nietzsche has seemingly set for himself. In Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur
frames the illusion that undoes Nietzsche’s project as a “transcendental illusion” that
confuses “idols” in need of destruction with “symbols” that call for both critique and
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Ricoeur takes Nietzsche’s proclamation of “God is dead” strictly as

having iconoclastic import and, therefore, still in need of some teleological justification
that Nietzsche is read as not providing.
At this point, Ricoeur’s hermeneutic exegesis of Nietzsche’s method meets up
with the difficulty of the seeming relativism that Nietzsche’s texts expound. This
problem serves as the central jumping-off point for many commentaries on Nietzsche’s
work; and the particular attempt at its solution reveals much about the ultimate use to
which the commentator will put Nietzsche’s philosophy. To be sure, Ricoeur does not
attempt a solution, for the need for this discussion to his project is only to show the
partial and incomplete nature of a strictly archaeological approach. But the crediting of
Nietzsche with a hermeneutic method and the general structure of Ricoeur’s problematic
will both figure into my attempt at a solution to the difficulties raised here concerning
Nietzsche’s project.
A standard way of presenting these difficulties is found in Nehamas’s Nietzsche:
Life as Literature:
An interpretation, simply by virtue of being offered, is inevitably offered in the
conviction that it is true. But then, despite any assurances to the contrary, it is
presented as a view which everybody must accept on account of its being true.
When we show that some other enterprise is partial, even as we assert that ours is
partial as well, we implicitly and perhaps against our will commend what we do
to universal attention. Every effort to present a view, no matter how explicitly its
interpretive nature is admitted, makes an inescapable dogmatic commitment. The
point is not that the faith in truth is not questioned enough but that a view cannot
be questioned at all while it is being offered. Even a view that denies that there is
such a thing as truth must be presented as true.306
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The concern raised here is that the claim ‘there are only interpretations’ implies that
positive statements of truth are possible, if only attributable to that particular claim.
Laurence Lampert phrases this concern in this way: “Does the perspectivity condemn the
perspectival knower to insurmountable skepticism about the truth of any perspective?” 307
Added to this is the compounding claim of Nietzsche’s that certain interpretations are
better (in some sense) than others. For example, Nietzsche’s argument against the value
of the ascetic ideal is that the ideal looks “for error precisely where the instinct of life
most unconditionally posits truth.”308 Nietzsche seems to enter into an epistemological
paradox wherein, on the one hand, there can only be interpretations of states of affairs
and, on the other, that some interpretations – most notably the one that there are only
interpretations never are statements of fact true – are better than others. Brian Leiter has
characterized this as the “Received View” of interpretation regarding Nietzsche’s
perspectivism. He claims that this (erroneously) attributes the following four claims to
Nietzsche:
(i) the world has no determinate nature or structure;
(ii) our concepts and theories do not “describe” or “correspond” to this world
because it has no determinate character;
(iii) our concepts and theories are “mere” interpretations or “mere” perspectives
(reflecting our pragmatic needs, at least on some accounts);
(iv) no perspective can enjoy an epistemic privilege over any other, because there
is no epistemically privileged mode of access to this characterless world. 309
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Nehamas and Leiter share the concern that an epistemology spelled out in this manner
would be self-undermining and risk nonsensicality. The concern that this raises for
Nietzsche’s interpretive project is in line with the apprehension that Ricoeur points to
with regard to the authority of the interpreter: what entitles Nietzsche to seemingly claim
the truth regarding the interpretations and concepts that he mobilizes? I will discuss three
approaches to the resolution of this paradox, as I think the secondary literature tends to
loosely divide itself and coalesce into these three camps, which I will refer to as the
“aesthetic,” the “holistic,” and the “naturalistic.” Some of the methods of these three
styles will overlap; but I will refer to them in this manner based on their way of resolving
the origin of the authority conferred to Nietzsche’s critical endeavors.

II. The Aesthetic Resolution
The first attempt at a resolution of the paradox that I will present is the aesthetic
or stylistic resolution. 310 The preeminent text propounding this interpretation of
Nietzsche’s works is Nehamas’s Nietzsche: Life as Literature. Nehamas argues that
Nietzsche, perhaps knowingly, falls short of achieving a full critique of the will to truth
because of the paradox generated by Nietzsche’s genealogy of the ascetic ideal. To
Nehamas, Nietzsche’s genealogy reveals asceticism to be a mode of life that denies itself
as a product of life and desire while enabling life to continue. The ascetic life negates
itself in order that it may continue to exist, and Genealogy of Morals clearly demonstrates

310

I am following Christoph Cox, here, in characterizing this approach as “aesthetic.” See Christoph Cox,
Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1999), 63-70.

136
the role of the ascetic priest in this conservation of life. The priest articulates an
interpretation that the suffering of the many is the result of their own sins. Suffering,
therefore, is interpreted as a punishment that “will necessarily continue” because it is
coextensive with life itself. 311 Nietzsche’s genealogy shows that “[a]sceticism can never
eliminate suffering, but it succeeds in creating an interpretation that explains why it is
inevitable.”312
Key to Nehamas’s account is the assertion that part of the critique of asceticism is
Nietzsche’s fear of the spread of the ascetic ideal beyond those who “create” it: “The
ascetic ideal does not rest content with ordering the lives of those who may actually need
it.”313 It also seeks to impose a code of morality that anyone can follow and “thus
necessarily addresses itself to the lowest common denominator among the people whose
conduct it guides. This is its ‘leveling effect,’ which Nietzsche so despises.” 314 The will
to truth that lies behind the ascetic ideal projects not only its solution to suffering but also
necessitates the evangelization of its message as the only truth to any and all populations,
even those who are not distinctly in need of it. It is this promulgation of the ideal that
allows the “belief that the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb
– for thus [the ascetic priests or the weak] gain the right to make the bird of prey
accountable for being a bird of prey.”315 Genealogy here shows a double deception in the
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mode of life that holds deception to be sinful: 1) It hides its own manifestation of the will
to power as chosen from a free will despite the fact that it is merely the expression of the
will’s powerlessness; 2) It denies that its interpretation of the world is interpretation at all
and presents it as fact. However, despite this double ruse, asceticism remains, for
Nehamas’s interpretation of Nietzsche, an affirmation of life, albeit only of the particular
weak form. He writes, “Instead of attacking negative judgments of life directly,
[Nietzsche] treats them as hints or signs of the types of people who make them and who
are enabled to live by them. But he also treats positive judgments in just the same
way.”316 This entails that, given Nietzsche’s insistence on perspectivism, there can be no
reproach for any moral evaluation, on Nehamas’s account, from Nietzsche’s perspective
without risking the fall into the same dogmatism that is criticized. What, then, can be the
accusation against asceticism? For Nehamas, Nietzsche’s point must center on the
expansionist tendencies of asceticism and not on its particular perspective. If all
perspectives are ultimately affirmations of that perspective, then Nietzsche must “give up
the very idea of trying to determine in general terms the value of life and the world.”317
The paradox of perspectivism, following this reading of genealogy, will be resolved in
favor of a withdrawal from the critique of the content of asceticism. This entails that the
general tenor of Nietzsche’s texts are not directed against a general or wholesale
repudiation of asceticism. Nehamas argues that “Nietzsche... does not advocate and does
not even foresee a radical change in the lives of most people. The last thing he is is a
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social reformer or revolutionary.”

318

If all moral judgments are false on Nehamas’s

reading of Nietzsche, then Nietzsche’s own philosophy must avoid direct confrontations
with that tradition, since “an explicit attack would perpetuate that tradition.”319
This leaves Nietzsche’s works with the problem of moving from an implicit
rejection of the dogmatism of the philosophical tradition to generating the possibility of
raising a general affirmative perspective without his texts becoming dogmatic
themselves. To Nehamas, this paradox can be resolved gotten past only in the
aestheticization of one’s self. The purpose of genealogy, then, is to give us a stylistic
project whose goal is the creation of one’s own subjective perspective distinct from the
ascetic ideal that is our birthright.320 Nietzsche’s “unparalleled solution to this problem is
to try consciously to fashion a literary character out of himself and a literary work out of
his life.”321 This stylistic resolution sees the paradox generated by Nietzsche’s claims
regarding perspectivism to be avoided in Nietzsche’s attempted escape from the
articulation of a philosophical stance towards one of an aesthetic stance: “The very notion
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of the individual makes it impossible to say in informative terms how one an ever
become that.”322 Briefly, epistemological paradoxes are resolved by leaving
epistemology behind in an aesthetics of subjectivity, where any such methodological
discipline as epistemology would be fruitless in its labors regardless. Nietzsche’s
theories, on this interpretation, have their ultimate aim in a construction and project of the
self and subjectivity and not in an epistemology or cosmology. If we think of the
materials of Nietzsche’s art as being a philosophical subject, then Nehamas’s project is
similar to the one Nietzsche attributes to The Birth of Tragedy in his second preface to the
work: “to look at science through the prism of the artist, but also to look at art through
the prism of life.”323

III. The Holistic Resolution
If what I have called the aesthetic approach wishes to deflate any epistemological
or ontological readings of Nietzsche’s texts, the holistic exegesis offers an opposing sort
of resolution to the dilemma of perspective and truth.324 This approach interprets
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Nietzsche’s critique of the “will to truth” as a more successful endeavor and argues that,
with the death of god and the negation of the will to truth, the paradox of the truth of
Nietzsche’s pronouncement and his epistemology fades. It also leaves room for
epistemic and ontological claims, as long as they are understood as non-metaphysical
claims as well. In this way, Nietzsche’s philosophy is seen not just as a critique but also
as having profound positive implications. As Gilles Deleuze writes:
Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which their value
itself derives. Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference or
distance in the origin... But, understood in this way, critique at its most positive.
The differential element is both a critique of the value of values and the positive
element of a creation.325
Deleuze’s influential account of Nietzsche’s philosophy reads genealogy as a critique, in
the Kantian sense, of both sense and values. This allows Deleuze to read Nietzsche’s
works as not only completing the Kantian project but also as overturning the Platonic
project. The emphasis here is on the drives that Nietzsche conceives of as ontologically
positive and plural forces; Deleuze’s Nietzsche is a holist because there are, for him, only
these forces, which are responsible for both the interpretation of sense and the evaluation
of values. The anti-Platonism Deleuze credits Nietzsche with is a result of the
valorization of the constant becoming of these forces from an original “differential
element,” the will to power.326 Rather than look for the becoming of Being, as Plato’s
texts do, Deleuze reads Nietzsche as offering a pluralist ontology of the being of
becoming. Through this, Nietzsche’s genealogies diagnose the reactive forces that seek
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to deny becoming through the kind of values and senses they create – ressentiment, bad
conscience, and the priestly incarnation of the ascetic ideal. It is through these reactive
forces that a weak or slavish consciousness conceives of change and becoming as a
negative process and attempts to preserve itself, instead of understanding that
“multiplicity, becoming, and chance are adequate objects of joy and that only joy
returns.”327 Deleuze posits that only through the active destruction of ideals and creation
of new ideals can critique, understood as the critique of sense and values, be
accomplished.
As was seen with the aesthetic interpretation, this method draws much of its
impetus from a reading of Nietzsche’s critique of ascetic ideals. In the third essay of the
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that science is not a radical departure from
metaphysics but only its latest, “most unconscious, involuntary, hidden, and subterranean
ally!”328 The reason for this is what Nietzsche sees as science’s ultimate faith in the will
to truth as being supremely valuable. For this reason, Nietzsche claims that science
springs from the same ground or soil as metaphysics and is traceable to an attempt to
represent a denial of suffering and a negation of life: “science today is a hiding place for
every kind of discontent... – it is the unrest of the lack of ideals, the suffering from the
lack of any great love, the discontent in the face of involuntary contentment.”329 The
only way we can speak of the “progress” from metaphysics to science is that science
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would jettison all the faiths of metaphysics, save the faith in the will to truth. However,
science still suffers from the absence of ideals that characterizes a weak reaction to life.
Thus, Nietzsche argues that science cannot create except with the same goals in mind that
it has inherited from Christian morality. With science we reach the “kernel and esoteric
form of the ascetic ideal” – the will to truth.330 Science reveals, in other words, most
starkly to Nietzsche what is at stake in the belief in the ascetic ideal. In leaving the ideal
of truth uncriticized, Nietzsche views science as inheriting and endorsing the key
metaphysical concept of truth because science still emanates from the reactive morality
that places truth as the highest good.331
What I term the holistic approach to the exegesis of Nietzsche’s texts takes
seriously Nietzsche’s injunction that there can be no creation without destruction and also
argues that the creative act in just as important an element in Nietzsche’s texts as the
critical. This methodology is holistic insofar as it interprets the will to power as
constitutive of a Nietzschean naturalized ontology.332 This creative act, beyond the
critical aspect, cannot be constructed with the same ideals or subject to the same ideals as
what was criticized. So although perspective is raised as a counter to dogmatic truth, the
holistic interpretation must invent a new standpoint from which interpretations can be
330
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judged. It is through perspective that the will to truth calls itself into question for
Nietzsche, but if we are to build an interpretation that does not fall prey to the same
problem, the adjudication between differing perspectives must have a different standard.
The holistic methodology turns here to the standards of the will to power as the ‘far side’
of the critique of the will to truth. Nietzsche attempts to disconnect the metaphysical
belief in the identity and banality of goodness and truth: “What is good? – All that
heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad? – All
that proceeds from weakness.”333 For Deleuze and Foucault, this entails a perspectivism
where perspectives are weighed not by their truth value but by their value for life,
conceived of as will to power. This has two consequences. The first is that Nietzsche’s
axiology must be considered as part of his epistemology, erasing any hard distinction
between epistemology and ethics, as both are grounded in the conflicts and expressions of
wills to power. The second is a commitment to a thoroughgoing pluralism regarding
wills to power. In this way the holistic interpretation of Nietzsche’s will to power as
ontology entails a pluralistic ontology as well:
[T]he object itself is force, the expression of a force... There is no object
(phenomenon) which is not already possessed since in itself it is not an
appearance but the apparition of a force. Every force is thus essentially related to
another force. The being of force is plural, it would be absolutely absurd to think
about force in the singular.334
In the creative act, for the holist account, the paradox of the dogmatism/relativism of
perspectivism cannot be countenanced as a problem, as this is an issue only for
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interpretive schemes still driven by the will to truth. The account of the Nietzschean
determination of sense must conform instead to the essential pluralism of the wills to
power and their conflicts:
Consequently, I do not believe that a “drive for knowledge” is the father of
philosophy, but rather than another drive, here as elsewhere, used knowledge (and
mis-knowledge!) merely as a tool. But anyone who looks at people’s basic
drives, to see how far they may have played their little game right here as
inspiring geniuses…, will find that they all practiced philosophy at some point, and that every single one of them would be only too pleased to present itself as the
ultimate purpose of existence and as rightful master of all the other drives.
Because every drive craves mastery, and this leads it to try philosophizing. 335
Rather than taking Nietzsche as sidestepping the paradox, they encourage the reading of
the paradox as a paralogism that Nietzsche solves in saying that both views are false.
According to the very criteria of the will to truth itself, dogmatic epistemology will
always fail in its quests for totality because it cannot, as just as Ricoeur showed, satisfy
its desire for a self-grounding of knowledge. Relativism, on the other hand, obviously
fails the will to truth’s criterion of a unified account or truth. As truth has never been
univocal, Nietzsche suggests that it cannot be and desiring to make it such will remain a
self-defeating undertaking. The holists interpret Nietzsche as reading the paralogism as
being motivated by the will to truth; and once the will to truth is suspected, both because
of its value for life and for its perpetual failure, this problem dissipates.
The naturalized ontology that the holistic interpretations have in mind is a
proliferation of perspectives evaluated by the axiology that Nietzsche presents in his later
works. The main target here is the hidden asceticism that all theories of truth and
metaphysical systems promulgate. Thus, their problem, and it is no small task, is to
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replace this ascetic metaphysics with non-ascetic conceptions of epistemology and ethics.
We will return to this problem later in the chapter. For now, let us move to the third sort
of resolution of the paradox of perspectivism.

IV. The Naturalistic Resolution
Recent studies in Nietzsche’s texts, largely following the suggestions of John
Wilcox’s Truth and Value in Nietzsche336 and Richard Schacht’s Nietzsche337, attempt to
solve the paradox of interpretation in Nietzsche’s works by arguing that Nietzsche’s
philosophy of truth subscribes to a thoroughgoing philosophical naturalism. This,
however, is not intended to be the naturalistic ontology seen by the holistic interpreters.
These predominantly Anglo-American exegetes argue of Nietzsche that “he shares with
analytic philosophy a strong naturalizing impulse – and effort to see through the
mystifications of religion and metaphysics and to treat all aspects of the human with a
scientific eye. He intends that genealogical analysis to be a naturalistic or scientific
account of human values and prejudices.”338 More specifically, Nietzsche’s naturalistic
attitude is interpreted to be primarily a methodological one: “[Methodological
Naturalists], then construct philosophical theories that are continuous with the sciences
either in virtue of their dependence upon the actual results of scientific method in
different domains or in virtue of their employment and emulation of distinctly scientific
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ways of looking at and explaining things.”
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On this account, Nietzsche’s genealogical

practice is a coherent whole that does not eschew truth entirely but submits metaphysical
claims to truth to a naturalistic criticism. From this, the naturalists argue, we can read
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and theory of interpretation as putting forward naturalistic
criteria for truth that can be cashed out by scientific methods. Thus the paradox of truth
and perspective fades when we view truth correctly as non-metaphysical truth or as
naturalized truth. As Leiter writes of Nietzsche (and also Freud and Marx): “When one
understands conscious life naturalistically, in terms of its real causes, one contributes at
the same time to a critique of the contents of consciousness: that, in short, is the essence
of a hermeneutics of suspicion.”340
Justifications for this approach argue that Nietzsche’s rejection of truth is only
partial and that the supposed paradox of truth and perspective must ignore several of
Nietzsche’s texts to generate its problem. Hales and Welshon point, for example, to AntiChrist Section 50 as the type of passage that has been overlooked: “Truth has had to be
fought for every step of the way, almost everything else dear to our hearts, on which our
love and our trust in life depend, had had to be sacrificed to it. Greatness of soul is
needed for it: the service of truth is the hardest service.”341 This suggests, as do other
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passages,

342

that Nietzsche’s skepticism towards truth may not be total, that truth and

perspective may be compatible, and that Nietzsche may indeed have a “universal sense of
truth.”343 The Nietzschean critique is then taken to be focused on properly metaphysical
claims of truth but will allow “truth claims about history, philosophy, the ascetic ideal,
and the affirmation of life....”344 In the end, Nietzsche will reject metaphysical truths on
the grounds that they are nihilist – because they refer to nothing. Naturalistic claims of
the methodological sciences, for example, can be countenanced as truth claims because
they refer to something real.
Two of the most commonly referenced sections of Nietzsche’s texts that are cited
in support of this interpretation are Twilight of the Idols Books Three and Four and
Genealogy of Morals Third Essay, Section Twelve. The passages from Twilight of the
Idols, as I take it, support the interpretation of Nietzsche’s empiricist epistemology, while
the section of Genealogy of Morals sketches Nietzsche’s idea of “objectivity” as well as
its possibility. The holistic view also reads Nietzsche as a kind of empiricist, so for the
sake of contrast here I will focus on the “objectivity” passage from Genealogy of Morals
since that does a specific kind of philosophical work for the naturalist position. 345 If the
naturalistic interpretation is correct, then truth will appear as a concept or value that
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Nietzsche has not given up on and may even be advancing as the “key to Nietzsche’s
actual epistemological position.”346
For the naturalistic interpretation, Nietzsche advances and articulates his theory of
perspectivism most clearly in Genealogy of Morals Third Essay, Section Twelve in the
context of a criticism of the Kantian theory of the necessity and unknowability of the
thing-in-itself. 347 In place of the “disinterested” knowledge that for Kant comes from the
proper coupling of concept and intuition, Nietzsche would prefer a concept of objectivity
that is “understood not as ‘contemplation without interest’ (which is a nonsensical
absurdity), but as the ability to control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that
one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives and affective interpretations in the
service of knowledge.”348 This passage seems to posit both the desirability of objectivity
and knowledge as well as their possibilities rising from perspective. Leiter characterizes
this as Nietzsche’s “Doctrine of Epistemic Affectivity” which holds that any real
knowledge will always be conditioned by the affects or interests that motivate the
potential knower.349 Thus, contra Kant, knowledge about the objective world cannot
occur – it simply is not possible – without an interest in the intuition or the concept on the
part of the knowing subject. This interpretation also finds support in the passage that
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follows it, which I will quote here at length, due to its importance for the naturalistic
interpretations:
Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the dangerous old
conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing
subject’; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure
reason,’ ‘absolute spirituality,’ ‘knowledge in itself’: these always demand that
we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no
particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces, through which
seeing alone becomes seeing something, are supposed to be lacking; these always
demand of an eye an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective
seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more eyes, different eyes, we can
use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our
‘objectivity’ be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every
affect, supposing we were capable of this – what would that mean but to castrate
the intellect? – 350
This passage reveals, for Leiter, Nietzsche’s “Doctrine of Perspectives” – that knowledge
is essentially perspectival in an analogous fashion to the manner in which sight is
perspectival. 351 From this, most naturalistic interpreters of Nietzsche’s works will argue
for an interpretive litmus test that would check any attempted interpretation of
Nietzsche’s epistemology for its fitness with the optical analogue. The limit of the
analogy here is held to be coextensive with Nietzsche’s epistemology; and this will
enable this “optics” of perspectives to be viewed as a privileged metaphor in Nietzsche’s
texts.
On this interpretation, the paradox of truth an perspective characterized by Leiter
as the “Received View” dissolves as there is no optical equivalent for the paradox’s
statement that no one perspective can be privileged over another. For Leiter, this violates
350
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an epistemic analogue of the optical metaphor. Just as sight of an object can be distorted
due to “identifiable distorting factors” so too can knowledge of the object be distorted.352
This entails an epistemic “purity claim” that “[t]here exists a catalogue of identifiable
factors that would distort our knowledge of the object: that is, certain interpretive
interests and needs will distort the nature of objects….”353 For the naturalistic
interpretation, these optical distortions are akin to the metaphysical targets of Nietzsche’s
method of demystification in that both present illusions that from one perspective may be
compelling but, when seen from other perspectives, are clearly erroneous. Knowledge
may be perspectival; but when these perspectives more closely align with truth or human
truths they can and ought to be valued. These ‘truths’ on the naturalistic account must be
squared with what Leiter terms are Nietzsche’s remarks on the “terrible truths” that only
strong interpretive perspectives can know.
Ultimately, Nietzsche’s texts under this exegetic technique are interpreted as
arguing for an epistemology where knowledge can be described as objective, real, and
actual. This possibility rests squarely on human perspectives:
It is a condition of knowing objects that we do so from the standpoint of particular
interpretive interests and needs, and against the background of the profusion of
human interpretive interests. If they are not to distort the real (but
nontranscendent) nature of objects, however, these particular interests must be
adequate to relevant aspects of the ‘terrible truth’ about reality. 354
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Also, these perspectives are not a limit on the desired totality of knowledge, as long as
knowledge is understood as human knowledge and not as metaphysical knowledge:
Well if by ‘absolute knowledge’ one means extra-perspectival knowledge, then of
course there is no absolute knowledge to be had... However, if ‘absolute
knowledge’ refers to the knowledge of absolute truths, where an ‘absolute truth’
is a proposition true of all perspectives, then humans may in fact have absolute
knowledge, and nothing in [Genealogy of Morals, Third Essay, Section 12]
suggests otherwise. 355
In this manner, Nietzsche’s criticisms of truth are interpreted as founding a naturalistic
epistemology which avoids the paradox of relativism seemingly caused by the pairing of
truth with perspective.

V. The Hermeneutic Resolution
These three attempts at a resolution of this apparent paradox in Nietzsche studies
all point to differing ways of solving the problem that results, as Ricoeur articulates it, if
Nietzsche’s texts remain only at the level of a negative hermeneutics or a philosophical
criticism. Viewed from this hermeneutic perspective, all three agree that Nietzsche’s
own archaeology into traditional morality and metaphysics runs the risk, on the surface
anyway, of duplicating some of the errors for which he reproaches each. None of these
competing interpretations, either, wants to abandon Nietzsche’s thought to the
“eclecticism” Ricoeur criticizes in another context that would say that we can do
anything we want with Nietzsche’s texts, since Nietzsche contradicts himself, knows this,
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All three, therefore, can be read as attempting to describe the goals

of Nietzsche’s writings as somehow distinct from the goals of traditional metaphysics. In
other words, in each interpretive schema, the seeming contradictions arising from
Nietzsche’s archaeology of truth are explained by reference to an aim that is set apart
from a metaphysics of being. The aestheticist reading of Nietzsche’s works sees the
trajectory here are entailing a project that ends in the radical stylization of the self – with
no concern for truth, ethics, or epistemology. The holistic interpretation finds a new
teleological drive to articulate an ontology of forces, while the naturalistic view discovers
a Nietzschean philosophy that abandons metaphysical concerns for the methodology of a
naturalized science. Reading these various interpretations through a Ricoeurian
framework, it is tempting to say that all three attempt to reconstruct the hidden or absent
teleological pole that will fulfill the sense of Nietzsche’s texts. The disparity between
their reconstructions, however, seems to indicate that “too many ruins” have indeed
surrounded Nietzsche’s works (of his own doing!) and that such a figuring of a
teleological pole is not possible. At this point, I would like to begin my attempt at
answering this hermeneutic challenge, while also showing how Nietzsche’s texts could be
interpreted to avoid the “paradox” ascribed to them as well as some of the superfluous
interpretations produced to that same end.
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If, as was said in chapter two, we see Nietzsche’s genealogies as instituting a
critique of the meaning of the expressions of consciousness, then I believe several
answers to these interpretations become clear. Nietzsche, at every turn, criticizes any
theory of knowledge that places its faith in the immediacy of that knowledge’s meaning.
Idealism fails because its claims of immanent truth for its meanings cannot be made
actual. In order for its truths to mean anything, concrete ideals must be mediated in
consciousness through experience. This contaminates the supposed purity of the ideal
and opens the door for Nietzsche’s evaluation of ideals as “conceptual mummies” that are
produced out of resentment towards life. 357 As soon as the genesis of ideals is enquired
into, Nietzsche holds that we glimpse a “dark workshop” where “[weakness] is... lied into
something meritorious....”358 The method of genealogy inquires precisely into the social
and historical conditions for the emergence of these ideals. Similarly, realism or
positivism fails for Nietzsche because its methods cannot have unmediated access to
reality: “Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as science ‘without any
presuppositions.’”359 Insofar as realism claims to grasp reality itself through the senses, it
falls to the illusion of thinking itself perspective-less. However, in claiming the truth of
its phenomena, it still demonstrates an unjustified and very perspective-driven belief in
truth: “We see that science, too, rests on a faith... The question whether truth is necessary
must get an answer in advance, the answer ‘yes’....”360 Thus both positivism and
357
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idealism are expressions of a metaphysical demand for truth – either the truth of things or
the truth of their meanings. This demand, above all else, is an interpretation of life
evaluated as “weak” by Nietzsche in that a concept of truth is felt as needed in order to
justify life.
With regards to the aestheticist resolution of the paradox of truth and perspective,
I think it can be successfully argued that Nietzsche does condemn asceticism more
strongly than Nehamas thinks he does. Importantly, Nietzsche does not interpret every
perspective as affirmative in the same manner. The criterion for this condemnation arises
in Nietzsche’s description of the ascetic priest. The genealogy of the ascetic priest will
also lead into my reconstruction of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics through an investigation of
what is at stake in Nietzsche’s question of “What is the meaning of ascetic ideals?”361
The text of the third essay of the Genealogy is one of Nietzsche’s finest examples of
Nietzsche’s interpretive technique; and it yields for us the “first psychology of the priest”
as well as illustrates the practice of self-interpretation in the exegesis of the aphorism “On
Reading and Writing” from Zarathustra.362 However, I want to focus less on the aspect
of the ascetic ideal for the moment and look more closely at the question of Nietzsche’s.
He does not ask “what is?” the ascetic ideal but rather about what the ascetic ideal means.
After several examples of the ascetic ideal and its various meanings as they have been
actualized historically, Nietzsche notes:
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that the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to man, however, is an expression
of the basic fact of the human will, its horror vacui [horror of a vacuum]. It needs
a goal – and it will rather will nothingness than not will. – Am I understood?...
Have I been understood?... “Not at all, my dear sir!” – Then let us start again
from the beginning. 363
It is fair to say, then, that the rest of the third essay, in addition to being an exegesis of the
aphorism affixed to it, is also an exegesis of this first section. And it is not the truth of
the ascetic ideal that is necessarily under question at this point but only its meanings and
the actual forces or wills for which those meanings are signs. For Nietzsche, the plurality
of meanings that asceticism has borne signifies the human need of a goal. This “basic
fact” of the human will reveals a certain nihilistic impulse – but it is one prior to the
advent of the ascetic priest.
Nietzsche’s typology of the ascetic priest begins in earnest with section eleven.
Here the problematic of the essay is sharpened to the genealogy of the meaning of the
ascetic ideal when uttered by the priest. Until this point, the problem has not been
“serious” because only with the ascetic priest do we get the “actual representative of
seriousness.”364 Whatever the motives of the ascetic priest, with this figure arrives a
desire to represent ideals of seriousness as being good, as opposed to a changeable and
unconcerned external world. It is this type – the ascetic priest – that brings together
asceticism and its practices with the ressentiment of the weak towards a threatening
world. Thus, the genealogy of the ascetic priest is important to Nietzsche’s overall
strategy because the type expresses both a negative evaluation of life as well as a belief in
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the truth that is generated as a response to that evaluation – a truth that the priest believes
can be represented. Artists and philosophers still express ascetic ideals in practice, but
the meanings of these ideals are different precisely because they seek different ends than
the priest and employ the ascetic ideal only as a mask. The practices of the artists and
philosophers do not attempt to represent the ascetic ideal as somehow meaningful in
itself. The priest differs in taking the mask seriously and as inherently meaningful. In
the presence of this type, Nietzsche writes, “we stand before a discord that wants to be
discordant, that enjoys itself in this suffering and even grows more self-confident and
triumphant the more its own presupposition, its physiological capacity for life,
decreases.”365 Thus asceticism does disingenuously attempt to foist its interpretation on
others as truth, but this truth only has the ground of its meaning as a negation of life. The
fact that Nietzsche finds something to affirm in asceticism does not, as Nehamas states,
mean that asceticism itself is affirmative. The affirmation of a style of life it presents
arises only after the negation at the root of its meaning.366 However this conservation of
life is not meaningful other than as a type of nihilism. 367 And, as a form of the will to
truth, asceticism will continually fall short of its own goal, making it a self-defeating
“stylization of character.” Without this equivalence between all forms of life as
affirmative, we can question Nehamas’s rejection of any ontology or epistemology
attributable to Nietzsche’s texts.
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Nietzsche’s criticism of the ascetic ideal, I think, also extends to apply to what I
have termed the “Naturalistic reading” of truth and perspective. Nietzsche’s attack on the
concept of the thing-in-itself applies not only to Kant, but as I have argued, any claim to
immediate knowledge. The naturalistic interpretation here claims the complement to
immediate knowledge, that is, a fully-mediated knowledge of things through a
transparent medium of science or the scientific method. However, as Nietzsche notes, the
knowledge of “things” is of secondary importance after an interpretation of their
meaning: “This has caused me the greatest trouble and still does always cause me the
greatest trouble: to realize that what things are called is unspeakably more important than
what they are.”368 The ability to assert that things or statements can be true is only
possible for Nietzsche if they have already been interpreted to be bearers of some kind of
meaning. The illusion to which Nietzsche is calling attention here is the one that assumes
that this meaning, and perhaps meaningfulness in general, exists prior to its being
interpreted. The “Naturalistic reading” ignores this question of meaning entirely in its
swift movement to accept the scientific method as a bearer of truthfulness. However, as
we have seen for Nietzsche’s texts, the assertion that an absolute truth can be a
proposition true in all human perspectives postulates an as-yet-unfound full mediation
between all perspectives. It interprets the existence of a unified end of meaningful
knowledge prior to its actualization, which Nietzsche has explicitly criticized. Therefore,
this complete mediation is yet another version of the thing-in-itself which would regulate
and justify our knowledge from a standpoint outside of our perspectives, a standpoint that
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has not and cannot be actualized. In this way, a totalized scientific mediation appears as
another form of the will to truth – this time acknowledging perspective but positing an
agreement or harmony between perspectives that pre-exists the actualization of those
perspectives.
We do have good reason to extend this criticism of the thing-in-itself to Leiter’s
and Clark’s accounts. Both argue that, while there is a plurality of affects or desires or
perspectives that enable knowledge about an object, there is some real nature to the
object that serves as a boundary for these interpretations. Clark notes that “perspectivism
denies metaphysical truth, [but] it is perfectly compatible with the minimal
correspondence account of truth and therefore with granting that many human beliefs are
true.”369 Thus it is argued that, while Nietzsche denies the knowability of the thing-initself and even the possibility of the existence of the thing-in-itself, there can be human
perspectival agreement on some truths. However, this idea of truth founded on a weak
correspondence does not necessarily bring us truth, only an agreement among certain
interpretations. This minimal correspondence theory, however, has as its basis the same
agreement at the heart of the more robust, metaphysical truths; and I see no reason why
Nietzsche’s criticisms of the latter should not also apply to the former. And it is the
content of Leiter’s “purity claim” that does not fit will with the Nietzschean corpus.
Leiter writes, “If we are to have the epistemic purity claim then we must be able to make
out something like the following thought: certain interpretive needs and interests distort
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the nature of objects.”
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But if we look more closely at the section of Gay Science

quoted above, it seems that Nietzsche’s interest is far more devoted to the meaning of
interpretations and not focused on the “nature of the objects” interpreted. Thus, while
Nietzsche addresses “error,” it is not the error that is like a distortion in sight. Here the
optical analogy does not serve our understanding of Nietzsche’s texts very well when
applied past a certain point. The analogy works as a metaphor of the perspectivism of the
senses and interpretation. It may also be useful in a discussion of Nietzsche’s views on
what phenomenologists call “intentionality.” However, there is no textual reason to
extend the analogy as broadly as Leiter does. The reason for this is that such an
overextension places the optical metaphor in serious contradiction with several of
Nietzsche’s other texts where he states that we should not be misled into taking the
distinction between subject and object seriously. For example, in Twilight of the Idols,
Nietzsche states:
[i]t is this [metaphysics of language] which sees everywhere deed and doer; this
which believes in will as cause in general; this which believes in the ‘ego’, in the
ego as being, in the ego as substance, and which projects its belief in the egosubstance on to all things – only thus does it create the concept ‘thing’....371
Thus the ascription to Nietzsche of a commonsense naturalistic theory of truth does not
go far enough – on Nietzsche’s own criteria – towards eliminating the metaphysical
impulse. Questions of truth aside for the moment, it leaves here a weakened but still
determining object-in-itself which we interpret from the standpoint of subjecthood. As
Ricoeur notes, any theory of interpretation that is analogical at its core will give us a
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theory that is too narrow in its relation between meanings. This is precisely the result
when the optical metaphor is raised beyond its context and place as an aphorism to the
status of a general rule. The optical metaphor gives us no real insight into the
relationship between the meanings produced by interpretation, which I have been arguing
to be of primary interest to Nietzsche’s genealogy.
In fact, we need not abandon some ascription of a theory of truth to Nietzsche; but
we must be careful not to reproduce the metaphysical errors that he criticizes. In broad
terms, I think the holistic approach is closer both to Nietzsche’s texts as well as the spirit
of those texts. With the holistic epistemology, however, there is also a hermeneutics; and
it is the importance of each that ought to be stressed – after demonstrating the full import
of Nietzsche’s archaeology. Then we can argue that Nietzsche does have an empirical,
yet hermeneutic, epistemology that is distinctive not just in its critical method but also in
its construction of sense.

VI. Which God is Dead?
Key to Ricoeur’s reading of Nietzsche is his interpretation of the famous passage
of “God is dead.” Ricoeur interprets this as heralding the death of the god of morality,
and it is clear that morality in its various guises, especially as metaphysics, is a target of
the aesthetic, holistic, and naturalistic readings as well. However it is a misreading to
interpret Nietzsche’s texts as postulating only one “death of god.” This point is crucial
for seeing the depths of Nietzsche’s criticisms of metaphysics and his archaeology
because Nietzsche employs the death of god in many ways that have several different
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meanings. With the adoption of a rigorous perspectivism, Deleuze notes, “Existence or
non-existence cease to be absolute determinations which derive from the idea of God, but
rather life and death become relative determinations which correspond to the forces
entering into synthesis with or in the idea of God.”372 As knowledge becomes
meaningful only through the mediation between sense and perspective, the concept of
absolute truth becomes necessarily meaningless. Thus the manner of its becoming
determinate knowledge (or becoming concrete, as Ricoeur would say) is no different than
that of any other form of knowledge. Consequently God dies from the synthesis of
mediating forces, as well. But if God is a mediated idea, if it is to mean anything, then
the meaning of the proposition “God is dead” should be capable of several different
determinations. That Nietzsche’s texts give us multiple actual determinations of this idea
confirms this reading, I think.
The “event” of the death of God, Nietzsche writes, heralds the passing of a faith
and the raising of the question of the event’s meaning.373 But which meaning are we to
take from Nietzsche’s accounts? Which god dies in Gay Science 108 with no fanfare?
Which one is proclaimed dead by our hands by the madman in Gay Science 125? Or is it
the case that God sacrificed himself, as in Anti-Christ 40 and 41? These separate
depictions symbolize more than just a god of morality who is killed by nihilistic
metaphysics, although that is one aspect of the symbol that can be drawn from the event.
In each case, each death, the unity toward which morality and knowledge were held to be
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directed has vanished and new possibilities open in that event’s wake. Nietzsche himself
notes that, after this event “[e]ven less may one suppose many to know at all what this
event really means – and, now that this faith has been undermined, how much must
collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it – for example,
our entire European morality.”374 In other words, the dead gods that appear (or fail to
appear) in Nietzsche’s texts are the gods of morality, metaphysics and also of the
univocity of meaning of the “world.” It is this object of faith that holds together and
makes possible the metaphysical and weakly moral interpretations of the “world.” As
Nietzsche writes, “Around the hero everything turns into tragedy; around the demigod
everything turns into a satyr play; and around God everything turns into – what? Perhaps
‘world’?-”375 If, perhaps, only the two targets of morality and metaphysics were
intended, a single death would have sufficed to symbolize their death quite elegantly. It
is one event for the absolute being to die, but if this being guaranteed the univocity of
sense, then multiple meanings will appear at the event.376
This result of the death of God explains two of Nietzsche’s aphorisms where he
insists that that event may or may not have been fully comprehended: “New Battles. –
After Buddha was dead, they still showed his shadow in a cave for centuries – a
tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way people are, there may
still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. – And we – we must still
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defeat his shadow as well!”
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“‘Reason’ in language: oh what a deceitful old woman! I

fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar....”378 In these
aphorisms, the voice is undoubtedly Nietzsche’s-as-philosopher, as distinct from the
proclamation in Gay Science that Ricoeur has criticized for its doubtful authority or
source. The former aphorism, I think, symbolizes in part the concern of the latter.
Insofar as we understand language to be meaningful on its own, we have failed to
vanquish one of the shadows left in God’s absence. With the demise of God and
metaphysics also goes our belief in a unified ego and in the possibility of any simplicity
of meaning guaranteed by it, as we have shown previously. As our language’s structure
reflects that presupposition (about which Nietzsche is explicit in the passages leading up
the one cited from Twilight of the Idols), it too needs to be viewed as attempting to
represent an error in simplifying meaning as something unified on its own. What
Nietzsche is rejecting here is any theory of a transcending univocity of meaning, which
would be perhaps the longest shadow of the metaphysical God.

VII. Nietzsche on Ends and Goals
With his criticisms of an independent, real univocity of meaning, Nietzsche
removes another possible substitute for a real end of metaphysics or morality. Insofar as
philosophers have posited a definite end or boundary to knowledge (or interpretation)
they “have seconded the Church: the lie of a ‘moral world-order’ permeates the whole
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evolution of even the most recent philosophy. What does ‘moral world-order’ mean?
That there exists once and for all a will of God as to what man is to do and what he is not
to do....”379 If Nietzsche’s critique of the concept “world” is successful, as I think it is,
then it follows that Nietzsche’s philosophy can countenance no ideal that posits an
eschatological end to human knowledge or to life itself. This concept of an ultimate goal
we have seen Nietzsche criticize throughout his genealogies of morality and truth as the
product of a weak will that reacts against its own suffering. Any expression of an
eschatological end – or its correlate the causa sui – relies on a kind of knowledge that is
impossible for us perspectivally. Both rest on a faith that there can be some kind on
immediate, definite object of knowledge either metaphysically or temporally behind or
under us or a definitive end awaiting us. But both possible final determinations of
meaningfulness for Nietzsche would be, as he says of the causa sui: “the best selfcontradiction that has ever been conceived... But humanity’s excessive pride has got
itself profoundly and horribly entangled with precisely this piece of nonsense.” 380 The
pride of humanity of which Nietzsche writes is its moral supposition of being good when
compared with the life around it which it has posited first as evil.
However, I do not believe that this removes all ability for Nietzsche’s texts to
speak of teleology or of ends. Nietzsche, in discussing the concept of the will to power
regarding living beings writes:
Above all, a living thing wants to discharge its strength – life itself is will to
power -: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent
379
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consequences of this. – In short, here as elsewhere, watch out for superfluous
teleological principles! – such as the drive for preservation (which we owe to
Spinoza’s inconsistency -). This is demanded by method, which must essentially
be the economy of principles. 381
The problem to which Nietzsche points here can summarized as the postulation of a fixed
end outside of the process of becoming toward which all wills to power tend (in this case,
self-preservation). It is my contention that this characterization of “superfluous
teleological principles” is essentially Nietzsche’s reproach to any eschatological
formulation of ends. But Nietzsche’s method, which seems to want to project as little as
possible into the interpretation, still looks for a certain kind of limited teleology from the
standpoint of principles. This limited teleology lies in the workings of the will to power
to appropriate the conflict of interpretations it finds itself enmeshed in toward some
concrete meaning. This production of meaning is at the heart of Nietzsche’s conception
of “war.” However, and this is what distinguishes this approach most clearly from
Ricoeur’s tactic, each appropriation tends toward the creation of a meaning and not its
recovery. Nietzsche can be said to outline what Ricoeur refers to as archaeology in this
way:
The reputation, name, and appearance, the worth, the usual measure and weight of
a thing – originally almost always something mistaken and arbitrary, thrown over
things like a dress and quite foreign to the nature and even their skin – has,
through the belief in it and its growth from generation to generation, slowly
grown onto and into the thing and has become its very body: what started as
appearance in the end nearly always becomes essence and effectively acts as its
essence!382
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This is a concise statement of exactly the “suspicion” for which Nietzsche’s texts are
famed. Interpretations are made for historical, social, and even accidental reasons over
prior interpretations, which gives a new meaning to practices and become over time and
use what are taken to be actual essences of things. Ricoeur and others would be right if
this is all that Nietzsche does, but the same passage continues in this way:
What kind of a fool would believe that it is enough to point to this origin and this
misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as ‘real’, socalled ‘reality’! Only as creators can we destroy! – But let us also not forget that
in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and appearances
of truth in order to create new ‘things’.383
Here Nietzsche explicitly criticizes taking only half of the genealogical project and
making it stand for the whole. Without the appropriative activity of giving things new
names and values, by which I understand creating new concepts and evaluations,
Nietzsche is stating that old conceptions cannot be gotten rid of through criticism alone.
It is not the case, then, that Nietzsche lacks a hermeneutic pole of appropriation.
Instead he configures it in a manner consistent with the scope of his criticism of truth and
of ideals. As we have seen, any eschatological impulse to a final end, either in reality or
in sense, will be resisted by Nietzsche’s method; and it is for this reason that Nietzsche
would reject the characterization of the poles of hermeneutics as Ricoeur describes them.
“Suspicion” would be apt, but the pole of appropriation cannot be the recovery of
anything lost, but the creation of something different. Specifically, the creation must lie
in the realm of sense and meaning; and it is this directedness towards meaning that
constitutes the teleological aspect of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics. In the next chapter, I will
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flesh this out further, following a thread which was laid out earlier. Nietzsche does not
only set out the principles for his hermeneutic method but, in many of his works, actively
employs them in the cause of “explaining” and interpreting many of his own works.
Specifically, Ecce Homo is, I contend, a Nietzschean version of the philosophical
anthropology that Ricoeur set out to find in a phenomenological manner. If my
interpretation of Nietzsche’s method is viable, then the utilization of that method with
regards to the exegesis of Nietzsche’s own self-commentary should shed light on the ends
that Nietzsche is writing towards.

CHAPTER FOUR
NIETZSCHE’S TEXTUAL SELF-INTERPRETATIONS
Nietzsche’s genealogical method lies at the core of his philosophical project. The
overlapping iconoclasms of his critique of dominant cultural values and his attempts to
create “counter-ideals” to philosophical idealism both find their motivating force in
Nietzsche’s claim that all knowledge claims are based on interpretations. 384 Nietzsche’s
deployment of genealogy rests on his method of taking different perspectives on concepts
that have previously been held to be necessary in order to show their reliance on the
activity of interpretation for their meaningfulness. In this way, genealogy fractures a
general theory of knowledge or meaning by revealing the contradictory interpretations
possible from perspectives that, seemingly, have been synthesized within a general
framework of knowledge. Against the “contradictory concepts” of pure objectivity or
pure meaning associated with a unified subject of knowledge, he writes:
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “knowing”; and the more
affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can
use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our
“objectivity,” be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every
affect, supposing we were capable of this – what would that mean but to castrate
the intellect? -385
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Knowledge, rather than being a pure object grasped by reason alone, is a conglomerate of
the various perspectives of our affects and their interpretations. Here, Nietzsche’s
“counter-ideals” are not meant to replace entirely idealism with another form of idealism;
rather, they are intended to illustrate the contingent character of any teleological ideal:
The “evolution” of a thing, a custom, an organ is thus by no means its progressus
toward a goal, even less a logical progressus by the shortest route and with the
smallest expenditure of force – but a succession or more or less profound, more or
less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they
encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction,
and the results of successful counteractions.386
This is the case for Nietzsche because his conception of interpretation is always of an
expression of an affect or force (the will to power) acting from a particular perspective
upon and with the remainder of other forces. Nietzsche dramatizes interpretation as the
interaction and conflict of forces with one another. What is “interpreted” from the
standpoint of any perspective is the remainder of the other forces that any particular
perspective can subdue and synthesize with itself as dominant. Insofar as it is possible to
speak of only one of these forces, we can say that a particular force’s interpretation of its
perspectives will be “regional” in Ricoeur’s sense of the term. A more general or “more
complete” concept of any thing or text can only be available through the summation of
various perspectival forces on the thing. However, total interpretive completion, or
univocity of meaning, is not possible because any individual force cannot perfectly
reflect on its own interpretative activity. The self-interpretation of any text will,
therefore, never be complete. Eric Blondel states this in this manner: “[A] text is not
controlled by a code which it contains and dominates, but by one or several possible
386
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codes which lie outside it. This implies that the text should be ‘interpreted’ rather than
‘explained.’”387 As an example, the method of genealogy investigates states and events –
the states of ‘asceticism’ or ‘bad conscience,’ for example – from the differing
interpretive perspectives of the various forces involved in the syntheses of their
meanings. In other words, a state like ‘asceticism’ has more possible meanings than a
normal discourse would attribute to it, as Nietzsche demonstrates in the Third Essay of
Genealogy of Morals. Genealogy aims to untangle those forces that compose these states
from their normal interpretations and evaluations and show how other perspectives within
those states are suppressed or forgotten. This activity demonstrates how interpretation
provides the possibility for the meanings of these phenomena as well as the possibility for
different meanings.
To this end, Nietzsche’s major concepts of “will to power” and “perspective” are
explicated as principles of how the interpretation and evaluation of concepts ought to be
performed in a genealogical investigation. I have argued thus far that it is right for
Nietzsche to be counted as a hermeneutic philosopher – a reading of his texts that
Ricoeur’s interpretation wholly endorses; but also I have attempted to demonstrate that
Ricoeur’s casting of the limits of hermeneutics is called into question by Nietzsche’s
hermeneutic method as it is presented as genealogy. What is often seen as a shortcoming
of Nietzsche’s approach, the seeming absence of a determinate goal or end to the task of
genealogy, is actually the result of a more rigorous critique of meaning undertaken in
Nietzsche’s texts than is often appreciated. Nietzsche’s texts emphasize the continual
387
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process of becoming that characterizes each interpretive force or desire, against the
traditional philosophers’ “lack of historical sense for one thing, their hatred of the very
idea of becoming, their Egypticity.”388 “Becoming” alone is not the most important
criterion of “aesthetic” nobility or health for Nietzsche – it must be coupled with the
principle of expenditure – but it is a necessary aspect of the hermeneutic method.389
Because of the constant change of forces, any determination of the meaning of an event
according to the conflict of these forces will always be subject to reinterpretation as that
meaning comes into contact with other competing forces that may necessitate a
reinterpretation. In Nietzsche’s explication of interpretation, it is always possible for the
synthesis of forces that determines any meaning to be subject to a re-synthesizing or
reinterpretation that alters the meaning of an event in accordance with a new force that
seizes control of that process of determination. This implies that interpretation and
reinterpretation will never cease, that a final determinate meaning will never arrive if it
has not already done so, that every interpretation is always already a reinterpretation.
Interpretations are given in a field that is already mediated and will continue to be. This
is what Foucault means when he says in the context of a discussion of the postulates of
hermeneutics: “[I]f interpretation can never be completed, this is quite simply because
there is nothing to interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all
everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to
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interpretation but an interpretation of other signs.”

The hermeneutic circle is

inescapable because every sign it can consider is already a mediated interpretation of
some other sign.
With this in mind, it is possible to see that there are two kinds of “castration” that
the intellect may suffer against which Nietzsche is advising us in the above quote from
Genealogy of Morals. The first is easily identified as the lure of “knowledge in itself,” a
knowledge that can be known independently of any particular interpretation. The second
reveals itself as the prospect of a knowledge that is a summation of all perspectives. This
view would treat knowledge as already constituted, with each perspective giving a
particular adumbrated view on it. Knowledge in this case would simply be the sum
totality of all perspectives, with each will giving a particular Leibnizian mirroring of the
totality of the world. However this view would relegate Nietzsche’s conception of forces
to the status of representative agents of their particular slice of the increasingly realized
object of knowledge. 391 In this case the “active and interpreting forces” that Nietzsche
expounds in such detail would be curtailed by a predetermined end in the object. 392 This
conception of knowledge, then, is eschatologically determined in the speculative goal of a
unified object that determines each individual perspective. However, in Nietzsche’s texts
what is denied as possible is the prospect of any eschatology in the absence of an already
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actualized end. This is demonstrated in Nietzsche’s rebuke of Spinoza’s theory of the
superiority of the drive for “self-preservation” in the will as a “superfluous” teleological
principle.393 While Nietzsche rarely makes use of the term ‘eschatology,’ this
characterization of the “superfluous teleological principle” fits squarely with Nietzsche’s
criticism of the concept of a final end. Thus it is “castration” to assume both the
existence of a unified subject or object prior to its determinate realization. But this does
not rule out the more limited concept of a teleology of sense as determined by whichever
force happens to be dominant in the synthesis of meaning at a given moment. Thus, the
“shortcoming” of Nietzsche’s method of interpretation is only apparent if the goals of
eschatology and teleology are confounded. If these are clarified such that teleology is
understood as the particular aim of the “dominating instinct” in a synthesis and
eschatology as the general aim of a system towards a final end or meaning, then I think it
is arguable that Nietzsche’s genealogy can operate under the conditions of the former
while explicitly critiquing the latter.394
In this chapter, I want to consolidate the reading of Nietzsche’s method as
containing both a critical and an appropriative moment. The exegetical tactics that
Nietzsche employs in genealogical investigations demonstrate the actual conditions under
which concepts have acquired their meaning; and Nietzsche accounts for this production
of meaning by describing it as a synthesis of forces which can only be deciphered from
their symptoms, symptoms that appear as expressed meanings and never in their “own
393
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The second intention of this chapter is to confirm this reading

through two avenues given by Nietzsche which have yet to be considered: his selfinterpretation of his works and his account of the production of his own subjectivity or
perspectives in Ecce Homo. It is possible to view Nietzsche’s methods of interpretation
not only in his genealogies of morality and criticisms of other philosophical texts but also
through a study of Nietzsche’s self-interpretations published along with the second
editions of some of his earlier works, as well as in Ecce Homo. As Nietzsche was
composing and publishing what are considered the works of the start of his “mature
phase” – Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals – in 1886 and 1887, he
was also writing prefaces (or postscripts396) to his early works The Birth of Tragedy,
Human, All too Human, and Daybreak. He also composes during this time a new preface
for The Gay Science as well as adding a fifth book to that text. These prefaces and
additions show Nietzsche actively engaged in the process of coming to terms with the
development of his own concepts while demonstrating the techniques of interpretation he
has developed in determining what is of value in his earlier work. In this series of texts,
Nietzsche recasts these works in terms of their conceptual relationship to his mature
works, selects what he finds of value from their investigations, assumptions and
conclusions, and often submits them to a more penetrating analysis that they have
received elsewhere. In brief, we can see Nietzsche’s process of critique and
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appropriation at work regarding even his own texts in these prefaces. The same can be
said to be true of the sections of Ecce Homo under the heading “Why I write such good
books.” This task will primarily be approached through a reading of Nietzsche’s
recasting of The Birth of Tragedy in its second preface and in the reading he offers of it in
Ecce Homo.
The final part of this chapter will be an examination of a possible Nietzschean
resolution to Ricoeur’s motivating problem as it was developed in Chapters One and
Two. As we saw in Chapter One, Ricoeur takes up hermeneutics as a way of recapturing
a philosophical anthropology that could not be cashed out through the methodology of
phenomenology alone. In order to fill in the genetic accounts of meaning that purely
eidetic phenomenology could only assume or gesture towards, Ricoeur is forced to
undertake a series of regional hermeneutics of the various fields of human inquiry. Any
general hermeneutics could only be constructed from these regional investigations, lest it
begin under the sway of its own preconditions regarding the unity of meaning and, then,
fall short for similar reasons as eidetic phenomenology does.
In a similar vein, Nietzsche’s genealogies also constitute regional hermeneutic
approaches that, taken together, can indicate what a human subject is. The studies of the
bad conscience, ressentiment, modernity, and philosophical idealism all show the
subterranean aspects of what it is to be human. However, these are predominantly the
products of the critical or archaeological moments of the genealogical method. In terms
of the appropriation of a human subjectivity, Nietzsche’s account of his own subjectivity
in Ecce Homo is as alien a result of philosophical anthropology as can be expected, given
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both the traditional concerns of philosophical anthropology as well as Nietzsche’s own
starting-point in philological research. Nothing in Ecce Homo gives us any reason to
hope for a unified concept of the human subject. “I am not a human being,” Nietzsche
declares in the last part of Ecce Homo, “I am dynamite.”397 However, I wish to show that
it is precisely Nietzsche’s hermeneutic method that leads to this result – a much different
end than the one envisioned by Ricoeur in his attempt to reconstruct a philosophical
anthropology through a phenomenological hermeneutics. The Nietzschean poles of
critique and appropriation become concretized in Ecce Homo in the subject of Nietzsche
himself; and this appropriative pole is what is at stake in the subtitle “How One Becomes
What One Is.”398 In spelling this out, I hope also to show that the “positive” Nietzschean
philosophy cannot be adequately forecast before it is enacted as an event – an event
Nietzsche attempts to describe in Ecce Homo.

I. Nietzsche’s Genealogical Method
The essence of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics lies in the dynamics of his conception of
the will to power. The idea of the will to power is conceptualized by Nietzsche as
approachable in thinking only as already entangled and related to other wills. That is,
there are only multiple manifestations of willing; there are always already many wills to
power in any synthesis of meaning. A singular will to power cannot be known simply as
397
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it is for at least two reasons: a will to power is never encountered in actuality alone but
always as part of a complex of wills, thus it is a theoretical construction that does not
necessarily have an individual existence;399 and, also, as this complex of wills is always
in constant change due to the nature of its relations and conflicts, any attempt to pick out
only one aspect of it will mislead us as to the activity of the remainder of wills. Any
particular interpretation of a will to power, therefore, is approachable only as a heuristic
device and only through the work and interpretation of symbols, to use Ricoeur’s
vocabulary. For these reasons, Nietzsche argues that a singular will to power cannot be
fully determined, for only that which has no history or only one appearance is ever
definable in its totality. But, as Deleuze rightly attributes to Nietzsche, “Even
perception... is the expression of forces which appropriate nature. That is to say that
nature itself has a history.”400 All phenomena can be treated as symbols which give to
those forces capable of appropriating them the opportunity for the actualization of
differing meanings. As an example of this, Nietzsche points to the meaning of
punishment in his (and, arguably, our) culture. For him:
the concept of ‘punishment’ possesses in fact not one meaning but a whole
synthesis of ‘meanings’: the previous history of punishment in general, the history
of its employment for the most various purposes, finally crystallizes into a kind of
unity that is hard to disentangle, hard to analyze and, as must be emphasized
especially totally indefinable.401
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The apparent unity of the concept of punishment is undermined as soon as the many
actualizations of the act of punishment and their varying meanings are observed. The
various events of punishment may appear similarly, but each historical instance of
punishment is determined as meaning something different in each context. When
examining a concept that appears to be simple (like that of punishment), Nietzsche,
without fail, finds it to be overdetermined by a variety of historical and cultural meanings
in its various and varying expressions. In this way, even Nietzsche’s concept of will to
power cannot be fully determined. Any attempt at a description of it must involve its
becoming (of which I will speak more of in a moment) and its plurality. By the plurality
of the will to power, I mean to convey the same thing as what Ricoeur means when he
refers to the problem of the conflict of interpretations. The issue with knowing and
determining the will to power as a determinate thing lies not in its scarcity or secrecy but,
rather, in its superabundance. Raising the issue of the meaning of a will to power
immediately draws into consideration the meanings of all its interactions with other such
wills. Thus, a will to power cannot be known determinately in itself but only as it has
been actualized in complexes of meaning with other wills. It is possible to say, therefore,
that a will to power must be thought as the condition for the possibility of these
actualized meanings, although the existence of a will to power cannot be determined
absolutely. Just as the abundance of the symbol for Ricoeur demands interpretation, so
too does the plurality of the manifestations of meanings demand for Nietzsche the
development of an interest in perspectives as well as in the differences produced in
interpretation by them.
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If a will to power cannot be known simply, then Nietzsche’s genealogies must be
of the complexes of meanings that have been produced through the interaction and
conflict of the various wills to power. Knowledge of these complexes only arises out of
inquiries into these already mediated or synthetic relationships: “I sense a contradictio in
adjecto in even the concept of ‘immediate knowledge’ that is permitted by
theoreticians.”402 This suspicion of any assertion of immediate knowledge, such as
claims buttressed by a supposed immediate relation to the ego or to “reality,” gives us
reason to question the meaningfulness of any truth built upon those discredited
certainties. It is certainly the case for Nietzsche’s genealogy that each study will be
undertaken from a particular standpoint or perspective. But, with immediacy gone as a
guarantor of meaning, the study of any meaning becomes a matter of the interpretation of
how that meaning is produced from the perspective that motivates it. Nietzsche’s
hermeneutics attempts to account for these productions of meaning; but there are always
at least two aspects to the syntheses of meaning of which the hermeneutics must account.
The first is the archaeology of the various forces that are synthesized in the meaning.
The second is the determination of which force is the active agent in the production of
that synthesis. The former illuminates the archeological moment of the genealogy, but
the latter will give us insight into how teleology is accounted for in the Nietzschean
hermeneutics. Interpretation encompasses both movements, decoding the wills to power
present in a given meaning and determining which one is dominant in that synthesis. It is
the dominant will to power that is said to determine the meaning of the event. Nietzsche
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refers to this as “the fundamental will of the spirit” in Beyond Good and Evil and
describes it in this way:
The commanding element (whatever it is) that is generally called “spirit” wants to
dominate itself and its surroundings, and to feel its domination: it wills simplicity
out of multiplicity, it is a binding, subduing, domineering, and truly masterful
will… The power of spirit to appropriate foreign elements manifests itself in a
strong tendency to assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the manifold, to
disregard or push aside utter inconsistencies….403
Thus the act of interpretation by the dominant will to power selects what suits its
purposes from the multiplicity it encounters and appropriates that towards its goal.
Nietzsche’s “archaeological” moment uncovers the context surrounding the selection of
the multiplicity that the will to power will synthesize, while the “teleological” moment
accounts for the type of appropriation that those selected elements are used towards.
In the genealogy of the “bad conscience,” from Genealogy of Morals, Second
Essay, we see both of these moments at work. The phenomenon that we have taken to
calling the “conscience” is reconfigured by Nietzsche as a construction designed to
address the problem of how humans have “the right to make promises....”404 Nietzsche’s
critical project is evident as he examines “by what right” humans are able to promise, or
on account of what syntheses of forces is a human “able to stand security for his [sic]
own future, which is what one who promises does!”405 The implicit criticism of Kantian
moral theory here lies in this exhumation of a ground beneath morality, where how it is
that we are able to promise is a more fundamental question than what it is that we are to
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promise. Nietzsche finds human action to be only secondarily determined by an
adherence to a law of morality. In short, Nietzsche is asking how lawfulness is possible
in human actions and answering that it is only possible through the creation of a faculty
of memory. What the archaeological moment of the genealogy reveals is that promising
and, thereby, lawfulness can only be possible if a memory has already been formed
against “the opposing force, that of forgetfulness.”406 The abstract question of how
promising is possible is decoded by Nietzsche as a physiological question of how
memory is formed. That memory and, thereby, promising exists is the result of the
domination of certain forces over those active forces of forgetfulness: “Forgetting is no
mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an active and in the strictest sense
positive faculty of repression....”407 Of particular importance is the role of active
forgetfulness in making possible the experience of the present by “[closing] the doors and
windows of consciousness for a time.”408 Nietzsche is suggesting that consciousness,
without forgetting, would be constantly awash in sensations and reactions to those
sensations. As we will see shortly, without this faculty, consciousness becomes sick, and
“[p]eople and things become obtrusive, events cut too deep, memory is a festering
wound. Sickness is itself a kind of ressentiment.”409 There would be no space on the
surface of consciousness for the development of concepts or forethought without the
filtering of sensations by an active forgetting. This entails that there could be no
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promising, no morality as we know it, without forgetting, as there could be no present or
the awareness of it without forgetfulness. Memory, as a promise toward the future, is
thus dependent on and in conflict with the active forgetfulness necessary for its
development. The force by which memory prevails momentarily over forgetfulness is
that of the application of pain, either by the forces of consciousness itself or by forces
external to consciousness, such as cultural forces. The state of tension in the conflict of
opposing forces of memory and forgetfulness allows a phenomenon like promising to be
possible as long as the pain associated with forgetting is sufficient to allow memory to
dominate. For this reason Nietzsche remarks on the bodily or physiological nature of
these forces that oppose forgetfulness in order to accent “the instinct that realized that
pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics.”410
Thus, the “shameful origin” of promising and morality out of a desire to avoid
pain is discovered in the many revealed meanings of punishment. However, Nietzsche’s
genealogy makes no explicit ethical judgment on this finding. Instead, Nietzsche uses
this conclusion to launch an inquiry into the meaning of the kind of memory created in
response to the application of punishment. And this meaning of memory lies both in the
forces that produce it and the end toward which these forces are organized. In the case of
those forces that Nietzsche will diagnose as “healthy,” the forces derive their efficacy
from an active resistance to the forces of repression and forgetting:
an active desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of something
desired once, a real memory of the will: so that between the original ‘I will,’ ‘I
shall do this’ and the actual discharge of the will, its act, a world of strange new
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things, circumstances, even acts of will may be interposed without breaking this
long chain of will. 411
This active origin of memory arises for the purpose of guaranteeing a future action.
Memory may be of the past, to paraphrase Aristotle, but it exists in this construction as
the necessary precondition for a meaningful future. In response to pain, this active
memory grounds future actions with the end of “conscience” as its target. The meaning
of the construction of the conscience lies in its active resistance to the forces of forgetting
and its goal of appropriating desire into the formation of a new dominant instinct counter
to the instinct of forgetting: “The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of
responsibility, the consciousness of the this rare freedom, this power over oneself and
over fate, has… become instinct, the dominating instinct.”412 This may result in or come
from a being that is “calculable, regular, necessary” but this is no reason for its negative
evaluation as a phenomenon. It is only with the construction of conscience that humans
“possess the right to also affirm oneself.”413 The capacity for affirmation here stands as
the seal of the active origin of the conscience and its desirability despite its origins out of
pain. In fact, here pain is exactly seen as the type of “stimulus to life” in the conscience’s
directedness to the future. The meaning of this sort of memory is an affirmation of life
and a self-affirmation of the conscience that is constructed. Here the forces are
appropriated toward an end sympathetic with the expression and continuing expression of
the wills that form it.
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This may seem a strange version of the genealogy often remarked upon in the
Second Essay of Genealogy of Morals; however, it is the second genealogy of the essay
that is much more elaborated.414 This first genealogy that I have presented here is of the
less common, affirmative response to the problem of forgetting. This follows, I think,
Nietzsche’s suggestion regarding Genealogy of Morals that each section has “a beginning
that should be deceptive: cool, scientific, even ironic, intentionally foreground,
intentionally evasive.”415 What is “evasive” in the second essay is the affirmative
appropriation of the conscience, the possibility of which has largely been undiscovered
because of the forces elaborated in the remainder of the essay. Most of the Second Essay
offers Nietzsche’s genealogy of the more prevalent, more human reaction to the problem
of forgetting. After the meaning of the conscience is uncovered, Nietzsche turns to “that
other ‘somber thing,’ the consciousness of guilt, the ‘bad conscience.’” 416 This is crucial
to the understanding of the Genealogy and of the genealogical method as a whole. While
the conscience generally appears as a moral underpinning to behavior, built on memory,
it can possess, as Nietzsche would say, as many meanings as there are forces that can take
414
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command of it, can dominate it. In the abbreviated genealogy of the first sections of the
Second Essay, it is a generally affirmative, active force that affects the synthesis of forces
called ‘conscience.’ In order to more easily differentiate it from the similar synthesis of
reactive forces, Nietzsche christens the object of the second, more widely referenced,
genealogy as that of the ‘bad conscience.’ But again, this second genealogy demonstrates
both the excavation of the forces that compose the bad conscience as well as the
differentiation in their goal from the other phenomenon of conscience.
The problems that the concept of the bad conscience addresses are still the
problems of how a memory, and thereby a kind of promising, is possible against
forgetfulness; but, due to a difference in the origin of the construction of that memory,
the meaning of the conscience composed is nearly wholly opposed to the active
conscience. Nietzsche focuses on the differing appearances of the phenomenon of guilt
to reveal this other meaning. The traditional, moral interpretation of guilt is established
as a relation to a past debt that serves to cause pain, the memory of which is intended to
act as a corrective to future desires and actions. However, Nietzsche reverses this in two
ways in his genealogy of guilt. First, he points to a material or psychical (and not
spiritual) origin of the concept of guilt: “Have these genealogists of morals had even the
remotest suspicion that, for example, the major moral concept Schuld [guilt] has its origin
in the very material concept Schulden [debts]?”417 Nietzsche locates this material sense
of guilt in a failure to repay a debt, with punishment being the alternate form of
repayment in order to settle the debt. The second reversal is that the outcome produced
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by the spiritual concept of guilt multiplies the pain caused by guilt and does not constitute
an avenue around it, despite claims to the contrary on the part of traditional morality.
Through the mechanism of punishment, guilt is intended to be instilled as a preventative
to the expression of any instinct or force: “Punishment is supposed to possess the value of
awakening the feeling of guilt in the guilty person; one seeks it in the actual
instrumentium of that psychical reaction called ‘bad conscience.’” 418 However, the
meaning of punishment is by no means secure or indubitable either. As is the case with
all phenomena, it possesses for Nietzsche a “relatively enduring” aspect in its action but a
“fluid” series of meanings that are correlated to all those actions based on the kind of
synthesis that is operating on it.419 The same is true of the phenomenon of guilt, although
here it takes on a meaning useful to the ends to which this kind of memory is directed.
Guilt, understood in this perspective, is the feeling of indebtedness; but Nietzsche is
arguing that this form of indebtedness is invoked not for any determinate material reason.
Instead, the indebtedness is intended to remain unresolved in the psyche to act as an
opposing force to any instinct that we possess: “punishment tames men, but it does not
make them any ‘better.’”420 This guilt bears a different meaning from the memory of the
conscience as it is meant to facilitate the development not of a conscience but of a sense
of indefinite indebtedness to some other thing – others, a society, a leader, a deity. With
the option of an external discharge removed, those instincts are left only with avenue of
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internalization. Therefore, the only appropriation of this guilt that is possible is one that
would further implicate and reinforce the indebtedness of the instincts. This does not
presuppose a soul that is now imbued with this conflict; but, rather, this alteration of the
instincts causes them to produce the ‘soul’ as a construction: “All instincts that do not
discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalization of
man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his ‘soul.’” 421 In this
way, a soul is created as a thing with depth, whereas consciousness is merely a surface;
and it is the construction of the soul that is coextensive with the bad conscience:
“Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction – all this
turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the ‘bad
conscience.’”422 The archaeology of the forces that produce the feeling of guilt as infinite
indebtedness also reveals the phenomenon of the soul to be present with the creation of
the bad conscience, as bad conscience consists of a conflict of forces that are forced to
discharge their power inwardly upon themselves. The link between the Second Essay
and the First and Third Essays of the Genealogy becomes clear here when we note that it
is with the priest – the artist of guilt and asceticism – that “man first became an
interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and
become evil – and these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been
superior to other beasts!”423 The depth of soul, which is normally marked as the element
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of human exceptionalism, is created in the conflict between memory and forgetting.
Humans are interesting precisely because they are sick in ways other animals are not.
In this way, the meaning of the soul lies in the sense of indebtedness and guilt
elicited as responses to the problem of pain. This bad conscience is revealed to be the
meaning of the soul – an interiorization of both hostile forces from outside and also
desires redirected because of a stronger, commanding desire to avoid pain. The memory
of the pain creates a conscience predominantly concerned with avoiding that which
causes it pain, which, in turn, causes the internalization of desires, causing even more of
the pain that was to be avoided. The figure of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues
diagnoses this as well; but, whereas the prescription there is to purify the soul of these
vicissitudes of desire, Nietzsche diagnoses the soul as only these vicissitudes turned back
upon themselves. And Nietzsche labels this conscience as ‘bad’ precisely because it is a
conscience of inaction preoccupied with the past whose appropriative actions only
deepen this interpretation of infinite indebtedness. The bad conscience vows to never
forget its sufferings and to remember them precisely in order to keep them from
recurring. When they do recur, the bad conscience, being inactive, can only vent its
ressentiment on itself, through guilt. As it cannot prevent its suffering, any release from
suffering must be thought as emanating from an external source. We see here the
preparation for the genealogy of asceticism. Nietzsche writes, “In a certain sense, the
whole of asceticism belongs here: a few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, everpresent, unforgettable, ‘fixed,’ with the aim of hypnotizing the entire nervous and

intellectual system with these ‘fixed ideas….’”
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This kind of asceticism – that practiced

by the bad conscience – has as its goal the conscious ridding of pain from the conscience
that suffers from it through the mechanism of the ascription of guilt to some thing, which
turns out to be the conscience itself. Thus, the bad conscience is constructed in such a
way as to suffer from the past and from the constellation of forces that create it. As all
change causes it to suffer, only the unchanging can be thought to bring it relief or
salvation.
The result of Nietzsche’s genealogy of the bad conscience reveals not only the
forces that compose this phenomenon but also the ends that those forces tend toward.
The meaning ascribed to the bad conscience lies at the intersection of its composing
forces, which react against suffering, as well as its orientation towards future events. It is
not only the archaeological uncovering of its response to pain that is important to
Nietzsche’s analysis; of equal weight is the way in which the bad conscience’s future
actions are prescribed as a continual recrimination of itself and its past. The end towards
which the bad conscience claims to tend is, therefore, rendered impossible by its actual
tendency to react to every pain and to interiorize that reaction as guilt. The contrasting
phenomenon of the active conscience means something quite different for Nietzsche, as
both its composition and orientation are distinct from those of the bad conscience’s.
Archaeologically, the conscience is composed as a memory of a promise. This is a
reaction to pain as well; but, even at this origin, the memory is directed towards the
future. It tends here toward future action and becoming and not to further interiorization
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of pain or guilt, like the symbol of the “agony of the woman in labor” that Nietzsche
employs in Twilight of the Idols.425 Nietzsche writes:
In the doctrines of the [Dionysian] mysteries, pain is pronounced holy: the ‘woes
of a woman in labor’ sanctify pain in general, - all becoming and growth,
everything that guarantees the future involves pain… There has to be an eternal
‘agony of the woman in labor’ so that there can be an eternal joy of creation, so
that the will to life can eternally affirm itself. 426
The end of the conscience is active and meaningful only through the expression of the
forces that compose it towards the future. In this way the conscience can be affirmative
towards the pain that enables it because it makes and continually remakes a future as
being possible. For the bad conscience – the conscience of guilt – every future is a future
experienced as painful because its composing forces work toward conservation of the
past. The events of the conscience and those of the bad conscience are thus also
differentiated in Nietzsche’s work by their respective teleological impulses toward
becoming and toward conservation. The bad conscience seeks an eternal end in its
eventual ascetic incarnation’s devotion to fixed ideas. Its memory is devoted to a prior
state without suffering that is held as a fixed point and also on supposedly objective states
of reality that hold out redemption from suffering. In both cases, this memory serves to
deepen the inability to act on the part of the bad conscience.
This does not, however, entail that that bad conscience is a terminus from which
nothing can ever be extracted or appropriated. Nietzsche makes this clear, stating: “The
bad conscience is an illness, there is no doubt about that, but an illness as pregnancy is an
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Just as the Third Essay surprises its interpreters by insisting that life can only

deny itself in appearance, so too does the Second Essay turn our own metaphysical
presuppositions against us by claiming that even the bad conscience is worthy of
affirmation:
For fundamentally it is the same active force that is at work on a grander scale in
those artists of violence and organizers who build states, and that here, internally,
on a smaller and pettier scale, directed backward… creates for itself a bad
conscience…. [E]ventually this entire active “bad conscience” – you will have
guessed it – as the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to
light an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty
itself. – After all, what would be ‘beautiful’ if the contradiction had not first
become conscious of itself, if the ugly had not first said to itself: “I am ugly”?428

As the bad conscience forces more and more energy to be expended inwardly, it enables,
should it become active and not engage in further self-pity, a transformation of that bad
conscience into a conscience. When the pain of the bad conscience is taken as fuel for
creativity and not as fuel for self-recrimination, affirmation and expenditure again
become possible as the bad conscience actively reinterprets itself.

II. Nietzsche’s Self-Criticism of The Birth of Tragedy
The interpretive character of Nietzsche’s philosophy is further revealed in his
readings and commentaries on the import and value of his own texts. Although
Nietzsche has very little critical commentary on the texts composed after Zarathustra, his
new prefaces as well as his commentaries on earlier texts exemplify the dual approach
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that I have argued Nietzsche adopts toward interpretation. In these cases, Nietzsche reads
his earlier writings as addressing, even obliquely, the problems toward which his late
writings are directed: the critiques of culture, morality, philosophical idealism, and, in the
case of The Birth of Tragedy, the symbol of Dionysus. Archaeologically, Nietzsche
attempts to uncover the forces that lie beneath these texts and also to critique those
impulses present in the texts that run counter to his new goals. However, he also intends
to gesture towards those concepts and methods that he appropriates from his earlier work
and expands upon in his later texts. In this process of interpretive reading of his own
texts, Nietzsche demonstrates what he means for a reader or thinker to have “turned out
well”: “He instinctively gathers his totality from everything he sees, hears, experiences:
he is a principle of selection, he lets many things fall by the wayside. He is always in his
own company, whether dealing with books, people, or landscapes: he honors by
choosing, by permitting, by trusting.”429 The great health that Nietzsche sets as the goal
of interpretation is attempted in these repeated self-interpretations: “a health that one
doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually and must acquire because one gives it up
again and again, and must give it up!”430 Its techniques are the selection of the texts or
concepts that are relevant to his task, his weighing of their value for life, and his
construction of a “totality” that is aware of its contingency.
In the case of his readings of The Birth of Tragedy, the contrast between
Nietzsche’s perspectives is the most apparent. Because of the “Romanticism” that
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permeates the earlier book in Nietzsche’s estimation, his technique of interpretation is
allowed the most distance possible in which to operate.431 The distanciation is apparent
as Nietzsche states: “I shall not suppress entirely how unpleasant [the book] now seems
to me.”432 This unpleasantness stems from a variety of cited factors. Among these,
Nietzsche cites prominently that the book is “badly written,” that it smacks of enthusiasm
for its own positions, and that the “artiste’s metaphysics” that it expounds expresses a
deep resentment.433 In other words, Nietzsche diagnoses the work as expressing desires
of weakness and intending an aim of a final comfort from the suffering of a lack of
meaning. The author of Birth of Tragedy is, in Nietzsche’s own interpretation, like those
sufferers “who suffer from an impoverishment of life and seek quiet, stillness, calm seas,
redemption from themselves through art and insight, or else intoxication, paroxysm,
numbness, madness.”434 Romanticism and the impulse to it both arise on Nietzsche’s
estimation from a deep dissatisfaction with culture; but both hope and claim that relief
from that pain is to be found in a return to a fictional past. In the case of The Birth of
Tragedy, that past is one that offers a reconciled relationship between the impulse to art
and the impulse to knowledge. Essentially, Nietzsche is diagnosing the effects of
ressentiment operating through his text in its devotion to a messianic force that will return
the status of the arts, and thereby human existence, to a previously existing state of
431
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balance. Nietzsche, in Birth of Tragedy, is attempting to turn back the clock of artistic
and scientific expression – a sure symptom of ressentiment. These two illusions, of the
possibility of a final comfort (as calmness or madness) and the invention of a past state
where it has been actualized, are diagnosed as motivating Birth of Tragedy. Taken by
itself, the essay could be titled “The Re-birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music;” and
Nietzsche laments it has often been cited as such.435 This (mis)reading of the title and of
the book’s project emphasizes what underlies the book, but Nietzsche insists that “this is
why people failed to hear what was really valuable in the essay.” 436 It can easily be
thought that the younger Nietzsche who composed the book could be among those
offenders for thinking the return of the Dionysian in art is imminent. Thus, the
archaeology of the text and its concepts reveals them to be “politically indifferent,”
“offensively Hegelian and only a few formulas are tainted with the cadaverous fragrance
of Schopenhauer.”437 The distinction of the Dionysian and Apollonian instinct as
opposing and yet reconciling halves of the artistic impulse points, in the text of Birth of
Tragedy, to a future resolution between the two that re-expresses the harmony between
the two that Nietzsche reads in the Attic tragedies. This promised re-birth of the tragic
sensibility is, for the younger Nietzsche, a return to a healthier, tragic synthesis of the
human instincts to art and knowledge.
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However, these shortcomings of the book, along with its Romanticism, can be
placed as the results of one misstep on Nietzsche’s part. In a sweeping claim about the
manner in which it was written, Nietzsche attributes most of the problems of Birth of
Tragedy to his choice of a grammar and a vocabulary:
I now regret very much that I did not yet have the courage (or immodesty?) at the
time to permit myself a language of my very own for such personal views and acts
of daring, laboring instead to express strange and new evaluations in
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations, things which fundamentally ran
counter to both the spirit and taste of Kant and Schopenhauer.438
The vocabulary that Nietzsche employs in Birth of Tragedy is remarked upon as being
unsuitable for the type of work that was needed to express what was of value in the text.
The positive interpretation of Birth of Tragedy that Nietzsche is embarking on here
employs two features of the concept of health that Nietzsche has set as desirable: active
forgetting and the principle of selection. But to accomplish this, Nietzsche is remarking
that an appropriate form of mediation in language for his desired ends had to be invented
first. So long as he remained tied to the Kantian or Schopenhauerian vocabulary,
Nietzsche could not keep from expressing concepts that approximate theirs regarding art
and metaphysics. Precisely what has been diagnosed as troublesome in Birth of Tragedy
is the desire for art to be a metaphysical comfort – as Nietzsche alleges Schopenhauer to
be seeking – as well as a broadly Kantian impulse to see beauty in art as being the
expression of a hidden harmony in the observer. The Nietzsche of Birth of Tragedy seeks
in art the genesis of this harmony (and the comfort it provides) through the creation of
artworks that demonstrate the natural harmony in action. But it is the alternate forms of
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mediation that Nietzsche develops in his explicitly interpretive approach – before his
return to Birth of Tragedy in the Second Edition of the work as well as in Ecce Homo –
that allow him to reinterpret the work in terms of its importance to his later products.
Regarding Birth of Tragedy in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche first remarks, “You need to
forget about a couple of things if you are going to be fair to The Birth of Tragedy
(1872).”439 In order for the work to have a new present, in the terms of its interpretation,
it is necessary to actively displace the memory of what made the book remarkable on its
first appearance – its dedication to Wagner and the Romantic project that it represents to
Nietzsche. If the text of Birth of Tragedy is to find any sort of new determination of its
meaning, these past interpretations need to be suspended or bracketed so as to allow the
possibility of other meanings emerging. In other words, despite the use of a kind of
Wagnerianism that people “remind [Nietzsche]… is on [his] conscience,” Nietzsche’s
interpretation of that text cannot allow the development out of it of a bad conscience on
his part.440 The invocation of forgetting shows that Nietzsche’s conscience is not
inverted in its action by this past work. The existence of one type of interpretation of the
work, even if he licensed it as well at one point, does not eliminate other possible
readings of the text.
The expression of one of these other meanings is at stake in Nietzsche’s selection
of the concepts of value in Birth of Tragedy. In both the “Attempt at Self-Criticism” and
in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche elaborates the role of Birth of Tragedy in the invention of the
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symbol “Dionysus” and of the “understanding of Socratism: Socrates recognized for the
first time as the instrument of Greek disintegration, as a typical decadent.”441 Obscured
by the many problems of that text are the dual preoccupations of the later works of
Nietzsche – the problems of the affirmation of life as well as the various phenomena that
demonstrate the forces of life turned against itself – a “[d]isgregation of the instincts.”442
In these cases the instincts are degenerated sufficiently that the manners in which they
have been synthesized begin to crumble. This later evaluation of the type of Socrates as
decadent intends to capture more precisely what is at stake in adopting the strategy of
“Socratism” criticized in Birth of Tragedy. The issue is the feeling that only reason can
bring a relief from suffering and injustice; but this use of reason manifests itself as
another self-dissection, another case of forces turned against themselves. The diagnosis
of Socratism in Birth of Tragedy is the first step towards elaborating the concept of
decadence. As the concept of Socratism and its associated evaluation of truth is
diagnosed as a creation of a certain type of force as a reaction against specific problems it
encounters in life. This evaluation of truth manifests itself in the scientific impulse, as
this scientism is, for Nietzsche, one expression of the Socratic type. In short, Nietzsche
characterizes the book as the first that dared “to look at science through the prism of the
artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life.”443 Nietzsche’s appropriation of
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Birth of Tragedy focuses on the meaning of his initial question in that text, “What is
Dionysiac?” viewed through the language of forces that he has since adopted. He finds
that, although he contrasted the Dionysiac too strongly with the Apollonian instinct, the
logical extension of that question serves later to undermine much of the work of Birth of
Tragedy and provides the force for his criticisms of it. The “prism of life” has come to be
the central perspective in Nietzsche’s philosophy; and in his “self-criticism” he asserts
that it was this force that stood behind both his concern with the creativity of art as well
as the truthfulness of science. If both are viewed as symptoms of the kind of force that
creates and needs them (art and science), then Nietzsche has not substantially changed his
basic diagnosis of culture and science. However, the criticism reveals that, despite this
similarity, Nietzsche’s own text is implicated as yet another failed attempt at selfaffirmation. The text identifies the problem of affirmation in its invocation of Dionysus,
but the Nietzsche of Birth of Tragedy, does not recognize it as such, as he had not yet
conceptualized the regulative end that it serves in his later work. But this does not stop
the later Nietzsche from retroactively affirming the concepts created as elements in his
own becoming: “Everything is announced in advance in this essay….” 444 Nietzsche
means here that the symbolic ends that he will turn toward are present in nascent form in
Birth of Tragedy as is the basic critical thrust toward decadence and its associated
moralities. There is much to be forgotten or destroyed in Birth of Tragedy as far as the
later Nietzsche is concerned, but its central concepts and his appropriation of them point
the way to his interpretive criterion of health.
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Nietzsche regards “health” as a precondition for an affirmation of life, but the
affirmation that is the stated goal of Nietzsche’s thought must be regarded as a product of
a process that exists only in its becoming. Like the Aristotelian concept of “eudaimonia”
Nietzschean health exists as an activity and not as a finished product that, once complete,
needs no further actualization to continue. The reason for this is that the criterion of
health can only be demonstrated in action – specifically the action of interpretation:
Anyone whose soul thirsts to experience the whole range of previous values and
aspiration, to sail around this ‘inland sea’ of ideals, anyone who wants to know
from the adventures of his own experience how it feels to be the discoverer or
conqueror of an ideal, or to be an artist, a saint, a lawmaker, a sage, a scholar, a
pious man, an old-style divine loner – any such person needs one thing above all –
the great health, a health that one doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually,
and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it
up!...445
All of these types, as they have been set out in Nietzsche’s other texts, give a meaning to
their interpretations of reality from a perspective and expression of life. The squandering
here that Nietzsche associates with health is the ability to endow continually one’s
interpretations of the world with a meaning from the synthesis of one’s experience. If the
goal is to experience as many of these possibilities as one can, then that health will also
require the ability to disassociate from old interpretations and take up new ones. This is
not only the principle of expenditure in action, it also demonstrates that, even in sickness,
it is possible for the “strengths” of a philosopher to philosophize: “[F]or [this type,
philosophy] is only a beautiful luxury, in the best case the voluptuousness of a triumphant
gratitude that eventually have to inscribe itself in cosmic capital letters on the heaven of
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Nietzsche states that his facility in this has been developed as a result of his

illnesses. In giving himself reason here to display gratitude to even a questionable
occurrence such as being sick, Nietzsche attempts to demonstrate the freedom from
ressentiment that he claims is his good fortune. It also helps explain his claim that
“[g]ranting that I am a decadent, I am the opposite as well.”447 The value of the
fluctuations in Nietzsche’s health has been in their enabling of the discovery of multiple
perspectives from which to look at life: “I have a hand for switching perspectives: the
first reason why a ‘revaluation of values’ is even possible, perhaps for me alone.” 448 The
abrupt changes in Nietzsche’s own health have provided him with a distance from
everyday concepts. As Klossowski writes, “The observation of his own valetudinary
states led Nietzsche to live in a growing perplexity concerning what, in his own
experience, would be valuable or not – and always in terms of… health and
morbidity.”449 The actuality of having occupied different perspectives on health has
given Nietzsche the capacity for the perspectival revaluation of phenomena and concepts
based upon these new criteria. There is a direct link in the texts between the “giving up”
of one’s health and the distanciation involved in interpretive acts. To squander such
health and certainty implies the continual reapplication of interpretation in the
genealogical manner to settled concepts. Nietzsche’s correlation between health,
sickness, and distanciation is stated this way in Ecce Homo: “To be able to look out from
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the optic of sickness towards healthier concepts and values, and again the other way
around, to look down from the fullness and self-assurance of the rich life into the secret
work of the instinct of decadence – that was my longest training, my genuine experience,
if I became the master of anything, it was this.”450 The optics of sickness and health
supplement the optics of art and life that were examined previously in this chapter. The
Birth of Tragedy’s breakthrough was to see science and other inquiries into truth as
creative responses to problems motivated by specific types of forms of living.
Nietzsche’s expansion of this critique lies in the application of the evaluative criteria of
health and sickness to the expressions of life and art and not only to products of the
search for truth.
To condense the work of the Second Preface of Birth of Tragedy as well as Ecce
Homo’s reading of that volume to its methodological core, recall the work of Nietzsche’s
genealogy. In Nietzsche’s critiques, the genealogical method looks at the disguised
forces that form commonplace as well as philosophically considered concepts. The
moment of archaeology, I have argued, following Ricoeur, is formed out of a mistrust of
the products of consciousness. Even the act of seeing the contents of consciousness as
products of something other than consciousness itself is to have already introduced a
moment of suspicion to thought. The Nietzsche-author of Birth of Tragedy offers the
suspicion that Socratism, thought devoted to rationality, might be built on forces that it
could not acknowledge or would not acknowledge as rational. Nietzsche’s archaeology
reveals a conflict in the meaning of the artistic synthesis between differing types of
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instincts – the Dionysian and the Apollonian – beneath the surface of rational thought.
Only by repressing the former instinct could the rational demands of Socratism be
formulated as an extension of the latter, denying the Dionysian instinct that made it
possible in the first place. However, the Nietzsche-author of Ecce Homo and the
“Attempt at Self-Criticism” expresses further archaeological concerns about the
motivation of the Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche’s work subsequent to Birth of Tragedy
discovers that the forces of life can be redirected negatively back upon themselves,
however these are still expressions of life, albeit of a declining life. Granting its
conceptual contributions, Nietzsche criticizes the attempt at a re-birth of tragedy that the
book heralds as motivated by a similar disgust with life and its attending suffering.
Therefore, denials of life and its continual becoming need not be “Socratic.” The denial
can also make its appearance as the Romantic impulse to return to a state of nature that is
supposed to hold a brand of harmony that we lack. This second kind of resentment is
detected by Nietzsche in the motivation of the text of Birth of Tragedy in its nostalgic
evocation of Attic tragedy and its impending return through Wagner’s operas. For this
reason, the archaeology offered in Birth of Tragedy is incomplete and will lead to
unnecessary illusions caused by its failure to see the forces of resentment active in his
interpretations of art and Socratism.
However, beyond the archaeological critique, Nietzsche notes a teleological
failure in Birth of Tragedy and attempts to re-appropriate it through his interpretations of
it. Nietzsche’s reading of the introduction of the symbol of “Dionysus” states that the
problem raised by it in Birth of Tragedy remains unsolved as long as the question “what
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is Dionysiac?” is unanswered.

451

While Birth of Tragedy offers an answer to this

question, Nietzsche laments that he understood the end of the object of his praise, a new
German culture, too poorly to estimate its fitness with the symbol of “Dionysus.” 452
However, “Dionysus” also points Nietzsche to the problem of its affirmation. The
“Greek Problem” that he references here is exactly the issue of the formation of a
pessimism of strength or – said differently – an affirmation of life, “an art of
apotheosis.”453 In addition to developing a more critical eye into the formation of
concepts, Nietzsche has also developed a different conception of the goals of his
inquiries. This end, I have been arguing, is a concrete affirmation of life and the creation
of a type that is capable of it. The Birth of Tragedy could not affirm life as it understood
goals only in the realm of art and of culture and, then, as bound to a particular German
culture. Its Romanticism did not allow the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s demand in Ecce
Homo: “Nothing in existence should be excluded, nothing is dispensable…. To
understand this requires courage and, as its condition, a surplus of force….”454 In
viewing Socratism as dispensable, in advocating the return to the pre-Socratic synthesis
of tragedy, the Nietzsche-author of Birth of Tragedy is not yet able to affirm even the
base things. In lacking a vocabulary of concepts adequate to this end, Nietzsche does not
yet have the surplus of force necessary to lift his critique to this level. His development
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after Birth of Tragedy, with his illness and its “gift” of increased perspective, allows the
formulation of a concrete meaning that can begin to approximate the affirmation of the
symbol Dionysus: “I do not know any higher symbolism than this Greek symbolism of
the Dionysian. It gives religious expression to the most profound instinct of life, directed
towards the future of life, the eternity of life, - the pathway to life, procreation, as the
holy path….”455 This future of life, affirmation, is only discovered in the symbol of
Dionysus after the composition of Birth of Tragedy.

III. Concrete Meaning, Great Health, and Philosophical Anthropology: Ecce Homo
To begin to tie together these disparate strands of Nietzsche’s thinking, let us turn
fully to the text where Nietzsche – or so I will argue – constructs his subjectivity and
sketches an outline for a philosophical anthropology. This task is necessary for
Nietzsche’s philosophy, as we have seen, because the human being has no a priori
determinate meaning but only acquires a meaning through interpretation. Part of
Nietzsche’s advance in the project of philosophical anthropology is to insist on its
regional character and the impossibility of its acquisition of a universal character. By
this, I mean that Nietzsche sees the concretization of the meaning of a subject as the
outcome of a process of interpretation. There cannot be a determinate general theory of
the being of humans because direct intuition into that being is impossible. With the
possibility of a direct and general intuition or deduction of human nature ruled out, its
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being can only be explicated through the process of interpreting itself. However, this
self-interpretation for Nietzsche ends up constructing the meaning of the “object” of its
interpretation. The construction of the subject ‘Nietzsche’ in Ecce Homo is Nietzsche’s
response to the demand as he feels it to “say who I am.”456 It is fair, I think, to read this
as a plausible attempt to articulate content adequate to the apodictic judgment of the
Cogito. In this way Nietzsche can also be read as ensuring that he does not fall under the
rebuke he levels in Genealogy of Morals that “[w]e are unknown to ourselves, we men of
knowledge – and with good reason.”457 If Nietzsche is to become known as a subject, or
philosopher, as the precondition of his work, it is in spite of his usual dominant instincts;
but if we see a philosopher’s concepts, as Nietzsche does, as the expression of the type of
the philosopher, then the only way to ascertain the preconditions for the attainment of
Nietzsche’s concepts and goals is to know the type from which they have sprung. In this
way, Nietzsche is attempting to account for the phylogenesis of the type ‘Nietzsche’
through the interpretation of ‘Nietzsche’ on the basis of the forces that compose him. In
order to demonstrate the grounds adequate for an affirmative appropriation of life,
Nietzsche is constructing his own subjectivity and giving it meaning according to both
poles of the interpretive strategy that I have laid out. As Ernst Behler writes,
“Nietzsche’s practice of ‘active interpretation’ appears to consist in [the] reciprocal
interaction of different types of interpretation, the deliberate exchange of
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This concrete meaning of ‘Nietzsche,’ the Nietzsche composed from an

interpretation that gathers the vicissitudes of desire and the appropriation of those forces,
vindicates the methodology of genealogy in its capacity to produce an affirmative (or
positive) end. The status of Ecce Homo, is, according to Sarah Kofman, “as a test book
which is to put spirits to the test, to gauge whether or not they will be capable of bearing
the radical inversion of values, whether or not they will be strong enough to tolerate and
thus understand the boldness of the immoralist, this hitherto unheard-of type which
Nietzsche the artist invented as his own.”459
This end, I will argue, grants us both a look at the concretized meaning of the
subject ‘Nietzsche’ but also fulfills Ricoeur’s requirement for a kind of philosophical
anthropology. In effect, Ecce Homo is an accounting of the proximate forces that are
synthesized in the production of the subjectivity of Nietzsche – a subjectivity that is
importantly marked by Nietzsche as “healthy.” The text is simultaneously the description
of the mediation that the subject is as well as the active productive mediation of the
subject ‘Nietzsche’ itself. Nietzsche’s writing is the “test” to which he has put himself
and the accounting of the manner in which he has tempered his character. However,
since the activity of mediation (like interpretation) is never finished, this philosophical
anthropology reveals a subject that is not unified in its meaning but is always
“simultaneously decadent and beginning.”460
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Nietzsche begins Ecce Homo with the articulation of the “duty” he feels “to say:
Listen to me! I am the one who I am! Above all, do not mistake me for anyone else!”461
At first glance, this is a strange sort of statement for Nietzsche to make – and one that he
remarks with which “the pride of [his] instincts rebel.” 462 Given that one of the hallmarks
of decadence is the self-mutilation of the instincts, how is it possible that Nietzsche here
avoids self-incrimination is responding to this duty? However, if we remember
Nietzsche’s many remarks about the necessity of masks to the becoming of the
philosopher, then it is not only possible but probable that we will have misunderstood
Nietzsche: “the philosophic spirit always had to use as a mask and cocoon the previously
established types of the contemplative man – priest, sorcerer, soothsayer, and in any case
a religious type – in order to be able to exist at all….”463 This is not to say that Ecce
Homo will reveal the real or authentic ‘Nietzsche’ behind these masks; instead Ecce
Homo will only heighten the differences between Nietzsche, his contemporaries, and the
works of other philosophers. The ‘who’ that is Nietzsche is articulated here according to
the duty to make the conditions under which Nietzsche’s texts were composed visible.
Ecce Homo is, accordingly, a genealogy of the concepts and symbols signed with the
name ‘Nietzsche.’ Consequently, what it offers is not the key that will allow Nietzsche’s
interpretation to be metaphorically unlocked but, instead, further interpretations of
Nietzsche’s works and, therefore, also a meta-hermeneutic commentary on the conditions
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for interpretation in general. These conditions set out what, for Nietzsche, are the
conditions for the possibility of any future creation of meaning. The “health” that
Nietzsche insists he embodies in his philosophical anthropology signifies the condition
for new interpretations. But the concrete philosophical anthropology that Ecce Homo
offers is that of a human nature that has no unity except through interpretation; and, even
then, it is debatable whether this unity that is produced is a sign of health or of decline.
The various concepts of “human nature,” far from being bulwarks against the possibility
of shifting meaning, are themselves products of various forces which have made them
possible. “Human nature” is no more fixed in its meaning than any other object of
interpretation. In telling the reader who he is, Nietzsche articulates a theory of human
nature that is not unlike the nature of a Ricoeurian symbol: multiple, open to
interpretation, and often over-determined in its meaning. “Saying who he is means
showing how he has become who he is,” Kofman writes regarding Nietzsche’s
subjectivity. The self that Nietzsche constructs in Ecce Homo as the condition for his
works is, to echo Ricoeur’s formulation, a mediation or mediating construction. To grasp
its quality for affirmation, it becomes necessary to see how “Nietzsche” has been
synthesized.
The development of the conceptualization of the subject will be forced to square
with Nietzsche’s insistence that “I am one thing, my writings are another.”464 This points
us to the problem of the location of the coincidence between the forces of instinct and the
expressed meaning of a text. The author, Nietzsche, is signaling that the meaning of his
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texts is not to be found through an excavation of his conscious intentions toward the text.
Similar admonitions can be found in other of Nietzsche’s texts, which raises the dual
questions of: how are we to make sense of Nietzsche’s writings (what do these writings
reference?)?; and what are we to make of the figure ‘Nietzsche’ who is presenting
himself in Ecce Homo? The latter question, Nietzsche himself attempts to answer, saying
of the artist “that one does best to separate an artist from his work, not taking him as
seriously as his work. He is, after all, only the precondition of his work, the womb, the
soil, sometimes the dung and manure, out of which, it grows – and therefore in most
cases something one must forget if one is to enjoy the work itself.”465 The function that
the author of a text has is the condition of the composition of the work. The text emerges
as an expression of the vicissitudes of the author; but in describing the production of the
phenomenon of the text, Nietzsche is in no way claiming to determine entirely the
meaning of that text, which appears epiphenomenally. In other words, the text of
Nietzsche, in this case Ecce Homo, has no meaning without the activity of interpretation
upon it. Previously determined interpretations can serve to guide another interpretation,
but there is no given text that is recoverable before the advent of interpretation. As
Nietzsche has grounds to treat consciousness as another kind of text, this same general
principle regarding interpretation will apply to it as well. “Consciousness,” Klossowski
writes, “is nothing other than a deciphering of the messages transmitted by the
impulses.”466 Subjectivity is constructed much the same way as a text is; and its meaning
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is determined as part of the same process of interpretation by which any meaning is made
adequate to its “object.” Thus far, we have been treating the objects of interpretation
largely as symbols; but Nietzsche’s genealogies in general are less directed toward texts
and more implicated with events as pieces of lived experience. This subtle difference
will help us spell out the further implications of Nietzsche being one thing and his
writings another.
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche does not claim to be communicating either his
consciousness or a neutral subject’s consciousness to the reader directly. Although the
text is reflexive in its tone, it is not a story of an interior of a consciousness in the manner
of Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology or Descartes’s Meditations, for example. Nietzsche
asks a rhetorical question of his technique of appropriation and then remarks on its
necessarily mediated nature: “How could I not be grateful to my whole life? And so I
will tell myself the story of my life.”467 In other words, the task of the appropriation of
an affirmative mode of existence must pass through the mediation of language if it is to
be communicated. The goal of Ecce Homo is this concrete appropriation of an
affirmative life, but it can only be accomplished through the “telling” of Nietzsche’s life
to himself and to his readers. This appropriation of the subject Nietzsche, more than
those in any of Nietzsche’s other texts, has the resources to demonstrate the concrete
appropriation of the forces beyond the critical thrust of the genealogical method.
Nietzsche touches on this elsewhere, most notably in Zarathustra and Genealogy of
Morals, but neither of these texts approaches the philosophical question of the future with
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the same clarity. Zarathustra ends with the title character able to overcome pity only
through his withdrawal from even the “higher men.” Nietzsche notes in the text of the
Genealogy of Morals that each essay achieves “an ending with absolutely terrible
detonations, a new truth visible between thick clouds.”468 But the visibility of the
counter-ideal is not yet the enunciation or concretization of affirmation or health.
Although the Genealogy of Morals articulates the contingency of the ascetic ideal as a
form of life, it does not articulate other ways that one could live, only different previous
meanings to asceticism. In this way, Ricoeur’s charge concerning Nietzsche and
affirmation, that “Nietzsche’s major work remains caught up in the attitude of
resentment; the rebel is not, and cannot be, at the same level as the prophet. Nietzsche’s
major work remains an accusation of accusation and hence falls short of a pure
affirmation of life,” might be correct but only as applied to works like the Genealogy. 469
But there are two concerns here that can be answered if we consider the text of Ecce
Homo. The first is the question of how a not-yet-realized future ideal can be articulated
meaningfully before the actualization. The provisional answer to this – it cannot – is the
reason for Nietzsche’s reluctance to provide it in the Genealogy. The second concern
however is whether or not a future is at all possible. Nietzsche addresses the latter
explicitly in Ecce Homo, and his articulation of it allows him to concretize something like
a philosophical anthropology, albeit in a manner consistent with his conception of
determinacy of meaning and not Ricoeur’s.
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Nietzsche notes in Ecce Homo that the sense of his life in not fully determined.
He does this by referring to the futurity of the definition of who he is: “The happiness of
my existence, perhaps its uniqueness, lies in its fatefulness; to give it the form of a riddle:
as my father I am already dead and as my mother I am still alive and growing old.” 470 In
this case, his own case, who Nietzsche is is as yet not fully determined. If we determine
who he is on the basis of the texts he has written, we miss the aspect in which he is like
his mother – still alive, or textually, still capable of becoming something different.
Nietzsche refers to this eventuality by saying “The time has not come for me either.
Some people are born posthumously.”471 The account that Nietzsche is giving of himself
is knowingly incomplete as he is attempting to depict the likelihood of his becoming
different or, with respect to his works, our changing interpretations of them: “I am one
thing, my writings are another.”472 We can never get, and Nietzsche can never give, a
full philosophical anthropology of himself or any other human because of the method that
must be followed in order to determine meaning. The meaning of ‘Nietzsche’ is multiple
at its origin – his “double birth” that is both active and reactive. In the way that the
meaning of ‘Nietzsche’ is both partially determined by the signs and masks he inhabits
but also is directed away from them and toward the future. This is the route he must take
away from “vengeance” and ressentiment towards affirmation.473
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The ways in which Nietzsche is “dead” and a “decadent” reflect the manner in
which – archaeologically – meaning is determined by the signs that are available for use
by the forces that compose it. These signs are those that we have seen critiqued in his
“Attempt at Self-Criticism” before the reprint of Birth of Tragedy. Insofar as no one can
completely break from the use of commonplace signs, to that extent they are forced to
utilize the types of masks described in the Third Essay of Genealogy of Morals in order
to be understood. It its application to a philosophical anthropology, this outcome
dramatizes that human being must be expressed and find its meaning beginning with the
signs and symbols that are already available to it. But, as Nietzsche notes, he is also a
“beginning.” By this he means that every interpretation, even of those decadent signs, is
a new interpretation that could be carried out as an active task. For Nietzsche, the sign of
a successful appropriation is its ability to affirm itself, its health.

CONCLUSION
NIETZSCHE AND A PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE
Nietzsche subtitles Beyond Good and Evil a “Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future.” As the first full book composed by Nietzsche after Zarathustra, Beyond Good
and Evil appears, according to Nietzsche, as a “critique of modernity, including modern
science, modern art – even modern politics -, along with indications of an opposite type
who is as un-modern as possible, a noble, affirming type.”474 The critique of modernity
here takes center stage, but it would be a hasty reading that did not also connect to this
the statement that Beyond Good and Evil is primarily a prelude to another task – a
philosophy of the future. As Nietzsche indicates, this other and more obscure task of
assembling an affirmative type capable of affirming the future begins to appear here as
well. Just as a musical prelude contains prefigurations of themes that will be repeated
and expanded upon in a full score, so too does Beyond Good and Evil introduce the
concern of Nietzsche’s mature works on the whole. Although the strongest appearance
here is of the critical apparatus that Nietzsche has developed, the structure of Beyond
Good and Evil and Nietzsche’s own interpretation of it also consider the possibility of
this other type – the noble. It is this noble, or strong, or healthy, type which, I have
argued, functions as the goal for Nietzsche’s hermeneutic genealogical method. The act
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of the appropriation of sense through interpretation is strongly allied with Nietzsche’s
goal of affirmation, which I have argued in Chapters Three and Four that he achieves. It
is the “noble” or affirmative type that is able to affirm becoming instead of being and,
thus, will possess an ability to speak for itself, to signify for itself in the future.475 In
order to affirm the possibility of a future in philosophical terms, Nietzsche thinks it is
necessary to take up the active tasks of interpretation and evaluation. Along with the
“noble,” Nietzsche’s remarks about “culture” and a “great politics” must be read in this
light, as they are intended as other products of an affirmative interpretation and
evaluation of becoming.476
Nietzsche conceives of philosophy as interpretive and evaluative, which is itself
an act of criticism towards the philosophical tradition. As Ricoeur states, “[I]n Nietzsche,
life itself is interpretation: in this way, philosophy itself becomes the interpretation of
interpretations.”477 The traditional philosophical task of the pure exegesis through
description of “truth” and “the good” meets with considerable difficulty when
consciousness, which can justify its existence to itself, cannot justify the unity of
meaning in the same manner. If description as an enterprise discovers that the ground of
its own descriptions is problematic, then it can no longer assume that the thesis of the
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univocity of meaning that it has relied on is certain. In this case, the assumed unity of
“truth” and “the good” itself must be questioned. But, Nietzsche does not practice
interpretation and evaluation solely as reductive enterprises, to show the groundlessness
of traditional philosophical and moral concepts, as those who assert that his philosophy is
incapable of appropriation often state. As the moment of Nietzsche’s self-interpretation
of Beyond Good and Evil in Ecce Homo shows, his critique of modernity not only
exposes the conditions for the possibility of that modernity (including a belief in the
univocity of meaning) but can also express the possibilities that may yet be actualized
from the synthesized forces whose effects appear as modern science, modern art, and
modern philosophy. Each essay of the Genealogy of Morals presents a similar diagnosis
of those forces in ressentiment, bad conscience, or asceticism that could yet become
active and be capable of affirming life, as was shown in Chapter Four. The appropriative
aspect of genealogy includes the necessity of affirming this plurality of possible
meanings and indicates that the loss of univocity gives philosophy an orientation towards
future constructions of meaning. Prior (and subsequent) attempts to interpret existence as
univocal are, for Nietzsche, efforts “to strip [existence] of its ambiguous character.”478
As a way of concluding this study, I would like to revisit several themes here that
have earlier been mentioned but from this outlook towards a philosophy of the future. If
Nietzsche is correct in his formula that all philosophical concepts are interpretations of
the drives, then this leads us to a different understanding of how philosophy can proceed
in its future attempts to determine meaning and any prospects for a philosophical
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anthropology. Nietzsche’s method, I have argued, is a hermeneutic genealogy – a
procedure which treats the conscious expressions of concepts as effects of pre-conscious
forces, which Nietzsche has called the wills-to-power: “[M]ost of a philosopher’s
conscious thought is secretly directed and forced into determinate channels by the
instincts.”479 As Ricoeur has clearly shown, these instinctual forces cannot be known
directly in consciousness but only through a process of mediation that brings them to
consciousness. Without the presumption of their immediate appearance in consciousness,
these forces are destined to appear only through competing interpretations and the
varying methods of mediating between the multiple meanings that these concepts have
been able to bear. But whereas Ricoeur characterizes the “symbol” as the unit that
reveals this conflict between varying interpretations because of its excessive meaning,
Nietzsche effectively considers any concept to be capable of the same surplus of
meaning. This entails that genealogy is a method of mediating between the various
interpretive and evaluative claimants to a concept’s meaning. Genealogy accomplishes
this primarily through its progressive attempt to demystify the sources from which these
interpretations and evaluations spring. This is the first sense of the way in which
Nietzsche’s philosophy is a critique of meaning and value. What makes possible any
given meaning or morality is a synthesis of the instinctual forces that are in conflict with
one another and capable of being synthesized in a different way, that is, with a different
dominating will directing the synthesis. The plurivocity of meaning that makes Ricoeur’s
“symbol” possible is what makes genealogy possible as well.
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This sense of genealogy is identifiable as the moment of archaeology in
Nietzsche’s method, following Ricoeur’s terminology. To the suspicious eye, every
event of meaning can be seen as concealing as much as it reveals; every meaning is an
apparent univocal meaning that is selected and synthesized from a web of plurivocal
possibilities. Therefore Nietzsche feels justified in treating all meanings as sites where
interpretation is selecting a particular meaning and disavowing others. In this way,
Nietzsche is able to proceed, for example, from the analysis of our everyday sense of
“good” and “evil” to the conclusion that an affect of ressentiment rumbles underneath it
and is expressed in it.480 The genealogical unpacking of the senses of “good” and “evil”
reveals an intentional structure of meaning that is explicitly denied in those concepts’
everyday usage – that those evaluations contain a kernel of hostility toward others and do
not emanate from strictly benevolent impulses. Additionally, genealogy shows that this
intentional structure is not of a simple or immediate kind. For the work of suspicion, the
process of deciphering a concept’s meaning begins from a complex nexus of multiple
interpretations and proceeds to the conditions under which these interpretations are
expressed and the value these interpretations have. Problems arise, however, when we
treat these interpretations as bearing a simple or univocal meaning themselves.
Nietzsche’s archaeological work may reveal a matrix of unconscious or instinctual forces
to be involved in the production of meaning, but that does not entail that this is a fully
determinate arche for meaning. This sort of reading of Nietzsche’s texts condemns his
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hermeneutics to the status of a mere exercise in criticism and, more importantly, fails to
appreciate the full extent of the critique of univocal meaning that genealogy engenders.
In other words, when commentators treat the will-to-power as a simple concept
with a determinable, univocal meaning, it is quickly assimilated into a reading that
attempts to characterize it as a determinable archaeological origin for future interpretive
activity. In these systems, the will-to-power becomes a kind of determinate univocal
concept that shows only what other attempts at univocity have missed. This kind of fixity
in the origin of interpretation brings about the same logical effect in the types of
“interpretations” possible as would a fixed eschatological destination, which Nietzsche
clearly criticizes on a number of occasions. Both would put an end to hermeneutic
interpretation, as all elaborations of a concept would be dictated by the fixed starting or
end point, which renders interpretation into description. Determination would be
immediately identified not only as possible but as already actual, either in the origin or
the fixed end. This appearance of interpretation, then, does not work its critique as
extensively as Ricoeur or Nietzsche would desire from interpretation, as it merely
replaces interpretation with a process of deciphering meaning according to a pre-existing
analogy. 481 In this case, an already determined interpretation cannot be immanently
critical, cannot find its possibilities within itself, but must refer to an exterior,
transcendent point at the beginning or the end, with which to justify its conclusions.
Every instance of an indeterminate meaning could simply be regarded as a case of the
concept’s not yet being fully articulated in the meaning that it lacks. From this
481
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standpoint, it is then relatively simple to generate paradoxes regarding how Nietzsche’s
philosophy supposedly critiques a concept of “truth” and then merely proposes a different
justification for it. The attempts to overly naturalize Nietzsche’s “theory of truth,” which
were discussed in Chapter Three, raise even more questions as to how we should read, for
example, Nietzsche’s criticism of science as being just another form of the ascetic ideal.
Insofar as both science and the ascetic ideal treat “truth” as a non-problematic concept,
for Nietzsche, to that extent do they assume that “truth” is univocal in its meaning. This
assumption of the univocity of any concept is the primary target of Nietzsche’s
introduction of the method of genealogy. To interpret genealogy and the will-to-power as
a strictly determinable, univocal arche of meaning is to misinterpret the bulk of the
remainder of Nietzsche’s texts. In treating Nietzsche’s archaeological moment as a piece
of the genealogical method, I mean to avoid the problems associated with a
characterization of Nietzsche’s philosophy as strictly reductive. However, to fulfill the
Ricoeurian insistence on a concretized interpretive method, that moment must be
supplemented with what I have called Nietzsche’s teleological moment.
Like Freud, Nietzsche tends to utilize his archaeology along two lines, one
economic and one topographic. The wills-to-power function along an economic model
where their relationships of dominating and being-dominated serve to determine the
character of the synthetic meanings that are produced. They exist, as Ricoeur says of
Freud’s theory of instincts, as a diagnosed reality and not as an absolute reality. 482
Likewise, Nietzsche’s “types” of the bad conscience, priest, noble, etc., are topographic
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interpreted realities that come to exist through the genealogical method.
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Nietzsche, as

a physician of culture, diagnoses and synthesizes into meaningfulness the series of
concepts that appear to him through his analyses of our cultural symptoms. Ricoeur’s
general criticism of Nietzsche’s archaeological method is that it fails to adequately
account for its own meaning by not making explicit the teleological trajectory needed for
a concretizing of sense. In other words, the archaeologist may interpret a domain for the
critique of consciousness but often fails to be able to justify its methods itself from the
standpoint of consciousness. Ricoeur’s example here is Freud’s “implicit and
unthematized teleology” which is involved in the ego’s becoming-conscious of its nonmastery over itself. 484 Ricoeur maintains that the entire methodology of psychoanalysis
cannot be generated unless there is a teleology of consciousness already at work in
Freud’s thinking that serves as a contrast to the analytic.485 The ego appears as the
topographical feature that will come into existence from the vicissitudes of the
unconscious instincts. Freud’s failure to account for this in the same interpretive manner
in which he accounts for the instincts leads psychoanalysis into two problems. The first
is that Freud’s insistence on the natural, archaeological origin of religion causes him to
posit a mythologized primal scene that goes beyond anything analysis can justify
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according to its own methods. The second is that Freud’s work remains non-concretized
from his failure to appreciate his own resources, in the mechanism of sublimation, for a
appropriative course for psychoanalytic interpretation. The charge Ricoeur makes
against Nietzsche appears similarly. Ricoeur states, regarding Nietzsche’s methods:
“What Nietzsche wants is the increase of man’s power, the restoration of his force; but
the meaning of the will to power must be recaptured by meditating on the ciphers
‘superman,’ ‘eternal return,’ and ‘Dionysus,’ without which the power in question would
be but worldly violence.”486 Although it is not explicitly remarked upon in Ricoeur’s
text, this horizon of “restored power” would have to appear for Ricoeur as the
unthematized teleological element of Nietzsche’s philosophy. It would be this sense of
power that would be recovered, on Ricoeur’s reading, but there is no indication given of
how this power would act differently given its new knowledge of its conditions. Thus, he
can say that Nietzsche remains mired in the accusation of metaphysics and morality that
he seeks to critique because this archaeological movement cannot discover the
teleological trajectory that would build meaning, instead seeing only idols that must be
destroyed. Nietzsche’s work, for Ricoeur, remains unable to contemplate a concretized
sense of consciousness or fulfill the task of a philosophical anthropology because it
cannot treat “symbols,” with their multiple interpretive possibilities, as anything more
than idols.487
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As I argued in Chapter Two and Three, although Freud and Nietzsche share
much in common, this ascription to Nietzsche of an un- or under-developed teleology is
not well-founded in the texts. Two issues are of note here, the first being that Nietzsche’s
critique of consciousness goes further than Freud’s in doubting the necessity of that
consciousness. Ricoeur is right to see in Freud an unthematized teleological directedness
in the diagnosis of the unconscious: “It is of this quasi-Hegelian operation that Freud
speaks in the celebrated saying: Wo es war, soll ich werden – ‘Where id was, there ego
shall be.’”488 But this, under a Nietzschean critique, would be no more than the setting
up of not a teleological but of an eschatological end toward which the id must tend. The
possible meaning of the id or the unconscious desires is already tied to a determinate end
– the end of the ego. Therefore, in the case of psychoanalysis, interpretation of the
unconscious forces is not bound to a symbol with a double meaning but to a moral ego
that is merely yet to be reclaimed from the din of the instincts. This assumed, fixed
moral point that Freud assures us the healthy ego must develop acts as an external judge
by which a kind of diagnostic law can be handed down to interpretation.
Nietzsche’s critique of final ends acts in this case as a criticism of Freud’s
methodology; and it should be considered that it acts as a critique of Ricoeur’s method on
this point as well. The Freudian teleology that Ricoeur develops in the last sections of
Freud and Philosophy is based on Freud’s “recovery” of the ego through sublimation.
Ultimately, the deciphering of consciousness by Freud only leads to a less ill, more

488

Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 241, citing Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis and Other Works, Vol. XXII of Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, ed.
and trans. James Strachey (London, 1964), 80.

224
realistic reconstruction of the ego that now is totalized into meaning by the
psychoanalytic perspective. Consciousness and its possible meanings, in this case, can
never become anything other than what the psychoanalytic framework have set out for
them to be – either as healthy or as sick. Thus, there is no future possible for
consciousness or for its meaning outside of psychoanalysis once psychoanalysis is done
with it. Similarly for the Ricoeurian pairing of suspicion and recovery, what is to be
recovered is a full and determinate immediacy with meaning, or a fully mediated, and
therefore still determinate meaning.489 As we saw with Nietzsche’s conception of the
will-to-power, even this hope for full mediation must be set aside for the critical project if
the criterion of immanence is to be met.
If there is to be a philosophy of the future, for Nietzsche, it is to be one based on
the interpretation of our origins, which cannot be fully explicated, for the purpose of
building and creating new meanings. But merely showing the origins of our conscious
meanings is insufficient for the purposes of creating new meanings, just as Ricoeur
maintains. What is often neglected is Nietzsche’s insistence on the goal of
reinterpretation through critical genealogical analysis of concepts. Nietzsche writes:
What kind of fool would believe that it is enough to point to this [arbitrary] origin
and this misty shroud of delusion in order to destroy the world that counts as
‘real’, so-called ‘reality’! Only as creators can we destroy! – But let us also not
forget that in the long run it is enough to create new names and valuations and
appearances of truth in order to create new ‘things’.490
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In this highly suggestive text, Nietzsche lays out his sense of the teleology for which I
have been arguing. The ability of philosophy to affirm the future, to affirm interpretation
and evaluation themselves, hinges on its ability to synthesize new meanings from what
has counted as ‘reality.’ In order to displace any of the unhealthy meanings which have
dominated consciousness and culture (or ‘reality’), simple diagnosis is insufficient. A
new meaning capable of assembling a new arrangement of those existing forces is
necessary. In other words, this Nietzschean teleology cannot be imposed on a synthesis
of meaning from outside that synthesis but is brought to it internally by whichever will or
force happens to dominate in the synthesis. Meaning is never produced or destroyed
from an external critical action – meaning, too, is perspectival. Likewise, it cannot seek a
new meaning by introducing never-before-synthesized forces or meanings into these new
productions, as he has argued that there are only interpretations, meaning that there
always already only other synthesized meanings with which to work.
For these reasons, new creation of meaning can only occur alongside the
dissolution of other meanings; and, more importantly, the critical destruction of meanings
which are no longer viable must be accompanied by an appropriation of a new
construction of meaning. To do otherwise, Nietzsche suggests, is not creation but merely
the recovery of our old metaphysical and moral instincts from their idolized/idealized
existence. The most remote level of this prejudice, Nietzsche argues, is our reliance on
the idol of “truth.” For interpretation and evaluation to be possible, its effects must be
critiqued wherever they are found. This is perhaps the most dominant sense of
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the ‘death of God.’ He writes: “God is dead; but given the
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way people are, there may still for millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. –
And we – we must still defeat his shadow as well!”491 To accomplish this goal,
Nietzsche relies both on the archaeological excavation of the illusion of univocal
meaning as well as the teleological appropriation of this critique towards the affirmation
of the creative use of interpretation and evaluation.
However, “given the way people are,” how is this possible? I have tried to show
in Chapter Four that the possibility of realizing Nietzsche’s goal of affirmation can only
come about if Nietzsche is able to re-interpret humanity itself. As Nietzsche says in The
Anti-Christ: “The problem I am posing is not what should replace humanity in the order
of being ( - the human is an endpoint - ): but instead what type of human being should be
bred, should be willed as having greater value, as being more deserving of life, as being
more certain of a future.”492 Nietzsche ties the fate of humanity to its ability to create
meanings which are capable of affirming life. The goal of Ecce Homo is just that, an
interpretation and evaluation of the forces that make it possible to say “Behold, the man”
(the decadent Nietzsche) as well as the excesses of that concept that allow for reinterpretation and re-evaluation of its composing forces (the “beginning” Nietzsche).
Whereas man suffers from a lack, Nietzsche has “only ever suffered from multitudes.” 493
In this manner, Nietzsche is attempting to demonstrate that what he refers to as
“Dionysus” is still a possible actualization of human meaning: “it is explicable only as an
491
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excess of energy.”

494

Nietzsche’s strange philosophical anthropology in Ecce Homo is

designed to show not the meaning of the human being but the things that a human being
has meant and can mean. An identification of any excess remaining in the concept
‘human being’ or ‘man’ will indicate that new meanings for it are still possible; and,
therefore, that this gives it a justification for the having of a future. For this reason,
Nietzsche attempts to make clear as many of the compositional elements of ‘Nietzsche’
that he can discover, in order to interpret and affirm them all – questions of location,
climate, course of study, nutrition, etc. – insofar as they have produced him. 495 The
anthropology of ‘Nietzsche’ exhibits already the excess of meaning that cannot be
totalized in the simple designation of ‘man’ or ‘human being’: “One day my name will
be connected with the memory of something tremendous, – a crisis such as the earth has
never seen, the deepest collision of conscience, a decision made against everything that
has been believed, demanded, held sacred so far. I am not a human being, I am
dynamite.”496 The method of genealogy, applied to the man Nietzsche, shows us that the
name ‘Nietzsche’ is not irreducibly tied to the man ‘Nietzsche’ but, instead, is associated
with an event of meaning. ‘Nietzsche’ is, like all of genealogy’s other analysands,
plurivocal and capable of exploding into as many meanings as there are instincts that can
become dominant over it. In this way, Nietzsche becomes a subject for us through his
interpretation of his own texts while demonstrating the meaning that is able to be created
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from his own works as well as others’. This particular event of meaning, the meaning of
the human being, as of yet, bears no dominant meaning on its own because no one, until
Ecce Homo, had been able to interpret it actively and evaluate it affirmatively. It is in
this manner that genealogy, as a hermeneutic method, is able to give the philosopher
Nietzsche the right to a future. This future is indefinite, thanks to his conception of
teleology but infinitely determinable through the entire genealogical operation.
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